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 “Words will never be able to explain the love and hope that I now carry home with me because 
of the Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy at Columbia. I feel so blessed 
to leave with a wealth of knowledge, valuable experiences, and an international family.” 
 
“What formed over the course of the program went beyond the academic discourse of 
Indigenous ‘issues’ to the construction of a therapeutic landscape—a shared Indigenized space 
grounded in personal experience and collective compassion. Indigenous epistemologies, 
histories, and solutions were elevated to a priority position, and the sharing of participant 
experiences provided support, nourishment, and a degree of healing of the raw scars of 
colonization. … Telling our stories with the view to healing our hearts is at the core of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Movement. Such spaces have an important role to play in strengthening 
Indigenous resilience, promoting Indigenous healing, and Indigenizing education.” 
 
“We should keep this flame burning.” 
 
 [Words of alumni of the international Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
and Policy at Columbia University] 
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First and foremost, the editors, the Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race and 
the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Program of the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at 
Columbia University would like to thank the authors of this book, alumni of the 
international Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy (ISSP) at 
Columbia University, for attending to this book with such care and dedication.  
 
 We are grateful to Anthony McKnight for offering his inspiring artwork, “The 
Lyrebird within Me,” for the cover of the book and for his written contribution in 
explanation of the artwork. 
   
Shayna Halliwell was our superb copy editor, alumna of the Institute for the Study 
of Human Rights at Columbia, committed as much to the substance as to the elegance of 
the texts.  
 
We appreciate the colleagues of the Institute for the Study of Human Rights, 
Andrew Rizzardi and Elyse Greenblatt, who have helped us navigate the artistic, technical 
and logistical paths that made this publication possible.  
 
Since this publication is a celebration of five years of the international Summer 
Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy, we would like to thank all those inside 
and outside Columbia that contributed tirelessly to the realization of such a learning space 
of human rights solidarity: Frances Negron-Muntaner, Teresa Aguayo, Josephine Caputo, 
Stuart Rockefeller, Audra Simpson and Nefert Tadiar  of CSER/Columbia University; the 
instructors Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Myrna Cunningham,  Mattias Åhrén, Kevin Tarrant, 
Tone Bleie, Karla General, John Henriksen, Raja Devasish Roy and the late Tonia 
Gonnella Frichner; colleagues at the United Nations that offered briefings includ ing 
Chandra Roy-Henriksen, Arturo Requesens, Mirian Masaquiza, Rama Rao, Beatrice 
Duncan, Nicola Brandt and Mitra Motlach; Ambassadors who held dialogues with ISSP 
participants including Carsten Stauer (Denmark), Yanerit Morgan (Mexico), Ib Petersen 
(Denmark), Ruben Ignacio Zamora (El Salvador); the Mohawk officials and community in 
Akwesasne, who offered extraordinary insights and hospitality to the ISSP internationa l 
groups: the St. Regis Mohawk Tribal Council of Akwesasne and the officials of various 
departments, the Judge of the Tribal Court, the Chief of Police and his colleagues, the 
Mohawk Council of Chiefs, and especially Chief Howard Thomspon who received us and 
taught us in the Longhouse, the director, teachers and children of the Freedom School, the 
Director of the Museum of Akwesasne, the Rourke family and many other friends. 
 
 The co-editors, Elsa Stamatopoulou and Pamela Calla, consider ourselves 
privileged to have taught all five years of the Summer Program and to have met such 
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inspiring participants, colleagues with whom we walk together on the paths of social 
justice struggles. We greatly appreciate the friendship of all those from around the world 
who participated in this project with dedication to peace and to the vision of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
       
Elsa Stamatopoulou and Pamela Calla 











































Our vision is to make the University a cultural bridge of the world, through 
strengthening leadership and research in human rights and social justice. The 
International Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy at Columbia 
University is one of those avenues. This edited volume is devoted to the Fifth 
Anniversary of the Summer Program. It is a collection of essays by alumni of the 
program from around the world and is co-edited by two of the professors of the Summer 
Program, one from Columbia University and one from New York University. It 
represents a commitment by all of us to continue building community, solidarity and 
hope across borders in a moment in our histories when the “rights” frame of nation-states 
is being challenged globally.   
 
  Columbia has moved forward on Indigenous Studies since 2010. Through the 
Center for the Study of Ethnicity and Race, the Institute for the Study of Human Rights 
(and its Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Program) as well as other departments, the 
University has been securing a home for this field and area of practice in recent years. 
Why? Because we believe that it is impossible to study the world without including 
Indigenous Peoples’ political practices, cultures, ways of knowing, aspirations and their 
global movement. It is also incongruous to ignore that Indigenous Peoples are literally 
changing the face of contemporary politics in every continent and have been and are 
continuously producing valuable knowledge for both the benefit of Indigenous Peoples 
and the wellbeing of our entire planet. The international Summer Program thus emerged 
from the simple fact that we felt the need to invite people from outside and inside 
Columbia, as teachers and participants, to share and benefit from an international 
interdisciplinary curriculum based on human rights and for us to engage with the 
important work being done in the world as well as nurture our own. 
The adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 
launched a new era, where various actors at local, national, regional and international 
levels should be able to engage in dialogue with Indigenous Peoples on the basis of this 
comprehensive normative framework. The Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights and Policy is a unique immersion human rights program addressed to researchers 
and professionals1. The program responds to the clear need of researchers, professionals 
and social leaders, who do not otherwise have access to learning opportunities in this 
subject matter at a university setting to devote concentrated time (two weeks) to a 
comprehensive study of the topic in its most cutting edge aspects and in conversation 
                                                 
1 The acronym “ISSP” refers to Indigenous Studies Summer Program. The full title of the program for the 
first five years has been Indigenous Studies Summer Program on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy, or 
ISSP for short.  
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with instructors from academia, Indigenous leaders, diplomats, international 
organizations officials and civil society.  
 
After five years of operation (2013-2017), ISSP is now a mature program, 
accredited by Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences starting in 2017 
and enjoying a distinguished reputation worldwide. The only such program 
internationally, ISSP brings together researchers and professionals from around the world 
to learn about Indigenous Peoples’ rights and related policy. To-date, the program has 
hosted some 135 participants from 40 countries, and from many Indigenous Peoples on 
all continents. The great majority of participants are Indigenous persons, researchers, 
academics, professionals and practitioners. Professors at various universities, diplomats, 
government officials, tribal government officials and officials of intergovernmental 
organizations and non-governmental organizations are included among the participants. 
 
While engaging with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the 
authors of this publication touch on a broad variety of contemporary topics: 
 
In her piece on “Law and the Literary: A Narrative Approach to the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” Keira Anderson is 
contributing to a dialogue between literary scholarship and international policy pertaining 
to Indigenous Peoples’ rights. She locates a critical reading of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a possible resource that can 
contribute to a more engaged and reflexive research methodology in literary scholarship. 
By focusing on legal and narrative conceptualizations of sovereignty, consent, and 
understandings of collectivism, she is making a case for the lessons that literary 
researchers and scholars can learn from the Declaration as well as the lessons that human 
rights practitioners and scholars can learn from literary approaches. She stresses the 
importance of self-reflexivity and critical inquiry into the colonial institutions, traditions, 
and spaces within which this work is carried out and points to critical shifts, both political 
and epistemological, that establish spaces for possibilities beyond colonial limitations.  
 
Theresa Castillo writes on “Decolonizing Health Policy: An Evidence-Based 
Conceptual Framework for Addressing the Right to Health for Asian Indigenous 
Women.” She points out that, despite recent global commitments to women's health 
rights, often Indigenous women are excluded from this discourse. Extreme health 
disparities fuel an increasing demand for health equity by Indigenous Peoples. Sparse 
literature is available and the ongoing omission of Asian Indigenous women from 
national data collection negatively impacts their right to health. The article identifies 
community-based leader perspectives on the challenges, promising practices, and 
recommendations for ensuring Indigenous women's health rights in Nepal and 
Bangladesh.  
 
In her essay “Traditional Tribe or Corporate Entity? The Influence of Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlements on Tribal Groups in New Zealand,” Melissa Derby examines the 
influence of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) settlement process on iwi (extended tribe) and 
hapū (tribe). This article considers how the settlement process affects the structure and 
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function of these tribal groups, specifically the implications of state definitions and the 
requirements of these groups during the settlement process. The hapū of Ngāi 
Tamarāwaho is used as a case study to illustrate the points made in this article. For 
comparative purposes, parallels are drawn with other Indigenous groups, specifically 
Hawaiian and Australian communities, to highlight similarities between the experiences 
of these groups and those of Ngāi Tamarāwaho. The article concludes that, in many 
instances, the settlement process has played a significant role in redefining tribal groups 
and the ways in which they operate, and that these challenges require careful and 
considered navigation as increasingly more iwi and hapū plan for their futures in a post-
settlement environment.  
 
Vida Foubister’s “The Sixties Scoop: Canada’s Legacy of Lost Children,” 
through an account of her family’s story, brings out the consistent and deliberate 
separation and forced assimilation of Indigenous children in Canada combined with 
chronic underfunding of child welfare services that has profoundly injured Indigenous 
Peoples and their communities, who continue to experience poor living conditions and 
substandard schooling, among other issues.  The “Sixties Scoop” refers to the pervasive 
child-welfare approach that was removing First Nation, Inuit and Métis children from 
their homes across Canada and placing them with non-Indigenous families. 
 
In “Himalayan Indigenous Peoples in Local Election after Twenty Years: The 
Historical Gendered Perspective from Dolpo,” Tashi Tsering Ghale examines the non-
inclusive relationship of the state of Nepal with the Dolpo Indigenous Peoples, focusing on 
state-led federal democratic local elections and the community’s gender relations. Local 
elections conducted by the state have continued the historical gender inequality of the 
Indigenous community. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of effective 
political participation, especially of women. The research is informed by a year’s data 
collection through primary and secondary sources. Participant observation of the local 
election, and semi-structured interviews with Dolpo men and women who voted and 
officials who monitored the voting process, inform the research piece. Materials published 
through books, personal blogs and national dailies also served as important sources of 
information for this paper.  
 
In her essay “A Continuation of a Vision for Indigenous Governance through the 
United Nations,” Deanne L. Grant points to an appreciation for Indigenous visioning 
through the United Nations. She stresses that, although there are legal limitations of 
UNDRIP vis a vis states, the articles articulated within UNDRIP come from Indigenous 
Peoples’ time, energy, knowledge, and visioning. Indigenous Peoples from around the 
world contribute to and build upon a significant effort to clarify commitments from 
member states to recognize the unique rights of Indigenous Peoples, starting with Cayuga 
Chief Deskaheh, who traveled to Geneva in 1923. 
 
Ingrid Johanson’s article on “Australia’s Human Rights and Wrongs” discusses 
the difference between dualist and monist structures of power, explaining how 
international law and domestic law theoretically remain separate in Australia. This essay 
also draws upon the dismissal of the human rights treaty body authoritative advice 
 viii 
regarding the Northern Territory Emergency Response Act as a case study, to highlight 
the negative impact Australia’s approach to international law can have on its Indigenous 
Peoples. The paper concludes that, until Australia adheres to its international legal 
commitments, or, alternatively, implements more solid domestic human rights provisions, 
the rights of all Australian citizens remain alarmingly vulnerable. 
 
The topic of Rachael Ka’ai-Mahuta’s essay is “The Right to Return: Challenging 
Existing Understandings of ‘Citizenship’ in Aotearoa/New Zealand.” Polynesian peoples 
are increasingly having to face the migration and displacement of members of their 
communities. It is estimated that at least one in six Māori now live outside of New 
Zealand, mostly in Australia. The governments born out of colonization dictate the terms 
of citizenship to the Indigenous communities of the lands over which they rule. This 
paper explores issues at the intersection of diaspora, identity, and citizenship, 
specifically, should overseas-born Māori who are not New Zealand citizens be granted an 
automatic right to citizenship or a multi-generation citizenship by descent clause? This 
will go some way towards answering the overarching question of what rights, if any, 
Indigenous people have when they are not citizens of the state that governs their ancestral 
homeland. 
 
Tilu Linggi writes about “‘Forced’ Prior Informed Consent at the Barrel of a Gun: 
A Case of Indigenous Peoples in Arunachal Pradesh.” Similar to several alleged human 
rights abuses documented across various parts of the India, the events that were recorded 
in the years 2011 and 2016 in the eastern and western parts of the state of Arunachal 
Pradesh drew mass criticism against the growing tendency of impairing the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. These two separate events where Indigenous Peoples were shot and 
tortured, were seen as the result of the state’s underlying failure to address the principle 
of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in relation to the construction of several 
micro- and mega-hydroelectric power projects planned by the state. While states are 
under obligation to comply with various international and national laws and to respect 
and ensure prior informed consent, free from intimidation and coercion, the state’s 
strategy such as discrediting environmental protestors and resorting to violence, has led 
to widespread concerns that such projects are being forced upon Indigenous Peoples 
without their consent. 
 
In her article “Our Unique Historical Opportunity: Indigenous-State Relations,” 
Rachael Grace Patten finds that relationships between States and Indigenous Peoples 
have made substantial and significant strides towards harmony in the last twenty-five 
years. These changes were brought about by Indigenous Peoples’ extraordinary efforts, 
focused via the Indigenous Peoples movement and fueled by their resilience and 
dedication. Due to the strength of the Indigenous Peoples’ movement, there now exist 
dynamic models for peaceful and just State-Indigenous People relations. Through the 
work of Indigenous Peoples within international bodies such as the United Nations, the 
world now has unprecedented international instruments at its disposal to guide and 
ameliorate relations. As humanity seeks urgent solutions to climate change and to 
maintain and enhance biodiversity, we, as citizens, States, and Indigenous Peoples, have 
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the historic opportunity to improve State-Indigenous Peoples relations. This paper 
examines where we have come, where we are now, and where we can go.  
 
Saket Suman Saurabh writes about two Indigenous women’s testimonies in his 
article “Rigoberta Menchu and Dayamani Barla: A New Normal in the Hegemonic World.” 
He argues that their lives and the communities they were part of--Maya–Quiché, 
Guatemala and Jharkhand, India respectively—were shaped by a history of Spanish and 
English colonialism. Looking at the history of genocide and repression of these 
communities, he explores and compares the contemporary conditions and the spaces they 
inhabit as sacrificial zones where the use of land, forests, water and other resources 
facilitate a form of “development” that exploits them as “unpaid unskilled labor” to the 
benefit of wealthy elite classes. Through a lengthy discussion of “testimony” as a genre, 
Saket assesses the way in which Rigoberta Menchu Tum and Dayamani Barla give voice 
to those silenced by genocide (Guatemala) and displacement, state corruption and 
extractivism and exploitation in both India and Guatemala.  
 
 
Vera Solovyeva writes about “Ecology Activism in the Sakha Republic, Russia’s 
“Large-numbered” Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.” She provides a short overview of the Indigenous movement 
around the world and in Russia particularly, and analyzes general trends and individual 
examples of social involvement in her homeland, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), 
explaining the evolution of people’s awareness. More attention is paid to the little known 
information on the Sakha people’s ecological and social activism. The author also 
emphasizes the importance of applying the UN recognized term “Indigenous Peoples” to 
all non-Russian Natives regardless of their population size, which would allow them to 
better protect their rights according to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. 
 
In her essay “From Margins to Center: Untranslatability as a Decolonial 
Practice,”Doro Wiese takes possible constraints experienced by Euro-Western readers in 
understanding Indigenous articulations as a point of departure. She argues that the 
limitations experienced when interacting across cultures are productive since they limn 
out and contour the limits of knowledge and challenge Euro-Western hegemonies. When 
working across languages, the impossibility to transfer meaning from one culture to the 
next is called untranslatability. Taking the literary works of Native American 
Renaissance writer Leslie Marmon Silko as an example, the critical scholarship on her 
oeuvre is taken one step further by connecting it with the seminal discussion on 
untranslatability currently led in Comparative Literature. The main goal is to establish 
untranslatable narrative notions as an analytical object for reading literature across 
cultures. It is posited that narrative expressions can remain culturally specific and 
unappropriable when untranslatable. To show the validity of the main idea on the 
productiveness of untranslatability, a close reading of Silko’s novels Ceremony and 
Almanac of the Dead will show how the untranslatability of narrative expressions is 
achieved in these works.  
 
 x 
     * * * 
 
We are proud to be marking the fifth anniversary of the Summer Program. An 
alumni page has been created (http://www.cser.columbia.edu/indigenous) and this edited 
volume is being published with contributions from ISSP alumni. ISSP has created a 
unique space for building knowledge, long-term engagement with the topic and bonds 
among participants for years to come. Generations of alumni now meet again as they 
pursue their work at national, regional and international fora, including the United 
Nations and academia.  
 
Our warmest congratulations go to the authors of this book. We dedicate this 
volume to all the Summer Program alumni and the community they have become in 
support of the international movement of the Indigenous Peoples of the world. 
     
 












This painting is a Lyrebird, and it depicts the three knowledge spaces that exist 
within me in oneness. The Lyrebird in Yuin culture is a sacred and significant Ancestor 
bird that holds a diverse range of language and story. The Lyrebird is a great mimic and 
can mimic every bird in Australia except the Kookaburra. The Lyrebird can also mimic 
most man-made things that are heard within the bushlands of Australia, for example a 
cross-saw or people cutting trees. The Lyrebird holds the language from the past and 
present, and young people today still observe the Lyrebird to learn the songs and dances 
our Ancients sang and danced. My journey so far with the Lyrebird has taught me how 
to mimic and interpret the teachings from Mother Earth and how to respectfully engage 
in Western knowledge systems and processes. If I mimic Country1 respectfully and in 
relationship, then I can stay grounded with Country when Western knowledge is present 
by being respectful to the knowledge systems that are present by staying true to self 
(Country).  
 
In the context of this painting, the Lyrebird represents the language of my Yuin 
cultural knowledge (Country), Western knowledge and my third or shared space 
(intersection or coming together of two knowledge systems): me. For my PhD, I had to 
determine or discover my own understanding of the relationship between my Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal knowledge sites and the space when/where they overlap by force or 
choice. The Lyrebird is a metaphoric and real representation of myself as I cannot 
separate the knowledge worlds that I live, learn and behave within. To assist the reader 
to a degree, I recognize my cultural education and knowledge as the orange-yellow 
Lyrebird in the painting. The orange represents the knowledge system that keeps me 
balanced (Country) and the yellow reinforces the importance that Grandfather Sun 
(Country) plays each day in my life. The green background represents Mother Earth 
(Country) and the Sacred Mountains of Gulaga and Biamanga that have taught me so 
much in my cultural education: to breathe like a Mountain. The Black, White and Grey 
Lyrebird represents my journey within Western knowledge. I have utilized these colors 
                                                 
1 Ambelin Kwaymullina (2005), 12, an Aboriginal woman and academic from the Palyku people of the 
Pilbara region in Western Australia, positions Country through Aboriginal law. “Country is much more 
than a place. Rock, tree, river, hill, animal, human—all were formed of the same substance by the 
Ancestors who continue to live in land, water, sky. Country is filled with relations speaking language an d 
following Law, no matter whether the shape of that relation is human, rock, crow, wattle. Country is 
loved, needed, and cared for, and country loves, needs, and cares for her peoples in turn. Country is 




to help me see things in Black, White and Grey, with each color having a significant 
role and responsibility (something to think about). However, more importantly, there is 
no such thing as Black or White spirit, because spirit is all encompassing. The White 
also represents Grandmother Moon (Country) and how she influences me on a number 
of levels, especially my emotions. The darker green circle at the head of the Lyrebirds is 
the shared space, which is a contested space but at the same time, it cannot be a space 
for contestation. For me to have respectful reciprocal relationships with diverse 
knowledge systems, similarities must be identified to balance the creation of a deep 
understanding in respect to maintaining connectedness to the best of my current ability. 
The blue also represent Father Sky (Country) and a reminder not to stay too high 
(intellect) in the mind, but rather to ground myself back to the Mother, like the rain. 
 
The varying spirals that are attached demonstrate that over time and in certain 
situations I have valued or utilized specific knowledge sites and, especially when I was 
younger, I got very lost and confused in being and learning how to be respectful in these 
knowledge relationships. With time, I have also learned that I have never been 
disconnected as my Ancients and Ancestors have never let go of me. I have gotten lost 
in some circumstance, but Country (my cultural education system) has bought me back 
to oneness. 
 
The painting represents many other things that are discussed within my PhD, 
“Singing Up Country in Academia.” 
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 This article aims to contribute to a dialogue between literary scholarship and 
international policy pertaining to Indigenous Peoples’ rights. I locate a critical reading 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a possible 
resource that can contribute to a more engaged and reflexive research methodology in 
literary scholarship. By focusing on legal and narrative conceptualizations of 
sovereignty, consent, and understandings of collectivism, I hope to make a case for the 
lessons that we, as literary researchers and scholars, can learn from the Declaration as 
well as the lessons that human rights practitioners and scholars can learn from literary 
approaches. As Sophia McClennen and Joseph Slaughter argue, “[t]he type of critical 
thinking needed to seriously engage with the complexities of human rights analysis 
demands an optic that exceeds the confines of traditional disciplinary formations.”1 As a 
non-Indigenous researcher, I stress the importance of self-reflexivity and critical inquiry 
into the colonial institutions, traditions, and spaces within which this work is carried 
out. During a special event to mark the International Day of the World’s Indigenous 
Peoples on 9 August 2017, UNPFII Chair Dr. Mariam Wallet Aboubakrine stated, “the 
Declaration represents important shifts in both the structure and practice of global 
politics.”2 These critical shifts, both political and epistemological, establish spaces for 
possibilities beyond colonial limitations.  
 
On 13 September 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration’s adoption was the 
culmination of over twenty years of work within the United Nations system, as well as 
many decades of grassroots and community work outside of that system. I stress this 
point to combat the risk of locating the United Nations as the sole or primary space for 
Indigenous Peoples’ intellectual and advocacy labor. The most important work is 
happening within these communities on a daily basis.  
 
Whereas the UN’s trajectory of Indigenous involvement in international 
relations often commences with Cayuga Chief Deskaheh (Levi General) travelling to 
Geneva in 1923 to advocate for the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) peoples at the newly-
formed League of Nations, it is imperative to acknowledge that Indigenous nations are 
the First Nations. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy is considered to be the world’s first 
League of Nations. Globally, Indigenous Peoples practiced diplomacy for thousands of 
years prior to the creation of modern states. Deskaheh was not permitted to speak inside 
the League of Nations’ halls, but was provided the opportunity to address the city public 
of Geneva. James Anaya (former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples) cites a lobbyist in attendance who stated, “[t]he representative of the world’s 
                                                 
1 Sophia A. McClennen and Joseph R. Slaughter, “Introducing Human Rights and Literary Forms; Or, the 
Vehicles and Vocabularies of Human Rights,” Comparative Literature Studies 46, no. 1 (2009), 13.  
2 Mariam Wallet Aboubakrine, “High-level segment: Remarks,” International Day of the World’s 





first League of Peace received no welcome from the world’s newest.”3 Maori leader 
T.W. Ratana travelled to Geneva soon after, joining Deskaheh in providing the 
foundations upon which the legal language for Indigenous Peoples’ rights has 
developed. The League’s dismissal of Deskaheh and Ratana prompts us to pose the 
questions of when, how, and why the territorial claims of newly-formed states came to 
supersede the sovereignty of long-existing nations.  
 
We might begin in 1095, with Pope Urban II’s “Papal Bull Terra Nullius.” This 
edict, which translates to “empty land,” gave European monarchs the right to discover 
and claim land held by non-Christians. Of course, we can identify the paradox in 
referring to occupied land as empty land, but in the mind of the Catholic Church this 
paradox, like the “pagans” to which the decree refers, did not exist. Non-Christians were 
non-humans. The later “Papal Bulls Inter Caetera,” issued by Pope Alexander VI in 
1493, followed suit, providing rationalization and incentive for the colonization of the 
Americas.4 Today, this “doctrine of discovery” survives as the cartography of empire 
carved upon the earth. Look to the names of the British and the U.S. Virgin Islands or to 
the U.S. states of New York and New Hampshire or the Canadian provinces of Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland. Whereas the papal bulls provided rationalization and 
incentive for imperial land-grabbing, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia legitimized the 
process. If the conquest of non-Christian lands were sketched out in graphite under the 
papal bulls, the Peace of Westphalia began the process of tracing over those lines in 
black ink. Westphalia established a political order centered on the sovereignty of the 
state, challenging all competing claims to territorial sovereignty.  
 
Given this very brief historical overview, we might ask how we arrived at the 
point at which this new measure of political authority has become normalized. 
Throughout the West, the general population uses the term “country” to signify “nation-
state” with no real inquiry into what a nation is, what a state is, and what the 
implications are when both terms are “cobbled together” or “solder[ed]” through 
hyphenation, to borrow Judith Butler’s phrasing.5 I find it useful to approach these 
questions through Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as an “imagined 
political community,” from his seminal study on nationalism.6 Anderson’s nation has a 
two-part structure: it is conceptual because it is imagined and material because it is 
political. How is it, then, that one politic was able to impose its imagination onto the 
minds of the entire world? Anderson locates the rise of the printing press as having 
provided a rhetorical monopoly for imperial powers to disseminate a singular 
worldview.7 In a volume of the same title, Stefan Berger argues that it was the literal act 
of “writing the nation” that elevated imperial powers to political primacy.8 He outlines 
the turn of the nineteenth-century shift from the more cosmopolitan “Enlightenment 
historiography” to that of the modern era which, he argues, “employed history to 
                                                 
3 James S. Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (New York, USA: Aspen, 2009), 
4-6. 
4 Jens Korff, “How was Aboriginal land ownership lost to invaders?” Creative Spirits (May 2016), 
https://www.creativespirits.info/aboriginalculture/land/how-was-aboriginal-land-ownership-lost-to-
invaders.  
5 Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? (Calcutta, India: Seagull 
Books, 2007), 2. 
6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York, USA: Verson, 2006), 6. 
7 Ibid., 37-46. 
8 Stefan Berger, “Introduction: Towards a Global History of National Historiographies,” Writing the 
Nation: A Global Perspective, ed. Stefan Berger (New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
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establish the unique character of nations, legitimate their existence in history and justify 
their alleged superiority over other nations.”9 As Berger contends, “it was the encounter 
with Western imperialism which gave national history a new relevance and urgency in 
the colonial world.”10 For Indigenous communities particularly, the codification of 
imperial history served to negate their own claims of nationhood and as such “[t]he 
coming of modernity was accompanied by the victory of the nation-state over all rival 
forms of territorial and non-territorial allegiance.”11 Work in Indigenous Studies calls 
into question these territorial claims of nation-states, thereby calling into question the 
entire political organization of the modern world. 
 
I first presented the research for this article, in its initial stages, at an academic 
conference in San Diego, California during the spring of 2017. I put together a 
slideshow which began with a brief overview of Indigenous Peoples’ involvement at the 
United Nations and then presented the voting record for the Declaration. I organized the 
slides so that the 144 member state votes “for” were shown first and the four member 
state votes “against” followed (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States 
of America). When I switched to the latter slide, many in the audience were visibly and 
audibly shocked and this point was later highlighted during the questions segment. My 
argument for this article materialized in that response. Before I continue, I am 
compelled to acknowledge that my understanding of the Declaration was mostly 
nonexistent until I attended the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Policy program at 
Columbia University during the summer of 2015. At that point, I had been working on 
my graduate thesis on the critical writing of Thomas King since the summer of 2013, 
twice choosing to extend my submission deadline. I began to look back at my sources 
through this new point of reference and found that most non-Indigenous literary 
scholars (in works post-2007) provided little to no reference of the Declaration, 
specifically, and Indigenous Peoples’ involvement in activism, advocacy, and shifts in 
policy, more generally. What I fear this lack of analysis does is locate cultural 
production as separate from lived political realities. Referring back to the conference in 
San Diego, what do we expect the role of the university to be if professors who teach 
Native literatures at American universities and doctoral students who are writing their 
dissertations at these same universities are either unaware of the Declaration or unaware 
that the United States was one of the four votes against the Declaration? Are Indigenous 
Peoples’ rights movements being discussed in these literature classrooms? For settler 
scholars and researchers, a lack of engagement with Indigenous policy often 
corresponds to a lack of critical self-reflexivity. In order to better understand this 
particular lack of analysis, we must first turn a historical lens to the university as a 
colonial institution.   
 
From the fierce global debates surrounding academic speech and affirmative 
action to the rise of Ethnic Studies departments, the university is forced to grapple with 
its colonial foundations. The “subject/object” research dichotomy and the prioritization 
of European intellectual traditions have served the purposes of epistemic exclusion and 
erasure. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues, “[t]he academy played a very significant role 
in upholding Western intellectual superiority; the disciplines of Western knowledge 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 9. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Ibid., 4. 
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were used as a platform for dismissing or denying the existence of indigenous 
knowledge, a view that still exists in some parts of the academy today.”12 Elizabeth 
Cook-Lynn’s 1997 essay “Who Stole Native American Studies?” provides a thorough 
analysis of the institutionalization of Native Studies in the United States. The Lakota 
scholar commences with an overview of the First Convocation of American Indian 
Scholars, held in 1970 at Princeton University. She argues that the meeting in New 
Jersey asserted “the academic intention of U.S. colleges and universities […] to use 
education to affect the policy of this nation in Indian affairs” through “the development 
by Indians of bodies of indigenous knowledge.”13 Cook-Lynn elaborates that these 
knowledges would be referred to as “Native American Studies as an Academic 
Discipline” and would function “endogenous[ly],” that is, “emerg[ing] from within 
Native people’s enclaves and geographies, languages and experiences”; a challenge to 
the conventional academic approach of objectivity which Cook-Lynn locates as “the 
exogenous seeking of truth through isolation.”14 As Cook-Lynn makes apparent, this 
discipline was to be both produced and facilitated by Native peoples. However, she 
contends that the discipline has been “co-opted” by non-Native scholars, as “[t]he 
college campus and the discipline of social science, and commercial and university 
publishing houses rather than the tribal institutions based within Native populations 
dominate the intellectual strategies that influence Native American studies as an 
academic discipline.”15 If the discipline were intended to influence policy from a space 
of Indigenous Peoples’ narrative sovereignty, then its co-optation by non-Native 
academia has influenced policy from a space of coloniality. The relevance of Cook-
Lynn’s essay—having now approached its twentieth year since publication—to 
contemporary Native scholarship exposes an ongoing definitional struggle against the 
prevailing attitudes of the academy. 
 
As researchers, we are taught to be concise and definitive in our argumentation, 
leaving nothing open to possible “misreadings.” It might be a surprise to some then that 
the Declaration contains no formal definition for Indigenous Peoples. The authors made 
this choice deliberately, arguing that after having had identities imposed upon them 
since the first colonial contact, Indigenous Peoples are entitled to the respect to define 
themselves. The authors were also aware that no single definition could possibly cover 
the estimated 370 million of the world’s distinct and diverse Indigenous Peoples.16 
There was a fear that if a definition were included in the Declaration, states could use it 
to deny recognition to the Indigenous Peoples within their political territory. However, 
many states continue to use the lack of a definition to deny these collective rights and 
this remains a significant challenge in the Declaration’s implementation at the state 
level. 
 
Although there exists no strict definition, the most frequently-cited “definitional 
framework” for Indigenous Peoples comes from the 1981 Martinez Cobo Study on the 
                                                 
12 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies (New York, USA: Zed, 2012), 222. 
13 Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “Who Stole Native American Studies?” Wicazo Sa Review 12 no. 1 (1997): 9. 
14 Ibid., 9, 11. 
15 Ibid., 13, 19. 
16 United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
United Nations Document ST/ESA/328 (New York, USA: 2009). 
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Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations.17 Jose R. Martinez Cobo 
was the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities of the former UN Commission on Human Rights (replaced 
by the Human Rights Council in 2006). The Martinez Cobo “working definition” reads: 
  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at 
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop 
and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with 
their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 
 
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period 
reaching into the present of one or more of the following factors: 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living 
under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, 
means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the 
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the 
main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language); 
e) Residence on certain part of the country, or in certain regions of the 
world; 
f) Other relevant factors. 
 
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these 
indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous (group 
consciousness) and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its 
members (acceptance by the group). 
 
This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide 
who belongs to them, without external interference.18 
 
The flexibility of the Martinez Cobo framework offers a non-prescriptive means for 
approaching Indigeneity in the global sense.  
 
Deferring to Indigenous Peoples to define themselves is an integral part of the 
right to self-determination, a concept which garnered the most resistance from member-
states. Article 3 of the Declaration reads:  
 
                                                 
17 Jose R. Martińez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations  (New 




Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.19 
 
The Declaration’s inclusion of the term “peoples” is especially significant. The 1989 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 
(No. 169) includes a disclaimer about the use of the term. ILO Convention 169 Article 
1.3 reads: “The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as 
having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under 
international law.”20 Within international law, “all peoples have the right to self-
determination,” as codified in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.21 
Despite only having twenty-two ratifications, ILO 169 is still in force and still 
considered a significant document in regard to Indigenous Peoples’ rights. The shifting 
legal language, from “minorities,” “populations” and “issues” to “peoples,” is a direct 
result of the work of Indigenous Peoples and non-Indigenous advocates pushing for 
Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination as a non-negotiable component of the 
Declaration.    
 
Anaya explains that the Declaration’s allusion to processes of colonization 
provides a common point of historical reference for Indigenous Peoples.22 We are 
reminded that Indigenous Peoples constitute distinct and diverse nations, which happen 
to share histories of colonization and, often, a political agenda against colonialism 
stemming from those histories. What I find most striking about the two preambular 
paragraphs that Anaya references in this regard (the fourth and the sixth), is their 
explicit indictment of colonialism. The latter refers to the historical process of 
colonization: 
 
…Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historical injustices as 
a result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, 
territories, and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, 
their right to development in accordance with their own needs and interests…23    
 
And the former refers to attitudes of coloniality24 which have served to rationalize 
colonization as process: 
 
…Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or 
advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or 
racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, 
legally invalid, morally condemnable, and socially unjust….25 
                                                 
19 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
United Nations Document A/RES/61/295 (New York, USA: October 2007). 
20 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169 (Geneva, 
Switzerland: June 1989).  
21 United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York, 
USA: December 1966).  
22 Supra note 3, at 59. 
23 Supra note 19. 
24 Aníbal Quijano and Michael Ennis, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 





Despite the Declaration’s direct references to the effects of colonization for Indigenous 
Peoples as well as the inclusion of Article 3, within the United Nations system, 
Indigenous Peoples’ rights and political decolonization are identified as two separate 
projects. According to the UN Committee on Decolonization (formally referred to as 
The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), there 
currently exist only seventeen non-self governing territories remaining to be 
decolonized.26 Sheryl Lightfoot explains, “indigenous peoples’ self-determination was 
specifically excluded from the decolonization regime by the ‘saltwater thesis’ 
(sometimes known as the ‘blue water thesis’), which asserted that only overseas 
colonial territories were eligible for decolonization and self-determination.”27 How, 
then, do we understand the right to self-determination for Indigenous Peoples, 
particularly with reference to the Declaration’s final article? Article 46 reads:  
 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.28 
 
Anaya explains that self-determination, as employed in the Declaration, does not call for 
political secession or statehood.29 Rather, it more closely resembles the “third space of 
sovereignty” that Kevin Bruyneel has suggested as a site of dynamic resistance for 
Indigenous peoples living in settler-colonial states.30 In the context of U.S. settler 
politics, Bruyneel argues, “[t]ribal self-determination is sovereignty without the 
mechanisms of statehood,” recognizing the legitimacy and potential of non-statist forms 
of governance and political organization.31 Understandings of what self-determination 
should look like are, of course, going to be diverse and based on the particularities of 
time, space, and context.      
 
Jace Weaver has argued, “[t]he struggle may be land and sovereignty, but it is 
often reflected, contested, and decided in narrative.”32 For non-Indigenous literary 
scholars and researchers, recognizing Indigenous Peoples’ sovereignty requires us to 
recognize and reject the identities and constraints that have been imposed upon 
Indigenous Peoples within our own fields. Within literary scholarship, the lenses of 
post-colonial and postmodern theory are those that have been most frequently applied to 
studies of Indigenous literatures. Thomas King’s 1990 essay “Godzilla vs. Post-
Colonial” provides both a challenge and an alternative to the use of post-colonial theory, 
which Western scholars have used overwhelmingly as a template for their studies of 
                                                 
26 “The United Nations and Decolonization,” United Nations, www.un.org/en/decolonization.  
27 Sheryl R. Lightfoot, “Indigenous Rights in International Politics: The Case of ‘Overcompliant’ Liberal 
States,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 33, no. 1 (2008), 86. 
28 Supra note 19. 
29 Supra note 3, at 60. 
30 Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of U.S. – Indigenous 
Relations (Minneapolis, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xvii.  
31 Ibid., 152. 
32 Jace Weaver, That the People Might Live: Native American Literatures and Native American 
Community (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1997), 41-42. 
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politically-marginalized groups. Through a tendency toward homogenization of colonial 
experiences, Western academics have projected a standard of post-colonial 
universalism. King begins his essay with a personal story, a technique that is prevalent 
throughout his critical work. He recounts how he was scouted to play basketball as a 
teenager due to his tall stature. Through this anecdote, King establishes a context for a 
greater discussion about cultural assumptions. Just as his coach assumed that he would 
be good at basketball because he was tall—though King confesses, “I wasn’t even 
mediocre”—he tackles the assumptions made by the term “post-colonial” and how these 
assumptions function within the discursive constructs both established and upheld by 
the academy.33   
 
King designates post-colonial as “part of a triumvirate”; the “post” implies a 
“pre” which extends a Eurocentric frame of reference to a period of time prior to the 
initial point of European-Native contact.34 Furthermore, he argues, “the term [‘post-
colonial’] organizes the literature progressively suggesting that there is both progress 
and improvement.”35 Weaver also recognizes the problems associated with arranging a 
literary tradition upon a colonial trajectory. He references Gerald Vizenor’s term 
“paracolonial” and offers “pericolonialism” in response.36 Weaver provides an 
etymological description for both terms and elaborates, “[p]ericolonialism […] 
acknowledges the thorough, pervading nature of settler colonialism and marks it as 
something that, for indigenes, must be gotten around, under, or through.”37 Weaver 
argues that his “pericolonialism” and Vizenor’s “paracolonial,” “[shift] the temporal 
metaphor (postcolonial) to a spatial one, something that must be overcome here, in this 
place.”38 Vizenor and Weaver’s semiotic contributions are pertinent in that they 
establish a less hierarchical conception of settler-Native relations, while also addressing 
the continuation of colonial presence in settler-colonial societies. As Cook-Lynn 
pointedly asserts “[p]ostcolonial study has always been defined by Euro-American 
scholars as the discourse that begins from the moment of what is called ‘colonial 
contact,’ not from the moment that imperial nations reject colonizing as an illegal 
activity, because that time has never come.”39 In its application to Indigenous Peoples 
living in settler states, the term “post-colonial” denies the contemporary realities of 
settler-colonialism.   
 
Arguably his most influential contributions to Native literary theory, King offers 
four alternative terms for the study of Native literatures: “tribal, interfusional, 
polemical, and associational.”40 Through this example, we can see how King is doing 
theory both on his own terms and with his own terms. Unlike “post-colonial,” King 
argues, “these terms are not ‘bags’ into which we can collect and store the whole of 
                                                 
33 Thomas King, “Godzilla vs. Post-Colonial,” Unhomely States: Theorizing English-Canadian 
Postcolonialism, ed. Cynthia Sugars (Peterborough, Canada: Broadview, 2004), 183. 
34 Ibid., 184. 
35 Ibid., 185. 
36 Jace Weaver, “Splitting the Earth: First Utterances and Pluralist Separatism,” American Indian Literary 
Nationalism, eds. Robert Warrior, Jace Weaver, and Craig S. Womack (New Mexico, USA: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2006), 39.   
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Supra note 13, at 13.  
40 Supra note 33, at 185. 
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Native literature.”41 In American Indian Literary Nationalism (a collaborative study 
with Robert Warrior and Craig Womack), Jace Weaver argues for a critical discourse of 
“pluralist separatism,” which recognizes the legitimacy of tribal nationalisms alongside 
intertribal (international) alliances.42 Similarly, in his foundational study Orientalism—
designated as one of the founding texts of post-colonial theory, along with the work of 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Homi K. Bhabha—Edward Said advocates both 
“general and particular” critical perspectives.43 Through his terms, King not only 
establishes a critical discourse that differentiates (North American) Native experience 
from the experiences of other colonized groups, but also allows for differentiation 
between the various and distinct tribal nations throughout North America. Craig 
Womack argues:  
 
Native literature, and Native literary criticism, written by Native authors, is part 
of sovereignty: Indian people exercising the right to present images of 
themselves and to discuss those images […] While this literary aspect of 
sovereignty is not the same thing as the political status of Native nations, the two 
are, nonetheless, interdependent. A key component to nationhood is a people’s 
idea of themselves, their imaginings of who they are.44     
 
Postmodern thought also poses significant challenges for Indigenous literary 
studies. The anti-essentialism of postmodern theory has undoubtedly contributed to a 
blurring of narrative ethics. Whereas postmodern theory succeeded in opening up a once 
monologic space to make room for various perspectives and experiences, in doing so, it 
neglected to establish a capacity for prioritization. Too many non-Indigenous scholars 
working in the field of Indigenous literary studies are quick to reject Indigenous 
nationalist claims in favor of postmodern approaches. Womack posits postmodern 
theory’s critical flaw as the “tendency to decenter everything, including the legitimacy 
of a Native perspective.”45 Womack provides the text of his own correspondence with 
the Abenaki poet Cheryl Savageau who, in a discussion of academic anti-essentialism, 
writes, “[i]f everybody’s story is all of a sudden equally true, then there is no guilt, no 
accountability, no need to change anything, no need for reparations, no arguments for 
sovereign nation status, and their [mainstream] positions of power are maintained.”46 
Non-Indigenous readers must reject Roland Barthes’ famous assertion that “the birth of 
the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.”47 To suggest that “writing is 
the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin,” as does Barthes, is incredibly 
problematic, particularly within the context of cross-cultural scholarship.48 To argue for 
the exclusion of authorial intent and social and historical context is to disregard the 
reality of the imbalanced structures of power that shape cultural production.         
 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Supra note 36, at 74.   
43 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York, USA: Vintage Books, 1979), 8. 
44 Craig S. Womack, Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism (Minneapolis, USA: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 14. 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Ibid., 3-4. 
47 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” The Norton Anthology of Theory & Criticism, ed. Vincent 
B. Leitch (New York, USA: Norton, 2010), 1326. 
48 Ibid., 1322. 
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Postmodern trends toward intertextuality, pastiche, and the idea of an 
epistemological commons have, perhaps inadvertently, provided a problematic 
rationalization for appropriation. Conversations on intellectual property, from outside of 
the Indigenous Peoples’ rights framework, have often flirted with the issue of cultural 
appropriation but, in their lack of engagement with questions of coloniality, they have 
largely missed the point. In his influential study Cosmopolitanism, the philosophy 
scholar Kwame Anthony Appiah adopts a focused approach on intellectual property in 
the cultural context, however, he problematically aligns the corporation with the 
Indigenous nation. Appiah writes, “[t]alk of cultural patrimony ends up embracing the 
sort of hyper-stringent doctrine of property rights […] that we normally associate with 
international capital.”49 Even more explicitly, he claims, “the corporations that the 
patrimonialists favor are cultural groups.”50 Appiah references the Walt Disney and 
Coca-Cola companies and adds to the list, “Ashanti Inc., Navajo Inc., Maori Inc., 
Norway Inc.: All rights reserved.”51 I find Appiah’s rhetorical choice here troubling, 
particularly for a work that is of such high caliber in other regards. Ironically, a critical 
reading of “all rights reserved” exposes the principle error of his position. For many 
Indigenous communities and Peoples, rights are reserved, as in, denied to them. Anaya 
explains, “[i]t is precisely because the human rights of indigenous groups have been 
denied, with disregard for their character as peoples, that there is a need for the 
Declaration.”52 Article 31.3 of the Declaration reads:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as 
well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of 
fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games 
and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.53 
 
Additionally, “reserved” takes on a particularly concerning connotation in itself. In the 
verb form, “reserved” can easily be read as a synonym for government policies of 
relocation, the forced migration of Indigenous Peoples onto federal reserves and 
reservations.               
 
In this particular case, I contend that a reading of Appiah’s argument would be 
strengthened by an engagement with the Declaration and its causes for historical 
remedy. Analyses of cultural appropriation are always tied to the concept of power.54 
The corporations and cultural groups that Appiah so quickly aligns have entirely 
different stakes in the processes of cultural production and distribution. The most 
obvious difference is that a corporation is not a people. A corporation may, of course, be 
                                                 
49 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New York, USA: W. W. 
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50 Ibid. 
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52 Supra note 3, at 63. 
53 Supra note 19. 
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run by people but it does not define a people. Indigenous patrimonial struggles are 
protective whereas corporate struggles are exploitative. This distinction is key in any 
discussion of Indigenous Peoples’ claims to intellectual property or cultural patrimony. 
Glen Sean Coulthard’s work, in its Fanonian use of Marxist theory through a decolonial 
orientation, is particularly useful here.55 Coulthard argues, “what must be recognized by 
those inclined to advocate a blanket ‘return the commons’ as a redistributive 
counterstrategy to the neoliberal state’s new round of enclosures is that, in liberal settler 
states such as Canada, the commons belong to somebody – the First Peoples of this 
land.”56 Coulthard’s critical application calls our attention to the limitations of 
conventional theoretical approaches, but also provides an example of the ways in which 
many of these approaches can be re-oriented for decolonizing purposes.   
 
The concepts of intellectual property, cultural patrimony, and consent are 
inextricably linked to sovereignty. Indigenous Peoples have immense knowledge which 
is theirs to share with those outside of their communities only if they so choose. This is 
a matter of consent. Article 19 of the Declaration reads: 
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.57 
 
The Declaration’s language of “free, prior, and informed consent” (FPIC) is a shift from 
the language of “consultation” as outlined in ILO Convention 169.58 The language of 
consultation means that states and/or corporations are obligated to hold meetings with 
representatives of the Indigenous Peoples concerned to discuss projects or actions 
proposed that would affect them. According to the language of consultation, even if the 
Indigenous Peoples objected to the project, the state or corporation could still go ahead 
with it because they had met their requirements by simply taking the meeting. The 
language of consent gives Indigenous Peoples more agency in these consultations. 
According to the language of FPIC, Indigenous Peoples have the right to say “no” with 
hope that their “no” will be respected and upheld.    
 
The Declaration’s emphasis on collective rights provides an alternative 
framework to, but not an exclusion of, the individual referent of the liberal human rights 
regime. Tuhiwai Smith argues that the West locates the individual as “the basic social 
unit from which other social organizations and social relations form.”59 Moving from an 
understanding of the individual to an understanding of the collective also denotes a 
critical epistemological shift in research methodology. Tuhiwai Smith’s discussion 
about scholarly distance is particularly informative in this regard. She argues that in 
Western research methodology, “[t]he individual can be distanced, or separated, from 
the physical environment, the community” which “implies a neutrality and objectivity 
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on behalf of the researcher.”60 This (lack of) relationship represents the “subject/object” 
research dichotomy, founded on a colonial hierarchy of expertise. Indigenous Peoples’ 
narrative sovereignty and narrative consent subvert this binary. Narrative consent is also 
a part of the language of FPIC. Article 15 of the Declaration reads: “Indigenous peoples 
have the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and 
aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected in education and public 
information.”61 Questions about whether or not Indigenous cultures, traditions, histories, 
and aspirations are portrayed in an appropriate manner is a matter of consent and will 
vary by nation, as well as sometimes within nations. Consent is a concept considered far 
too infrequently in literary scholarship. In the social sciences, for example, field 
researchers must receive permission to work within a community and can therefore be 
held personally accountable to that particular community. How can we, as non-
Indigenous scholars and researchers, think about consent and permission in the context 
of literary research, particularly if our work is not specific to one nation or community?  
 
For non-Indigenous literary scholars and researchers, it is critical to always turn 
toward the work of Indigenous scholars as primary sources. Womack argues for the 
prioritization of Native perspectives, which “rise out of a historical reality wherein 
Native people have been excluded from discourse concerning their own cultures.”62 The 
common refraint remains “nothing about us without us.” For non-Indigenous literary 
scholars and researchers, this requires a turn toward Indigenous critical approaches, 
theoretical frameworks, and research methodologies. Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith 
remind us that the theoretical work of Indigenous studies is also inherently political 
work, with particular orientations and commitments. In their editorial introduction to 
Theorizing Native Studies, Simpson and Smith emphasize the connection between 
theory and practice, arguing for a “politically grounded and analytically charged form of 
Native studies.”63 The authors also suggest an “intellectual promiscuity” which 
encourages engagement with various forms and fields of critique, while remaining 
committed to the theoretical and political objectives of Native Studies.64 M. Nourbese 
Philip argues, “[w]riters coming from a culture that has a history of oppressing the one 
they wish to write about would do well to examine their motives.”65 Our interdiscursive 
analyses must also involve a questioning when working within colonial spaces. To my 
view, the liberal models upon which these institutions (the state, the university, and 
even the United Nations as an intragovernmental organization of states) are organized 
often allows for limitations in their ability to be self-reflexive in sincere and productive 
ways. This kind of reflexive ethic implores those of us who are non-Indigenous scholars 
and researchers to constantly think outside of ourselves (to the extent that we can) and 
critically examine our particular epistemological assumptions as well as what we 
understand our roles, responsibilities, and commitments to be, and to which 
communities we remain committed. As Taiaiake Alfred argues, “[a]ccountability in the 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 58. 
61 Supra note 19. 
62 Supra note 44, at 4-5. 
63 Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith, “Introduction,” Theorizing Native Studies (Durham, USA: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 1. 
64 Ibid., 9. 
65 M. Nourbese Philip, “The Disappearing Debate; or, How the Discussion of Racism Has Been Taken 
Over by the Censorship Issue,” Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation , eds. Pratima v. Rao 
and Bruce Ziff (New Brunswick, USA: Rutgers University Press , 1997), 106. 
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indigenous sense needs to be understood not just as a set of processes but as a 
relationship.”66  
 
I think of the family that I became a part of during the 2015 Indigenous Studies 
Summer Program at Columbia University. I was one of seven non-Indigenous people in 
a group of 26 scholars, activists, government and NGO professionals, and graduate 
students from 15 countries. We spent our first weekend at the St. Regis Mohawk Nation 
in Akwesasne, New York and were greatly touched by the warmth and grace with 
which we were received. It was in Akwesasne that I began to understand what 
Indigenous ethics like “all my relations” can mean for us all; we were truly welcomed 
as members of an extended family. I feel incredibly fortunate to have learned both from 
and with such a remarkable group of people. During our time together, we shared many 
stories of our diverse experiences, in both the formal setting of our seminar room and in 
our more informal gatherings. Some of our colleagues shared deeply personal stories. I 
remain humbled by their trust and it is this trust, as well as my promise to follow their 
lead as a friend, ally, and accomplice (to borrow my friend Bettina’s phrasing) which 
gives my work purpose.  
 
Craig Womack has stated of Indigenous Peoples, “We are not mere victims but 
active agents in history, innovators of new ways, of Indian ways, of thinking and being 
and speaking and authoring in this world created by colonial contact.”67 The Declaration 
serves as an important example of a global and collective Indigenous Peoples’ 
authorship and leadership. During a special event to mark the tenth anniversary of the 
Declaration during the 16th session of the UNPFII, Evo Morales, President of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and member of the Aymara peoples, stated, “Indigenous 
Peoples are the moral compass of humanity. [Their] movement is anti-capitalist and 
anti-colonialist.”68 In its emphasis on self-determination, consent, and collective rights, 
the Declaration provides for an alternative orientation (indeed, an alternative ethic) to 
the liberal system of governance. From within the United Nations system, within the 
university, and, most importantly, within their communities on a daily basis, Indigenous 
Peoples continue to challenge the constraints of colonial spaces, providing an example 
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Decolonizing Health Policy: An Evidence-Based Conceptual Framework for 
Addressing the Right to Health for Asian Indigenous Women 
 
Theresa P. Castillo 
 
I. Indigenous Peoples: Present, But Not Counted 
 
The United Nations (UN) human rights framework has been a catalyst for 
achieving gender equality in public policy around the world. Yet despite the recent 
global commitment to women's health rights, Indigenous women are often excluded 
from this discourse, especially among Asian countries.1 Extreme health disparities fuel 
an increasing demand for health equity by Indigenous Peoples worldwide. However, the 
ongoing struggle to protect their human rights remains contentious within many States.  
 
In the late twentieth century, the political will of United Nations (UN) member 
states advanced its commitment to global decolonization, with States pledging to 
transform public policy.2 Among the most affected by this policy shift is the world’s 
Indigenous population; approximately 370 million Indigenous people worldwide,3 with 
more than two-thirds living in Asia.4 However, many states in the Asia region have yet 
to recognize Indigenous Peoples’ rights and continue to exclude them from public 
policy.5 In most Asian states, the term “Indigenous Peoples” is not used formally or 
recognized in the national legislation and may deny their existence as Peoples.6 Without 
political participation, there is an inherent power differential that influences the 
decision-making process. Political recognition comes in the form of having quality data 
to help understand the context in which Indigenous Peoples are living. A 2013 UN 
report highlighted this need for disaggregated population data.7 Further, Stephens et al. 
argue that the “systematic marginalization and isolation” in combination with the vague 
definitions of Indigenous Peoples posed a challenge to developing Indigenous-specific 
health policy.8  
 
                                                 
1 “Overview of the State of Indigenous peoples in Asia,” Asian Indigenous People’s Pact Foundation 
(Chiang Mai, Thailand: AIPP Printing Press, 2014), 10-11. 
2 United Nations Secretary-General, “International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism Report of 
the Secretary-General: Fifty-fifth session, Agenda item, 18 Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” United Nations Document A/55/497 
(2000), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/55/497  
3 United Nations Population Fund, “Population dynamics of Indigenous peoples: Some global and 
regional highlights,” Presented at Annual Meeting of the UN IASG on Indigenous Peoples Issues, (New 
York, USA: November 2011). 
4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples,” 
United Nations Document ST/ESA/328 (New York, USA: 2009), 84.  
5 The Indigenous World 2013 (Copenhagen, Denmark: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 
2013). 
6 Realizing indigenous women’s rights: A handbook on the CEDAW (Baguio, Philippines: Tebtebba 
Foundation, 2013), 2-4. 
7 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya: Consultation on the situation of 
indigenous peoples in Asia, United Nations Document A/HRC/24/41/Add.3 (2013). 
8  Carolyn Stephens, John Porter, Clive Nettleton, and Ruth Willis , “Disappearing, displaced, and 




Building upon the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Social Determinants of 
Health9 model and the UN Right to Health10 model, this chapter will present an 
evidence-based conceptual framework for reshaping colonizing policies and the health 
care system to address the invisible right to health for Indigenous women in Asia. The 
human rights perspective submits a valued interdependency across government sectors, 
requiring nations to consider inclusivity and parity in their decision-making processes. 
While Bangladesh and Nepal have signed onto some international agreements that 
safeguard Indigenous health rights, the present study substantiates the multiple drivers 
of health inequities for Indigenous women.11 Further study analysis reveals a conceptual 
framework defining the associated systemic support and elements needed to decolonize 
health systems. It expands on existing theoretical models and provides guidelines for 
policymakers to ensure Asian Indigenous women’s right to health. 
 
II. Inequities & Vulnerabilities: The Status of Asian Indigenous 
Women’s Health 
 
Indigenous Peoples experience similar health issues at higher rates when 
compared to other populations.12 Specifically, Indigenous women are at a quadruple 
disadvantage due to gender, cultural, economic, and geographic discrimination, 
increasing their susceptibility to compromised rights.13,14 Mired in poverty, Indigenous 
women and girls are exposed to inequitable power differentials, placing them at higher 
health risks than their male or non-Indigenous counterparts.15,16 Currently, there is no 
reliable country-specific data available on Asian Indigenous women’s health and well-
being, leaving huge gaps in knowledge in this area.17,18,19 Recent research conducted on 
Indigenous women’s health has been mainly in high- income countries.  
 
This omission of Asian Indigenous women from disaggregated national data 
collection impacts their right to health negatively.20 High maternal mortality rates have 
been documented as a salient issue due to weak maternal healthcare services in the 
                                                 
9 Michael Marmot, Sharon Friel, Ruth Bell, Tanja AJ Houweling and Sebastian Taylor, on behalf of the 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health, “Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through 
action on the social determinants of health,” The Lancet 372, no. 9650 (November 2008), 1661-1669. 
10 “The right to health,” Joint fact sheet, United Nations Document WHO/OHCHR/323 (2007), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs323_en.pdf. 
11 Theresa Castillo, “A case study approach to the right to health for South Asian indigenous women: 
Interview findings with community-based leaders in the neighboring countries of Nepal and Bangladesh 
on challenges, best practices, and recommendations,” Doctoral Dissertation (Columbia University 
Teachers College, New York: 2015).   
12 Ibid. 
13 Pan-American Health Organization Gender and Health Unit, Gender, equity, and indigenous women’s 
health in the Americas, PAHO/GHU (Washington, USA: Pan-American Health Organization, 2004).  
14 Supra note 6, at 4-7. 
15 Supra note 4, at 161-162. 
16 Voices of indigenous women from the Asia-Pacific region,” Asian Indigenous Peoples Pact Foundation, 
Briefing paper presented at Rio+20 World Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio, Brazil: 2012). 
17 M. Levesque, R. Sidchogan-Batani and S. O’Farrell, Portrait of the indigenous women of Asia 
(Montreal, Canada: Rights and Democracy, 2008), 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dd-rd/E84-37-2007-eng.pdf. 
18 Jill Carino, “Putting together a picture of Asian indigenous women,” Tebtebba Magazine 2 (2000), 1-4.  
19 United Nations Population Fund, “UNFPA Summary Report,” Presented at Twelfth Session on the 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples Issues  (New York: 2013).  
20 Supra note 4, at 156-182.  
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remote regions of Asia, limited access to family planning, and minimal knowledge 
about formalized healthcare.21,22  In a recent study, Asian Indigenous women surveyed 
reported a lack of reproductive health information, provider discrimination and limited 
access to basic health services.23 Specifically, child marriage is one of the most 
commonly identified harmful practices affecting young Indigenous women, leaving 
them vulnerable to violence, sexual abuse, birth complications, infections and death 
during pregnancy.24,25,26 Furthermore, increased reproductive cancer rates and higher 
numbers of miscarriages and infertility have been documented among Indigenous 
women living in environmentally contaminated settings.27 Commonplace issues such as 
urbanization and seasonal work migration further leave Asian Indigenous women 
vulnerable to higher rates of HIV infection.28,29  
 
Violence against women was cited heavily in the literature consulted as a 
primary health issue inextricably linked to Indigenous rights and colonization.30 
UNICEF et al. describe violence as a priority Indigenous women’s health issue, given 
the prevalence of sexual slavery and the killing of tribal women in the Asia Pacific 
region during the past decade of militarization and armed conflict.31 There are multiple 
facets of violence that disproportionately affect Indigenous women, ranging from sexual 
violence in conflict settings, economic violence due to neoliberal policies, and political 
violence through colonization and forced displacement from Indigenous territories.32   
 
III. Research Study Methodology33 
                                                 
21 Tuku Talukder, “Report on Sexual health and reproductive rights: Articles 22, 22(1), 23, and 24 of the 
UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – Chittagong Hill Tracts context,”  Presented at 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, International Expert Group Meeting: Sexual 
health and reproductive rights: articles 22, 22(1), 23, and 24 of the UN Declaration of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples , (New York: January 2014).  
22 United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “International expert group meeting, Sexual 
health and reproductive rights: Articles 21, 22(1), 23, and 24 of the United Nations Declaration on the 
rights of indigenous peoples - Concept note,” (New York: 2014). 
23 Asian Indigenous People’s Pact Foundation, “Submission of AIPP to UNPFII,” Presented at United 
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, International Expert Group Meeting: Sexual health and 
reproductive rights: articles 22, 22(1), 23, and 24 of the UN Declaration of the rights of indigenous 
peoples  (New York: January 2014). 
24 Anthony Davis, Claire Postles and Giorgiana Rosa, “A Girl’s right to say no to marriage: Working hard 
to end child marriage and keep girls in school,” Plan International (Surrey, United Kingdom: Plan 
Limited, 2013), 40-43. 
25 International Center for Research on Women, “Child marriage and health”  (Washington: International 
Center for Research on Women, 2006). 
26 “Breaking the silence on violence against indigenous adolescents and young women,” United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary -General on Violence 
against Children (OSRSG/VAC) (New York, USA: UNICEF, May 2013). 
27 Andrea Carmen and Viola Waghiyi, “Indigenous Women and Environmental Violence,”  Paper 
presented at the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Expert Group Meeting on 
Combatting Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls (New York: January 2012). 
28 Minority Rights Group International, “State of the World’s Minorities and Indigeno us Peoples 2013: 
Events of 2012,” (London, United Kingdom: Minority Rights Group International, 2013).  
29 Supra note 4, at 162-175. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Supra note 26, at 7-35. 
32 Supra note 4, at 172, 226. 




This empirical, qualitative study sought to identify community-based leader 
perspectives on the challenges, promising practices, and recommendations for ensuring 
Indigenous women's health rights in Bangladesh and Nepal. The case study approach 
involved semi-structured interviews with 23 community-based leaders across both 
countries. Participants were selected as field experts based upon the level of knowledge 
regarding at least one of the criterion areas. Conducted over a two-month period in 
2014, participant recruitment used a criterion sampling method with support from two 
local human rights organizations, Kapaeeng Foundation and Justice for All, until 
saturation was reached. Interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis using 
Atlas.ti 7.0, and two cycles of coding were completed. Among the 12 key study 
findings, seven of the findings related to the current challenges in women’s health: 
sexual and reproductive health issues, violence, nutrition and food security, 
communication barriers, geographic/land rights, insufficient resources, and mainstream 
politics and traditional systems. Some promising practices identified were beneficial 
traditional practices and multilevel partnership models, such as mobile health systems 
and female community health worker models. Lastly, three recommendations for 
addressing Indigenous women’s health were identified: strengthening referral systems, 
increasing tailored health education, and focusing on adolescent girls' health.  
 
IV. Conceptual Framework for Ensuring Indigenous Women’s Right to 
Health 
 
Almost two decades ago, the WHO and the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights defined health as a human right, offering a model to 
guide states in adopting a health for all approach to their national health policies.34 This 
approach emphasized achieving a “participatory, inclusive, transparent, and responsive 
process” by observing the concepts of accessibility, availability, acceptability, quality, 
equality, and accountability in healthcare.35 While neither Bangladesh nor Nepal fully 
realized the model, a complementary conceptual framework emerged during the rights-
based analysis of the study findings, offering an expansion on existing theoretical 
models and guidelines. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues emphasized a 
holistic perspective to ensuring the well-being of the individual—including the whole 
community’s social, emotional, spiritual, and cultural well-being— so that the right to 
                                                 
34 Supra note 10. 
35 Ibid.; World Health Organization, “Women and children’s health: Evidence of impact on human rights” 
(Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization Press, 2013), 13. 
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health of Indigenous Peoples could manifest.36 It is through this lens that the conceptual 
framework emerged from the study results, reinforcing Asian Indigenous women’s right 
to health. The underlying emphasis is that broad-based healthcare has been excluding 
Indigenous women, and systems must be decentralized and contextualized for and in 
partnership with Indigenous women. 
 
The present study findings support a conceptual framework rooted in four pillars 
for reshaping colonizing health policy, while being central to the holistic health and 
well-being of Indigenous women. These pillars include: (1) assessing gender dynamics; 
(2) understanding that traditional medicine and practices can both benefit and harm 
Indigenous women’s health status; (3) contextualizing healthcare service delivery in 
post-conflict settings; and (4) monitoring the resource development environment created 
by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporate globalization, and 
privatization.  Undoubtedly, the study results suggest that ensuring the right to health 
for Indigenous women is complex and cannot be realized by any one factor alone. It is 
the web of multiple confounding issues that must be worked on, simultaneously, in 
order to achieve health equity. These overlapping 
framework elements supplement existing health models 
and highlight the core environmental factors that 
impact women’s health directly.  More focused 
research exploring these elements, including data 
disaggregation, is recommended to achieve health 
equity for Asian Indigenous women. 
 
V. Assess Gender Dynamics and Harmful 
Gender Norms 
 
Gender dynamics and the resulting 
inequities continue to be drivers for women’s poor 
health status and well-being.37 The power 
differentials experienced by women are exacerbated 
by harmful social and gender norms that “perpetuate the 
subjugation of females and condone violence against 
them.”38 There are many different forms of gender-based violence 
experienced by Asian Indigenous women—from food insecurity and early marriage to 
an absence of land rights and the abandonment of basic schooling for menstruating 
girls.39 Other factors impacting poor health status include migration, acculturation 
struggles, and limited access to education and quality reproductive health care.40 Since 
Indigenous women’s health and livelihoods are intertwined with ancestral lands, forced 
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displacement and globalization directly affect their health rights.41 Displacement from 
ancestral lands reduces access to traditional food sources, production and medicine.42 
With the loss of their traditional lands and resources, Asian Indigenous women’s 
livelihoods have shifted toward trafficking and forced prostitution to stave off poverty, 
which poses increased health risks for HIV, psychological trauma, reproductive health 
issues, and abuse.43,44,45  
 
For this study, globalization was defined as “the increased interconnectedness 
and interdependence of peoples and countries,” underscoring two interrelated elements: 
“the opening of international borders to increasingly fast flows of goods, services, 
finance, people and ideas; and the changes in institutions and policies at national and 
international levels that facilitate or promote such flows.”46 In the context of health,  
globalization specifically touches on issues related to public health security (i.e., ebola, 
cholera, HIV and AIDS, etc.), climate change, cross-border migration, access to 
pharmaceuticals, transnational corporations’ practices, health technology advances, and 
the brain drain of medical human resources.47 A deeper exploration of the systemic 
effects of globalization and colonization on gender and health also must be considered 
when discussing inequities.48 Women’s empowerment may be achieved through shifting 
cultural norms, as it is “reinterpreted, and even modified by Indigenous women and 
their communities in order to remove any negative impact on the human development of 
Indigenous women.”49 National government efforts for gender equality may consider 
making specific provisions for the inclusion of Indigenous women. In addition, recent 
literature highlights that tribal governments must begin to open up leadership and 
decision-making roles to Indigenous women to further facilitate enhanced 
healthcare.50,51 
  
VI. Integrate Traditional Medicine and Practices 
 
Study respondents noted both beneficial traditional practices that ensure 
women’s health rights, and also harmful traditional practices. Sherwood and Edwards 
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45“Gender and Indigenous Peoples: Briefing note no.1-6,” United Nations Office of the Special Adviser 
on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women & Secretariat of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). 
46 “Globalization,” World Health Organization, (n.d.), 
http://www.who.int/topics/globalization/en/http://www.who.int/topics/globalization/en/   
47 Greg Martin, Malcolm MacLachlan, Ronald Labonté, Fiona Larkan, Frédérique Vallières and 
Niamh Bergin, “Globalization and Health: Developing the journal to advance the field,”  Globalization 
and Health 12, no. 1 (2016), 6. 
48 Raewyn Connell, “Gender, health and theory: Conceptualizing the issue, in local and world 
perspective,” Social Science & Medicine 74, no. 11 (2012), 1675-1683.  
49 Supra note 45, at 10.   
50 Ellen Lutz, “Indigenous women’s empowerment begins with communication,” Cultural Survival 
Quarterly 28, no. 4 (2004), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-
quarterly/none/indigenous-womens-empowerment-begins-communication. 
51 Supra note 6. 
  
 22 
underscore the demand for health systems to embrace and respect the holistic health 
worldview that exists among Indigenous Peoples.52 Through advocacy, Indigenous 
women are “demanding access to culturally sensitive, rights-based healthcare, 
including: information and treatment in Indigenous languages; the incorporation of 
traditional medicine and practitioners into healthcare models; and female and 
Indigenous health practitioners.”53 While harmful traditional practices are complex 
issues to address, many Indigenous women’s rights groups disparaged the frequent use 
of culture to perpetuate gender inequities in their communities.54 Consideration for 
cultural asset-based models of care with respect for traditional medicine and practices is 
necessary by states and by NGOs. In particular, Indigenous families have a variety of 
practices that may include a preference for using traditional medicine, or Western 
allopathic medicine, or both.55 States should consider decolonizing health systems and 
seeking out alternative health service delivery models. Traditional medicine and 
practices can be a tremendous asset for Indigenous women. Community actions 
facilitate resourceful solutions, such as collectively supporting pregnant women who 
may need emergency obstetric care by pooling money or physically transporting them 
to formalized healthcare facilities. In the preservation of the Indigenous ways of 
knowing, states need to formally recognize and respect traditional knowledge.56 
 
VII. Adapt Services to Post-Conflict Settings 
 
The right to health for Indigenous women has been compromised by the politics 
of globalization, militarization, climate change, and migration due to forced 
displacement.  Indigenous women have increasing vulnerability to many forms of 
violence during conflict and militarization, such as sexual harassment and rape 
throughout Asia.57 This study substantiated women’s struggles with managing trauma 
and related health issues in post-conflict settings. Yet, countries in post-conflict settings 
are struggling with rebuilding their states, inclusive of Indigenous Peoples. Implications 
for public health practitioners and policymakers include the restructuring of health care 
systems to be inclusive of Indigenous health practices and experiences post-conflict. To 
strengthen health systems in post-conflict settings, consideration should be given to 
fluctuations in local politics and related power dynamics, as well as issues of forced 
displacement and reintegration.  In a recent review, Guerin found that there was no one 
panacea for decolonization, but rather a requisite need for tailored, context-specific 
interventions.58 Data from the Guerin study further suggest that models of care 
respecting traditional health practices and using multilevel partnerships be explored for 
each country. After colonization and post-conflict, there is a need to consider which 
groups may have an economic advantage compared to those Indigenous groups who are 
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endangered and living in extreme poverty.59,60  Moving beyond monocultural and 
multicultural health system models where language is a primary concern, 
contextualizing healthcare should include the consideration of intercultural health 
models, which empower Indigenous women and demand mutual respect for their 
cultural and health rights.61,62  
 
VIII. Monitor Resource Development Environment  
 
Given the interdependent nature of human rights, macro issues such as 
globalization become central to health discourse. Properly monitoring the resource 
development environment created by international NGOs, corporate globalization, and 
privatization is a necessary component of securing Indigenous women’s health and 
well-being. Indigenous women in the Asia Pacific region have been living in unstable, 
insecure environments because of the expropriations of traditional land by public and 
private entities.63 Consideration should be given to local protective mechanisms that can 
safeguard Indigenous women’s health rights, directly and indirectly. For Asian 
Indigenous women activists fighting development on ancestral lands, they have become 
targets for intimidation, gang rape, sexual enslavement, and death.64,65 National laws 
and policies in most Asian countries do not acknowledge Indigenous Peoples’ rights to 
their traditional lands, territories, and resources, nor do they acknowledge their 
customary laws regarding land ownership and tenure.66  As a result, their lands are 
expropriated for extractive industries, government programs, and other economic 
development projects. Therefore, a vital implication for governing state bodies is to 
seek out possible ways to responsibly protect Indigenous Peoples’ spiritual connection 
to lands and territories, which has the potential to gravely affect health status and well-




Recognizing health as a human right requires consideration of state 
accountability, which includes an examination of decolonization, institutionalized 
racism and their supporting infrastructures.67,68 Within this defined broader context of 
health equity, Indigenous Peoples experience unique decolonization vulnerabilities 
affecting health such as political recognition, conflict settings, land rights, cultural 
practices and gender norms. The study analysis and resulting framework demonstrate 
the immense complexity of Indigenous women’s health issues.  It is a panoply of 
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sociocultural, political, economic, and spiritual factors that comprise a proper response 
in safeguarding the right to health for Indigenous women. With sparse literature 
available on the topic, the inability of states to meet the right to health for Indigenous 
women suggests that there is still much work to be done. As outlined in the present 
study findings, the conceptual framework may provide the foundation for a survey 
assessment of Indigenous women’s health regionally within Asia, as well as globally.  
Further research on the implementation of the right to health framework may also be 
helpful for states, as it relates to Indigenous women’s health.   
 
This essay provides important guidelines for rebuilding health infrastructure and 
reshaping colonizing policy, while focusing on the needs of a most vulnerable 
population, Asian Indigenous women. The states’ obligation to respect, protect and 
fulfill the right to health must be inclusive of Indigenous peoples’ rights. In the 
aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake disaster and the 2017 influx of Rohingya 
refugees to Bangladesh, this essay may be most timely in shedding light on the potential 
contemporary opportunity for reshaping colonizing policy and healthcare to be 
responsive to Indigenous women’s right to health in the post-trauma (i.e., earthquake, 
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Traditional Tribe or Corporate Entity? 






The purpose of this article is to examine the influence of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(1840) settlement process on iwi (extended tribes) and hapū (tribes). This article considers 
how the settlement process affects the structure and function of these tribal groups, 
specifically the implications of state definitions and the requirements demanded of these 
groups during the settlement process. The hapū of Ngāi Tamarāwaho1 is used as a case 
study to illustrate the points made in this article. For comparative purposes, parallels are 
drawn with other Indigenous groups, specifically Hawaiian and Australian communit ies, 
to highlight similarities between the experiences of these groups and those of Ngāi 
Tamarāwaho. This article concludes that, in many instances, the settlement process has 
played a significant role in redefining tribal groups and the ways in which they operate, 
and that these challenges require careful and considered navigation as increasingly more 
iwi and hapū plan for their futures in a post-settlement environment.  
 
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to examine the influence of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(1840) settlement process on iwi (extended tribes) and hapū (tribes). Smith contends that 
the Treaty settlement process is “one of the most transforming and reforming processes”2  
that iwi and hapū are currently engaged in. This article considers how the settlement 
process affects the structure and function of these groups, and in particular, explores the 
implications of state definitions and the state’s requirements of these groups during the 
settlement process. The hapū of Ngāi Tamarāwaho is used as a case study to illustrate the 
points made in this article, and pseudonyms are used to protect the identities of hapū 
members whose comments are published in this article. For comparative purposes, 
parallels are drawn with other Indigenous groups, particularly Hawaiian and Australian 
communities, to highlight similarities between the experiences of these groups and those 
of Ngāi Tamarāwaho. The first section of this article outlines the settlement process and 
provides some details of the Ngāi Tamarāwaho claim. The major focus of this article is 
how the state influences iwi and hapū, both during the settlement process and in a post-
settlement environment, and attention is given to this in the second and third sections. 
This article concludes by summarising the points made in the preceding sections. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Ngāi Tamarāwaho is a hapū of the Tauranga iwi, Ngāti Ranginui. They are descendants of the captain of 
the Tākitimu waka, Tamatea Arikinui, who is known by many names. To Ngāi Tamarāwaho, he is 
Tamateapokaiwhenua. The hapū name comes from their ancestor, Kinotaraia, who was the grandson of 
Tamateapokaiwhenua and son of Kinonui, the great chief of Mauao. After Kinonui was killed at the Battle 
of Te Kokowai on Mauao, Kinotaraia was given the name Tamarāwaho, the Son of the Sea Breeze, when 
he moved inland and settled the area “touched by the breeze” that blows from Mauao to Puwhenua.  






II. The Treaty Settlement Process and the Ngāi Tamarāwaho Claim 
 
Political efforts, particularly in the 1970s, from groups such as Ngā Tamatoa and 
Te Roopū Matakite, which were involved in protests such as the 1975 Land March, placed 
the New Zealand government under increasing pressure to address the demands made by 
iwi and hapū3; largely in response to the efforts of these groups, the Waitangi Tribuna l 
was established in 1975. Internationally, a similar trend was occurring for other 
Indigenous Peoples, where their demands for recognition of historical injustices were 
gaining wider acceptance by non-Indigenous Peoples, and the practice of nation states 
providing restitution to victims of historical injustices was becoming more prevalent. 4 
Ngāi Tamarāwaho filed their Treaty of Waitangi claim, WAI 659,5 with the Tribunal in 
1997. Issues emphasised in the claim were the Church Missionary Society (CMS) 
purchase of Ngāi Tamarāwaho land; the New Zealand Wars; the relationship between 
Ngāti Ranginui and Ngāi Te Rangi; the return and subsequent alienation of tribal land 
following the confiscations in the 1860s; the economic and cultural loss experienced by 
the hapū; and the alleged failure of the Crown to provide adequate redress for twentieth-
century claims. 
  
    Some analysts6,7,8,9 who observe the growing international trend of Indigenous 
communities seeking restitution from nation states in recognition of historical injustices, 
also note the implications of negotiating redress within a Western framework. This same 
trend occurred in New Zealand. Ngāi Tamarāwaho focused their attention on progressing 
their claim with the Waitangi Tribunal in an attempt to have their historical grievances  
heard, and to seek redress primarily for the confiscation of tribal lands. Hearings with the 
Waitangi Tribunal commenced in February 2000. 10  The procedure for lodging and 
                                                 
 3 Paul Hamer, “A quarter-century of the Waitangi Tribunal: Responding to the challenge,” in The Waitangi 
Tribunal, eds. Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen (Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books, 
2004), 3-14. 
4 Ernesto Verdeja, “Restituting Past Harms: On the Complexity of Satisfactorily Engaging the Past,” H-
Genocide (August 2003), https://networks.h-net.org/node/3180/reviews/6265/verdeja-barkan-guilt-
nations-restitution-and-negotiating-historical 
5 WAI659 incorporated the previous claims, WAI42 and WAI86, that were filed in the 1980s (Waitangi 
Tribunal Register of Claims, 2000). For details of the claim, see: 
https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/WT/wt_DOC_68361657/Te%20Raupatu%20o%20Taura
nga%20Moana.pdf  
6 G.T. Alfred, “Colonialism and State Dependency,” Journal de la santé autochtone 5, no. 2 (2009), 42-
60. 
7 Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and negotiating historical injustices , (Baltimore, USA: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 262-282.  
8 Marcia Langton and Lisa Palmer, “Modern Agreement Making and Indigenous People in Australia: 
Issues and Trends,” Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 8, no. 1 (2003), 1-31. 
9 John Altman, “What future for remote Indigenous Australia? Economic hybridity and the neoliberal 
turn,” in Culture Crisis: Anthropology and Politics in Aboriginal Australia , eds. John Altman and 
Melinda Hinkson (Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press, 2010), 259-280.  
10 Waitangi Tribunal, Te Raupatu o Tauranga Moana, Report on the Tauranga Confiscation Claims 




settling a claim under the Treaty of Waitangi Act is lengthy,11 and at any stage during this 
process the claimants may seek to negotiate directly with the Crown via the Office of 
Treaty Settlements. Ngāi Tamarāwaho chose to settle their claim through the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Smith argues that the settlement process employed, as a tool of colonisat ion, 
the phenomenon of “preoccupation” which he terms the “politics of distraction.”12 During 
the settlement process, tribal groups are often “responding, engaging, accounting, 
following and explaining,” and this “leaves little time to complain, question, or rebel.”13 
Smith argues this is a “typical strategy often used over Indigenous people.”14 The result 
of this strategy for Ngāi Tamarāwaho is that some members of the hapū became “tangled 
up in a grievance space.”15  
    However, O’Regan16 contends that by participating in the process, claimants are 
hoping to “shift their focus away from grievances towards growth and development.” The 
redress Ngāi Tamarāwaho received as recognition of their mana whenua (territoria l 
rights) provides the hapū with access to an economic base, which McKay17 argues is 
“critical to Māori development.” Iorns18 concurs and contends that the provision of capital 
and resources is necessary to “equalise the economic and social conditions between Māori 
and non-Māori.” In a discussion on what the settlement means to Ngāi Tamarāwaho, 
Tane19  comments: “The settlement gives us many opportunities that we didn’t have 
before…. Before we had to fundraise.” Ana20 supports Tane’s comment, and adds: “We 
no longer have to be a hand-out hapū…. The settlement empowers us, and we don’t have 
to be reliant.” In addition to this, some theorists argue that an ability to provide for the 
group to which one belongs results in mana (status) being bestowed on the group, and in 
                                                 
11 For details of the process, see: http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-tribunal/the-claims-
process/the-claims-process 
12 Supra note 2. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15  Piripi Winiata, in personal communication with the author, 23 March 2013. 
16 Tipene O’Regan, Post Settlement Issues, Paper presented at the Strategies for the Next Decade 
Conference (Hamilton, New Zealand: 1997). 
17 Liam McKay, Waka Umanga: Has The Government Missed The Boat On Māori Collective Assets 
Management? Rethinking New Zealand Law For The Post-Settlement Era, Master of Laws Thesis 
(University of Otago, New Zealand: 2012), 2.  
18 Catherine Iorns, “Reparations for Māori Grievances in Aotearoa New Zealand,” in Reparations for 
Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives , ed. Federico Lenzerini (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 2008), 523-564. 
19 Melissa Derby, Te Whanaketanga o Ngāi Tamarāwaho: The evolution of hapū identity , Master of Arts 
Thesis (AUT University, New Zealand: 2016), 116. 




particular, on its leaders.21,22,23 Economic power also leads to political power,24 which 
Trask25  argues is pivotal to the decolonisation of Indigenous groups, including Ngāi 
Tamarāwaho. Nikau discusses the political power that Ngāi Tamarāwaho has as a result 
of the settlement, and observes:  
The settlement process has given us clout in terms of dealing with 
Councils. You have an Act26 to back up the demands to engage and to take 
into account what we as a hapū want to see happening in our city. It has 
recognised our mana whenua… and increased our confidence in engaging 
in the system.27 
Therefore, based on such observations, it can be argued that engaging in the settlement 
process has had numerous positive outcomes for Ngāi Tamarāwaho.   
 
III. The Influence of the State During the Settlement Process 
 
    In the traditional (pre-colonial) era, Ngāi Tamarāwaho was an autonomous group 
that played a central role in promoting group identity, language and culture among its 
members. 28  They had numerous interactions with neighbouring hapū that primarily 
served to strengthen their position and ensure their survival. Such interactions included 
intermarriage and unity in times of warfare. 29  However, during the colonisation era, 
which in the context of this research commenced in 1814 with the arrival of Pākehā 
(British) settlers and concluded in 1975 with the establishment of the Waitangi Tribuna l, 
the hapū was fragmented to such an extent30 that its structure and operation is markedly 
different in contemporary times. The Treaty settlement process has also played a role in 
bringing about contemporary changes, and has highlighted existing alliances and new 
structures. Trask31 notes the impact of state involvement, in particular state definitions, 
on Indigenous groups globally, and writes, “Who we believe ourselves to be is often not 
                                                 
21 Hazel Petrie, Chiefs of Industry: Māori Tribal Enterprise in Early Colonial New Zealand, (Auckland, 
New Zealand: Auckland University Press, 2013), 11-28.  
22 Haunani-Kay Trask, From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai’i , (Hawai’i, 
USA: University of Hawaiʻ i Press, 1999), 23-40. 
23 Maharaia Winiata, The changing role of the leader in Māori society, (Auckland, New Zealand: 
Blackwood & Janet Paul Ltd., 1967), 14-25.  
24 Charles Royal, Some speculations on Māori identity in the New Zealand of tomorrow , Paper presented 
at the Concepts of Nationhood Symposium (Wellington, New Zealand: 2007). 
25 Supra note 20, at 23-40.  
26 The Act relating to the Ngāi Tamarāwaho settlement will be implemented following the passage of the 
legislation, the process of which has yet to be completed. 
27 Supra note 17, at 116.  
28 Paul Woller, Nga Hāhi O Ngāi Tamarāwaho , Master of Arts Thesis  (Massey University, New Zealand: 
2005). 
29 Supra note 21, at 14-25. 
30 Carrie Wainwright and Karen Feint, Submissions of counsel for Ngāi Tamarāwaho (Wellington, New 
Zealand: Buddle Findlay Solicitors: 2000), 14-56.  




what the colonial legal system defines us to be….” Joseph 32  supports Trask’s 
observations, and warns that state definitions of Indigenous groups “strip them of their 
identity and consequently of their land and resources.” He adds that through the Treaty 
settlement process, “Māori have had systems of identity, governance and representation 
imposed upon them,” which has affected the traditional structure of tribal groups.  
 
    During the settlement of claims, the Crown (state) prefers to negotiate with what 
the Office of Treaty Settlements refers to as “large natural groups,”33 specifically, an iwi, 
or a cluster of hapū with a significant population and a large distinctive claim area. Their 
primary reasons for this are that this approach is cost-efficient, it makes it easier to deal 
with overlapping interests, and it allows the Crown to offer a wider range of redress, 
which the Crown believes results in more needs being met. 34  However, the Crown’s 
preference to negotiate with iwi rather than hapū fails to acknowledge the role of hapū as 
autonomous entities in their own right, who have legitimate individual grievances that 
may not be felt by the wider iwi. Ngāi Tamarāwaho had the “dubious distinction of being 
the hardest hit, and the worst affected by the raupatu (confiscations)”35; therefore, the 
hapū sought to have their claim settled in a manner that recognises their experiences 
separate from those of other hapū and the wider iwi. Trask,36 in reference to the challenges 
faced by Native Hawaiians, also notes: “We are constantly in struggle with government 
agencies and, sometimes, with our own people.” In an attempt to have their grievances 
addressed separate to those of the wider iwi, Ngāi Tamarāwaho encountered difficult ies 
with members of the iwi. Tai37 recalls: “Our biggest enemy wasn’t the Crown…. The 
hard part was dealing with ourselves because not everyone in [Ngāti] Ranginui suffered 
the same. The [confiscation of the] 50,000-acre block landed on our shoulders.” The hapū 
did not want to be engulfed by the wider iwi but rather insisted on having their grievances 
heard as a legitimate entity in their own right. 
 
    Ward,38 conversely, contends that in order for the settlement process to operate 
cohesively, definitions of tribal groups and claimants had to be made. The Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975 states that “any Māori” could bring a claim to the Tribuna l. 39 
However, as Ward40  points out, historical injustices largely occurred within a group 
setting where Māori possessed land as members of an iwi or hapū, rather than to 
individuals on their own. Furthermore, Māori protested the injustices collectively as part 
                                                 
32 Robert Joseph, “Unsettling Treaty settlements: Contemporary Māori Identity and Representation 
Challenges,” in Treaty of Waitangi Settlements, eds. Nicola. R Wheen & Janine Hayward (Wellington, 
New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books Limited, 2012), 151-165. 
33 “Office of Treaty Settlements,” Department of Justice (2002), www.ots.govt.nz. 
34 Supra note 30. 
35 Supra note 28. 
36 Supra note 20. 
37 Supra note 17. 
38 Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty claims in New Zealand today (Wellington, New Zealand: 
Bridget Williams Books, 1999), 28-46.   
39 Supra note 30. 




of their respective tribal groups or, in some instances, on a pan-Māori basis.41 Ward42 
believes that the provision that “any Māori” can lodge a claim means that any existing 
tribal authorities and structures could be bypassed and the Crown would be left to address 
a profusion of unrelated or competing claims that lack a common view. This could also 
lead to division and further fragmentation in tribal groups where there is no requirement 
to present a united front. In addition to this, Ward argues that hearing Treaty claims at a 
hapū or even whānau (extended family) level slows direct negotiation and Tribuna l 
hearings, which, in turn, slows the transfer of assets to iwi and hapū who remain largely 
deprived of an economic base. He also notes that central pooling of assets often 
maximises the economic leverage of tribal groups, and consequently increases their 
ability to effect change.  
 
   Ngāi Tamarāwaho persevered to have their identity as a hapū recognised and their 
grievances addressed at a hapū level. The Crown acknowledged the vastly different 
experiences of loss due to Crown breaches of the Treaty among the constituent hapū of 
Ngāti Ranginui and agreed to a “hapū centric” settlement, which was a first in the 
settlement process.43  However, while Ngāi Tamarāwaho negotiated directly with the 
Crown via hapū-mandated negotiators, the Crown required the eight hapū of Ngāti 
Ranginui to form a collective post-settlement governance entity (PSGE) for the return of 
assets. Te Roopu Whakamana o ngā Hapū o Ngāti Ranginui was mandated in 2008, 
charged with finalising the Deed of Settlement on behalf of the eight constituent hapū and 
receiving the settlement assets, which were then passed on to the respective hapū 
following the establishment of each hapū PSGE. Atawhai did not respond well to the 
Crown’s insistence that Ngāi Tamarāwaho form an iwi structure with other constituent 
hapū. She comments:  
 
The settlement has already affected us when we concede four per cent of 
the 50,000 acres that we lost to other hapū. They didn’t lose what we lost, 
and they got four per cent off the blood of our tupuna. They should get 
back in their patch and deal with their own affairs…. I question ourselves 
though. Why didn’t we have the things in place?44 
 
    However, Ward45 suggests that negotiating with the Crown is “precisely the kind 
of struggle that overarching iwi structures exist for.” Indeed, in the traditional era, Ngāi 
Tamarāwaho united with constituent hapū and even other iwi, particularly during times 
of warfare,46 and it can be argued that the struggle Ngāi Tamarāwaho faced to have their 
grievances heard by the Crown is a modern-day battle that warrants the joining of Ngāti 
Ranginui hapū at an iwi level. In wider society, tribal groups united at a pan-Māori level 
                                                 
41 Paul Moon, “The Impression of Hybridised Indigeneity: A History of the United Nations’ Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues and the Emergence of a Globalised Construction of Indigeneity,” 
International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 8, no. 1 (2015), 32-46. 
42 Supra note 36. 
43 “Ngāti Ranginui Iwi” (2011), www.ranginui.co.nz 
44 Supra note 17. 
45 Supra note 36. 
46 Evelyn Stokes, Te Raupatu o Tauranga Moana: The Confiscation of Tauranga Lands , Report prepared 




to increase their political power during the 1970s. Moon47 recalls that Ngā Tamatoa, an 
activist group that opposed racism and advocated for greater Māori rights, placed an 
emphasis on pan-tribalism and established a national framework for protest. The strength 
gained through numbers meant that the group achieved greater political influence. While 
some may argue that the Crown’s insistence on Ngāi Tamarāwaho participating in the 
settlement process at an iwi level is detrimental to the operation of the hapū, it can also 
be argued that uniting at this level is a modern-day demonstration of a traditional aspect 
of hapū life.  
 
    In the present era, some suggest that the Treaty claims process has been influentia l 
in the re-emergence of Ngāi Tamarāwaho as a hapū in its own right. The identities of 
many hapū were engulfed by nineteenth century anthropologists and government 
administrators who insisted on dealing with Māori at an iwi level,48,49 but the recognition 
provided to hapū like Ngāi Tamarāwaho contributes to the revitalisation of the dynamics 
of society in the traditional era when the hapū was often the main group. Ngāi 
Tamarāwaho did not want to be submerged in an iwi structure, or to have reparations from 
the Crown retained and managed at an iwi level. Indeed, Ward50 acknowledges there is a 
“tendency, always present in Māori society, for constituent hapū to reassert their 
identity….” In addition to reasserting hapū identity, Royal51 observes that hapū research 
into their own respective oral traditions to support their claims is a source of renewed 
pride and local strength. Smith52 notes that the Treaty settlement process has led to a 
“revival of participation and re-connection” with members to their respective tribal group, 
and research conducted in 2007 shows that the significance of tribal identity in wider 
society has become increasingly more important, with 75% of Māori agreeing that tribal 
identity is important to them, compared with fewer than 50% in 2004.53 The beneficia l 
role Ngāi Tamarāwaho compiled following settlement indicates that tribal identity and 
belonging is important to a significant proportion of hapū members.  
 
IV. The Influence of the State in a Post-Settlement Environment 
 
    The preceding section acknowledged that the state has an impact on iwi and hapū 
during the Treaty settlement process, and this section considers the influence of the state 
in the post-settlement phase. Before the Crown transfers settlement assets to tribal groups, 
there is a requirement that these groups establish a “suitable governance entity”54 that is 
                                                 
47 Supra note 39. 
48 Angela Ballara, Iwi: The Dynamics of Māori Tribal Organisation from C. 1769 to C. 1945 (Wellington, 
New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 1998), 69-73.  
49 Steven Bourassa and Ann Louise Strong, “Restitution of land to New Zealand Māori: The role of social 
structure,” Pacific Affairs 75, no. 2 (2002), 227-260. 
50 Supra note 36. 
51 Supra note 22. 
52 Supra note 2. 
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“acceptable, representative, transparent, and accountable,” and ensures that “any assets 
or resources will be managed and administered within a proper legal structure.”55  In 
response to such requirements, Ngāi Tamarāwaho established the Ngāi Tamarāwaho 
Tribal Authority Trust, comprised of seven members who administer the settlement assets 
on behalf of the hapū. The members must be from the hapū. Nikau comments:  
 
I don’t think there is any great issue working with a structure that the 
Crown gave us, or with the entity and how it was structured under the 
Deed…. It hasn’t changed who we are—it would be sad if that happened-
-it’s just affecting how we deal with our affairs.56 
 
However, Nikau argues that “the government has corporatized us” and adds: 
 
Under Westminster law, iwi and hapū are not recognised as a structure. 
For the government to release any money, they require us to create a 
structure under Westminster law, and we all run along because we want 
that money. Nobody has stood up and said, ‘Oh you agree that you’ve done 
wrong? OK, just give us our money.’ Why should we create any 
structure?57   
 
    Joseph58 argues that the Crown’s pressure on tribal groups to codify into “large 
natural groupings” and establish tribal and, in some cases, pan-tribal associations in a 
form that is consistent with Crown notions of organisation, representation and 
governance, has a significant impact on the identity of tribal groups, wherein tribal 
structures are at risk of being replaced by governance entities. Mikaere59 suggests that the 
settlement process, specifically the establishment of Crown-determined governance 
entities, has an underlying philosophy of assimilation, and Joseph60 concurs by arguing 
that tribal governance entities “meet government-driven agendas … to achieve 
devolution, mainstreaming and other neoliberal agendas.” Mikaere 61  adds that 
“corporatized” tribal groups are “rewarded,” and that “this form of neo-assimilat ion, 
while less overt than earlier policies, still has a devastating effect on Māori …[who] need 
to be mindful of excess corporatization to the detriment of tribal culture and identity. ” 
Durie62 notes the impact of corporate structures on the identity of tribal groups in Alaska, 
                                                 
55 Crown Proposals for the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims: Summary (Wellington, New 
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57 Supra note 17. 
58 Supra note 30. 
59 Annie Mikaere, “Settlement of Treaty claims: full and final, or fatally flawed?” New Zealand 
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and Altman63 observes the same trend for some Indigenous groups in Australia. Joseph64 
warns that tribal groups are at risk of being replaced by the governance entities, stating: 
“It is important to remember that the entity and its subsidiaries represent the tribe, they 
do not replace it…. Identity precedes representation, not the other way round.” Indeed, 
Nikau65 warns: “We mustn’t let the hapū be replaced by the governance entity. We must 
remember the entity acts on behalf of the hapū, but it isn’t the hapū.”  
 
    The Crown also influences the definition of tribal groups in the post-settlement 
phase. The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992, commonly referred 
to as the Sealord deal, is an example of a Crown definition of tribal groups in a post-
settlement environment. The Sealord deal transferred 20% of the Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch (TACC) of all Quota Management System (QMS) current and future 
stocks to Māori, together with funding to purchase a half share in the Sealord Group.66 
The Crown wrote into the Fisheries Act that it was for the benefit of “all Māori” while, at 
the same time, stating that fisheries quota should be distributed through iwi, entities that 
Ward67 notes are “far from being clearly defined.” Urban Māori groups, which comprise 
Māori who no longer have a strong connection with their ancestral tribal group, were 
concerned that they would not be allocated a fair share, if any, of the fisheries quota, and 
sought a distribution model that recognised them as a modern-day tribal group and 
legitimate site of belonging.68  
 
    The Waitangi Tribunal’s “Te Whānau o Waipareira Report,” which was released 
in 1998, found that this particular urban authority is “iwi- like” in nature, and the urban 
groups used this finding in support of their quest for recognition in the distribution of the 
fisheries quota. However, the High Court found that in the context of the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992, “iwi” meant “traditional iwi,”69 despite 
no evidence that suggests that hapū and iwi were traditionally fixed entities. Furthermore, 
Section 3 of the Māori Fisheries Act 2004 is a “legislative prescription of what the ‘tribe’ 
is to be in a commercial fisheries context and, with limited exceptions, does not allow for 
any evolution or change of ‘iwi’ group identification.”70 Joseph concludes that the state 
defined what a “Māori tribe” is despite this legislative decree not necessarily representing 
the way in which tribal groups want to be identified. Trask, again in reference to the 
Hawaiian context, supports such a sentiment, and observes:  
 
If we are tribal, the colonial power defines us so as to minimise the powers 
of the tribe. If we are not tribal, the colonial power uses our self-definit ion 
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against us by claiming that we are not Indigenous because we are not 
tribal.71  
 
Urban Māori groups continue to maintain that they represent new and 
genuine Māori communities, whose members are entitled to a share of the fishin g 
quota but who do not wish to secure their quota rights through membership of a 
traditional tribal group.72,73 Conversely, traditional tribal groups tend to question 
the legitimacy of these new, hybrid groups as valid entities in their own right. 74 
Some analysts contend that traditional tribal structures could not have functioned 
unchanged in a modern world and that, in order to achieve cultural continuity, it is 
essential to recognise the existence of hybrid or multiple sites of belonging to 
different places and groups.75,76,77,78  
 
V. Conclusion  
 
    Analysis of the Treaty settlement process and its influence on iwi and hapū during 
and after settlement indicates that the settlement process has played a significant role in 
defining tribal groups and the ways in which they operate. The settlement process has had 
some positive outcomes for iwi and hapū, such as Ngāi Tamarāwaho, by providing tribal 
groups with access to an economic base; contributing to a rejuvenation of hapū 
knowledge; and facilitating renewed participation for many tribal members. However, the 
process has also presented challenges for iwi and hapū. A number of groups have had to 
contend with state attempts to define them and many hapū, including Ngāi Tamarāwaho, 
successfully persevered to be recognised as a group in their own right separate from the 
wider iwi. In closing, these challenges require careful and considered navigation as iwi 
and hapū plan for their futures in a post-settlement environment. 
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The Sixties Scoop: Canada’s Legacy of Lost Children 
      
Vida Foubister 
 
I am four years old and completely focused on scrubbing every crevice of a 
black-and-white, snakeskin-print high chair with chrome legs. It is January 1973 and the 
high chair, with its white plastic tray that lifts overhead and absence of any harness, 
would never meet today’s child safety standards. I want the chair, first my sister’s and 
then mine, to be spotless for our new brother. 
 
His name is David. He is chubby with round cheeks and big, brown eyes. He is 
an Asinīskāwiyiniwak or Rocky Cree from northern Saskatchewan. Today is his 
birthday, but my mom tells me that it is too much excitement to have a cake with two 
candles to celebrate on the day he joins our family. 
 
 Twenty-three years later, I am sorting through my brother’s few possessions, 
alone in his rooming house in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside. Removed from his 
community and stripped of his language, culture and religion at birth, David struggled 
to find his identity. Though heroin took his life, Canada’s failed approaches toward 
Indigenous Peoples was a contributing factor. 
  
“Canada’s Indian policy, from its very inception, has sought to undermine the 
bond between aboriginal children and their families,” wrote Suzanne Fournier and Ernie 
Crey in their 1997 book, Stolen From Our Embrace.1 “Each era saw a new reason to 
take aboriginal children away from home, placing them in residential schools, foster 
care or non-aboriginal adoptive families.”2 
 
 This consistent and deliberate separation and forced assimilation of Indigenous 
children and chronic underfunding of child welfare services in their communities has 
profoundly injured Indigenous Peoples. Canada’s 1.4 million First Nations, Inuit and 
Métis people3 continue to experience poor living conditions and substandard schooling, 
among other issues.4 
 
 A 2016 study by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives found that 51 
percent of First Nations children live in poverty. This number rises to 60 percent for 
                                                 
1 Suzanne Fournier and Ernie Crey, Stolen From Our Embrace: The Abduction of First Nations Children 
and the Restoration of Aboriginal Communities (Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & MacIntyre Ltd., 1997), 
17. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Karen Kelly-Scott and Kristina Smith, “Aboriginal Peoples: Fact Sheet for Canada” (Ottawa, Canada: 
Social and Aboriginal Statistics Division of Statistics Canada, November 2015). 
4 David Macdonald and Daniel Wilson, “Shameful Neglect: Indigenous Child Poverty in Canada” 






First Nations children who live on reserves, with poverty rates as high as 76 percent in 
Manitoba and 69 percent in Saskatchewan for First Nations children living on reserves.5 
 
 This same study found poverty rates were 30 percent for non-status First Nations 
children, 25 percent for Inuit children, and 23 percent for Métis children. (Canada has 
an overall child poverty rate of 18 percent, ranking it 27 among 34 countries in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.6) 
 
I. The Sixties Scoop 
 
It was only after David’s death that I learned he was a victim of what is now 
commonly referred to as the “Sixties Scoop.” Patrick Johnston first used this term in his 
1983 book to describe the pervasive child-welfare approach that was removing First 
Nations, Inuit and Métis children from their homes across Canada and placing them 
with non-Indigenous families.7 (Despite the reference to one decade, the Sixties Scoop 
began in the late 1950s and persisted into the 1980s.) 
 
 “During the course of my research for the book, I interviewed a retired social 
worker in British Columbia, who said that during the sixties, she and her colleagues 
‘scooped’ children from reserves ‘almost as a matter of course,’” wrote Johnston. “The 
phrase was so evocative that I used it as the heading of the chapter in my book that 
presented the statistics.”8 
 
“That social worker was in tears when I interviewed her. At the time, she 
honestly thought that she had been acting in the best interests of the children by 
removing them from their families. She had come to believe, however, that the 
wholesale apprehension or ‘scooping’ of Indigenous children in the sixties had been a 
terrible mistake. Once admitted into care, the Indigenous children she and her 
colleagues had apprehended were much less likely to be returned to their parents than 
other children. If they were placed in foster families or adopted, it was very likely they 
would be placed with a non-Indigenous family.”9 A 1980 study by the Canadian 
Council on Social Development, for example, found 78 percent of status First Nations 
children who were adopted were placed with non-Indigenous families.10 
 
 The Sixties Scoop statistics are staggering. Based on 1977 data from Indian and 
Northern Affairs, Health and Welfare Canada, Statistics Canada and provincial 
departments of social services, an estimated 15,500 Indigenous children were in the care 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Patrick Johnston, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Toronto, Canada: James Lorimer & 
Company Ltd., 1983), 23. 
8 Patrick Johnston, “Revisiting the Sixties Scoop of Indigenous Children,” Policy Options (July 2016), 
http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2016/revisiting-the-sixties-scoop-of-indigenous-children/.  
9 Ibid. 
10 H. Philip Hepworth, Foster Care and Adoption in Canada  (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Council on 




of child welfare authorities that year.11 They represented 20 percent of all Canadian 
children living in care, even though Indigenous children made up less then 5 percent of 
the total child population.12 This situation was acute in the four western provinces, 
where the proportion in care was 39 percent in British Columbia, 44 per cent in Alberta, 
51 per cent in Saskatchewan and 60 percent in Manitoba. 
 
 The increase in the number of Indigenous children who were legal wards of the 
state coincided with a change in the Indian Act in 1951 that shifted responsibility for 
First Nations health, welfare and educational services from the federal government to 
the provinces.13 Provinces and territories initially provided on-reserve services only in 
extreme emergencies, but extended their reach after receiving federal funds for these 
efforts. 
 
 “By the end of the 1970s, the transfer of children from residential schools was 
nearly complete in Southern Canada, and the impact of the Sixties Scoop was in 
evidence across the country,” according to the final report of Canada’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a component of the Indian Residential Schools 
Settlement Agreement reached in 2006.14 
 
 The Commission was mandated to document the experiences of Indigenous 
children who, from 1879 to 1996, were removed from their families and placed in 
residential schools by the Canadian government, and to share the truth of survivors, 
families, communities and others affected with all Canadians. The first five of 94 calls 
to action in the TRC’s final report, released in 2015, focused on child welfare. 
 
II. Failure to Support Indigenous Mothers 
 
My parents chose to adopt an Indigenous child after my mother learned about 
AIM or Adopt Indian and Métis at a monthly meeting of the local Women’s Missionary 
Society, a group that is part of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. 
 
 Launched in 1967, the federal and provincial government-funded AIM project 
promoted the adoption of First Nations children by middle-class, white families. AIM 
was the only targeted Indigenous transracial adoption program in Canada.15 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Supra note 8.  
13 Vandna Sinha and Anna Kozlowski, “Structure of Aboriginal Child Welfare in Canada,” International 
Indigenous Policy Journal 4, no. 2 (2013), 3-4, http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol4/iss2/2.  
14 Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future (Winnipeg, Canada: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, 2015), 69, 
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_Ju
ly_23_2015.pdf.  
15 Allyson Stevenson, “Intimate Integration: A Study of Aboriginal Transracial Adoption in 





 In a CBC News clip produced after the project’s first year, several Indigenous 
children are shown playing as the reporter, Craig Oliver, tells viewers that they are only 
a few of the hundreds of “unwanted Indian and Métis children” ages six weeks to six 
years who are in need of homes. “They are the products of a sudden and sharp rise in 
illegitimate births and marriage breakdowns among Indian and Métis people.”16 
 
 Oliver also reported on the “extraordinary” results of the project, which placed 
100 children, including several family groups of children, in its first year—none of 
whom were returned to the agency. “[AIM] organized a saturation publicity campaign 
with radio and TV advertising and, most effective of all, large photographs in provincial 
newspapers.”17 
 
 The project, in its fifth year when my parents learned about it, also promised fast 
adoptions, with placement possible within 10 weeks. David arrived in our Saskatoon, 
Saskatchewan, home about five months after my parents initiated the adoption process. 
 
 Though my parents (and others like them) had the best intentions in opening 
their hearts and home to an Indigenous child, I now know that my brother’s birth 
mother might not have freely chosen to give him up for adoption. But as a young, single 
First Nations mother, one who was quite likely struggling with poverty, inadequate 
housing, and possibly alcohol and/or drug abuse, she would have lacked the support and 
resources necessary to fight the child welfare system to keep him. 
 
 Non-Indigenous agencies often required single, Indigenous mothers to live on 
their own, as opposed to traditional, multi-generational households, in order to regain 
custody of their children. “This demand goes against the native patterns of child care,” 
wrote Associate Chief Judge Edwin C. Kimelman, who led an independent inquiry into 
the adoption and foster placement of Indian and Métis children in Manitoba, in his 1985 
report. “In the native tradition, the need of a young mother to be mothered herself is 
recognized. The grandparents and aunts and uncles expect the demands and rewards of 
raising the new member of the family. To insist that the mother remove herself from the 
support of her family when she needs them most is unrealistic and cruel.”18 
 
 Membership changes in the new Indian Act also prevented single Indigenous 
mothers from living with their children on reserves and complicated placements with 
family members. Mothers who chose to remain on reserves with their children had to 
first prove that the father of their children had First Nations status. Additionally, 
children of unmarried First Nations mothers often could not be placed with families on 
reserves due to these same membership stipulations.19 
                                                 
16 Craig Oliver, “Adoption Agency Seeks Homes for Indian and Métis children in 1968,” 
CBC News (May 1968), http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/adoption-agency-seeks-homes-for-indian-and-
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17 Ibid. 
18 Associate Chief Judge Edwin C. Kimelman, “No Quiet Place: Review Committee on Indian and M étis 
Adoptions and Placements, Final Report” (Manitoba, Canada: Department of Community Services, 
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 “In the foster and adoptive care system, aboriginal children typically vanished 
with scarcely a trace, the vast majority of them placed until they were adults in non-
aboriginal homes where their cultural identity, their legal Indian status, their knowledge 
of their own First Nation and even their birth names were erased, often forever,” wrote 
Fournier and Crey.20 After his father died, Crey, who was 12, and five younger siblings 
were removed from their home and placed in non-Indigenous foster homes. The family 
was never together again.21 
 
III. Absence of Culturally Appropriate Care 
 
Many First Nations, Inuit and Métis children who were adopted already had 
homes and families. But due to income, cultural and religious differences, these homes 
did not meet the standards and expectations of Canada’s dominant white, middle-class 
society. “We must recognize that some children may have been taken into care not 
because they were unloved or unwanted or neglected, but because they were poor,” 
wrote Johnston.22 
 
 Further, not all foster and adoptive homes were appropriately screened and many 
failed to provide better environments for the Indigenous children placed with them. As 
experienced by their grandparents and parents in the residential schools that preceded 
forced placement in foster and adoptive homes, many children suffered from physical 
and sexual abuse. 
 
 Among them is Richard S. Cardinal, a Métis teenager who committed suicide in 
1984. Cardinal was removed from his home in Alberta at the age of four and then 
moved in and out of 28 foster homes, group homes and shelters. The seventeen-year-old 
left behind a diary he titled “I Was a Victim of Child Neglect.” It documents some of 
his abuse and neglect and was used as the basis for a documentary about his short life.23 
 
 Other children whose placements in non-Indigenous homes received significant 
attention were Carla Williams and Cameron Kerley. Unlike Cardinal, these children 
were taken out of the country, Williams to the Netherlands and Kerley to the United 
States. Both children were physically and sexually abused.24 
 
 Though some parents chose not to tell their adopted children they were 
Indigenous, my brother knew from a young age that he was Cree. As a young adult, he 
sought out and obtained his First Nations status card—an identity document that 
confirms someone is registered as a “Status Indian” as defined by the federal Indian 
Act—with the Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation located in northeast Saskatchewan. 
 
                                                 
20 Supra note 1, at 81. 
21 Ibid., 30. 
22 Supra note 8. 
23Richard Cardinal: Cry from a Diary of a Métis Child , Documentary film, directed by Alanis 
Obomsawin (Montreal, Canada: The National Film Board of Canada, 1986). 
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 However, David’s overall experience was likely fairly typical of Indigenous 
adoptions into white, Christian homes. Our family did not have a deep knowledge of 
Indigenous culture and we did not understand the importance of helping him connect 
with his First Nations community. 
 
 In a book documenting her and other families’ experiences adopting First 
Nations and Métis children, Marie Adams wrote that these children carry a double 
burden. “[T]hey absorb many of society’s negative stereotypes of natives and they are 
isolated from all of the positive aspects of aboriginal culture and values.”25 
 
 It was not until David left home that he slowly began to identify with other First 
Nations people. But he never reconnected with his family and community; he had 
paperwork to initiate this process in his room when he died. 
 
 David, like many other Indigenous adoptees, turned to alcohol and drugs to 
numb his pain. “[T]hey are in limbo between two cultures—uncertain of who they are, 
unsure of where they belong,” wrote Geoffrey York, who spent seven years covering 
native issues in Winnipeg for The Globe and Mail.26 
 
IV. Shift to Indigenous Child Welfare Agencies 
  
“Today, the effects of the residential school experience and the Sixties Scoop 
have adversely affected parenting skills and the success of many Aboriginal families. 
These factors, combined with prejudicial attitudes toward Aboriginal parenting skills 
and a tendency to see Aboriginal poverty as a symptom of neglect, rather than as a 
consequence of failed government policies, have resulted in grossly disproportionate 
rates of child apprehension among Aboriginal people,” wrote the TRC Commissioners 
in their final report.27 According to a 2011 Statistics Canada study, 14,225 or 3.6 per 
cent of all First Nations children aged 14 and under continue to be in foster care, 
compared with 15,345 or 0.3 per cent of non-Indigenous children. 
 
 First Nations communities have responded to the loss of their children and the 
resulting “cultural genocide” both by repatriating children whose adoptions failed and 
working to regain control over child welfare practices related to their children, starting 
in 1973 with the Blackfoot (Siksika) child welfare agreement in Alberta.28 While there 
are about 125 First Nations Child and Family Service Agencies across Canada, they 
operate through a patchwork of agreements that give them authority from the provincial 
government to provide services and funding from the federal government.29 There is no 
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overarching federal legislation setting standards for child custody proceedings like the 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 in the United States. 
 
 The shift to Indigenous-controlled child welfare services has not progressed 
without some problems, due in part to the communities’ limited experience and 
professional training. Additionally, many First Nations agencies do not have sufficient 
funding to provide necessary programs, such as home support, that can help keep 
families in crisis together. 
 
 Funding for child and family services on reserves is insufficient and 
discriminates against First Nations children, according to Cindy Blackstock, Ph.D., 
Executive Director of the First Nations Family and Child Caring Society and a professor 
in the School of Social Work at McGill University. The Canadian government’s own 
documents show Indigenous agencies receive about 22 to 34 percent less in funding 
than provincial agencies.30  
 
 Blackstock’s organization and the Assembly of First Nations, a political 
organization representing all First Nations in Canada, took the matter to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission in 2007. Their complaint, which alleged that the 
Government of Canada had a longstanding pattern of providing less government 
funding for child welfare services to First Nations children on reserves than is provided 
to non-Indigenous children, was referred to the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. 
 
 The Tribunal ruled in January 2016 that the Canadian government’s failure to 
provide equitable and culturally based child welfare services to 165,000 First Nations 
children amounted to discrimination.31 But the government, which spent at least $5 
million Canadian fighting the complaint, has failed to act on this and three subsequent 
noncompliance orders. 
 
 On August 25, 2017, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) called on Canada to: end the underfunding of First Nations, Inuit and Métis 
child and family services; to ensure that all children, on and off reserve, have access to 
all services available to other children in Canada, without discrimination; to fully 
implement Jordan’s Principle to ensure access to services is not delayed or denied 
because of funding disputes between the federal, provincial and territorial governments; 
and to address the root causes of displacement, such as poverty and poor housing, that 
disproportionately drive Indigenous children into foster care.32 
 
V. Sixties Scoop Settlement 
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As Indigenous communities continue to wait for the government to treat their 
children equitably, a Canadian judge ruled in February 2017 that the government was 
liable for the harm caused by the Sixties Scoop.33 Beaverhouse First Nation Chief 
Marcia Brown Martel, who suffered emotional, physical and sexual abuse after being 
placed in the foster system as a child, filed the class action lawsuit in Ontario nearly a 
decade ago. It was one of a series of class action lawsuits that had been launched in five 
provinces. 
 
 “The ‘scooped’ children lost contact with their families,” wrote Ontario Superior 
Court Justice Edward Belobaba in his decision. “They lost their aboriginal language, 
culture and identity. Neither the children nor their foster or adoptive parents were given 
information about the children’s aboriginal heritage or about the various educational 
and other benefits that they were entitled to receive. The removed children vanished 
‘with scarcely a trace.’”34 
 
 The $800 million Canadian settlement, which was announced October 6, 2017, 
will provide status First Nations and Inuit with $25,000 to $50,000 Canadian in 
compensation, depending on the number of claimants who come forward. It will also 
establish a $50 million Canadian endowment for an Indigenous Healing Foundation.35 
Non-status First Nations and Métis will not receive compensation under the 
settlement.36  
 
 “Never before in history has a nation recognized, in this way, children’s right to 
their cultural identities, and a government’s responsibility to do everything in its power 
to protect the cultural identity of children in its care,” said Jeffery Wilson, the lead 
attorney for the plaintiffs.37 
 
 Though it is too late for David, this recognition is a first step towards helping 
thousands of others affected by the Sixties Scoop to reclaim their identities. 
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Himalayan Indigenous Peoples in Local Elections after Twenty Years: 
The Historical Gendered Perspective from Dolpo 
 
Tashi Tsering Ghale 
 
I. Introduction  
On May 14, 2017, many Indigenous Peoples from Dolpo came out to choose 
their candidates for the local election. It was about 8 am that Sunday when the first vote 
was cast. Many Dolpo women also came together for this electoral democratic practice. 
There were very few people who were left out of the election. After three days, the 
counting of votes started clearly showing gender inequality among the winners. In three 
village bodies of Dolpo, the highest post went to men, with the exception of one village 
body’s (Chharka Tangshyong) deputy chairperson that went to a woman. Gender 
inequality in such democratic practices led by the state can be traced back to the 
country’s historically non-inclusive relationship with the Indigenous community.  
 
In the present political scenario, Dolpo comprises three village bodies: Shey-
Phoksundo (previously Phoksundo, Saldang and Vijer Village Development 
Committees (VDCs)), Dolpo Buddha (previously Dho and Tingyu VDCs), and Chharka 
Tangsong (previously Chharka and Mukot VDCs), all located in the northern 
geographical terrain of the country. Each VDC is separated by a rough terrain including 
high altitude passes. All these VDCs are at least two days away from Dunai, the district 
headquarters of Dolpa, which falls in a Karnali Zone, a mid-western development 
region of Nepal. The remote location of Dolpo also makes the structural exclusion 
apparent. There are more than 5,000 people relying on high altitude agricultural 
farming, the barter exchange system and the trans-Himalayan trade for their livelihoods. 
It has only been a decade since people shifted their livelihoods and started relying 
heavily on the Yarsagunbu1 economy, thanks to increasing demand for the product and 
the higher prices it is now fetching. Meanwhile, in 1998, under the coordination of the 
Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), the National Foundation for 
Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) and the Dolpo Indigenous 
Development Center (DIDC), Dolpo was categorized as one of the Indigenous 
communities of Nepal. Nonetheless, the Dolpo peoples continue to face marginalization 
from the socio-cultural and political spheres of the country. This exclusion has highly 
impacted Dolpo women in particular.   
 
Against this backdrop, this article examines the non-inclusive relationship of the 
state in regards to the Dolpo Indigenous Peoples, focusing on state-led federal 
democratic local elections and the community’s gender relations. Local elections 
conducted by the state have continued the historical gender inequality of the Indigenous 
community. This paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of effective political 
participation, especially that of women. The paper is informed by a year’s data 
collection through primary and secondary sources. Participant observation of the local 
election, and semi-structured interviews with Dolpo men and women who voted, as well 
as officials who monitored the voting process, inform the research piece. Materials 
                                                 




published through books, personal blogs and national dailies also served as important 
sources of information for this paper.  
 
II. Discussion and Findings 
Geographically, Nepal lies between India and China. Politically, since the 
Bahadur Company conversion to the East India Company with the invasion of India by 
the British, several rulers of the country, after King Prithivi Narayan Shah’s2 
unification, have sought their legitimacy from the British but have always failed to 
obtain a consensus from their Indigenous People.  
Dolpo, as a community, appears to be part of the Zhangzhung kingdom. 
According to the historian Nyima Woeser Choekhortshang,3 the Zhangzhung kingdom, 
which predates Tibet, covered the area of Dolpo in the East and Ladakh (a geographical 
area of present India) in the South. The kingdom had its own language, different to that 
of Tibet’s Sambotta script, and was only annexed by Tibet’s emperor, Trisong Detsen, 
in the 8th century after his killing of of King Ligmikya of Zhangzhung, leading to the 
Tibetan empire then assimilating those communities.4 Only by the end of the eighteenth 
century was Dolpo, then in the north-western part of the country, annexed under the 
current territory of Nepal without any bloodshed and under the control of the Lo 
Kingdom of Mustang. 
Rulers such as the Shahs and the Ranas have succeeded in satisfying the British 
by helping in their imperial quests while supplying ‘brave’ Gurkhas from the hill region 
of Nepal. Though a Nepali-Anglo war did occur between the rulers of Nepal and the 
East India Company from 1814–1816 as a result of border disputes and ambitious 
expansionism, the war ended with the 1816 Saugauli Treaty, which forced the ruler of 
Nepal to surrender around a third of Nepal’s territory to the British.5 While every 
benefit, including economic incentives and taxes, filled the pockets of these few elites, 
the people remained impoverished subjects to the ruling elites.  
                                                 
2 King Prithivi Narayan Shah completed his unification of Nepal in 1789. 
3 Nyima Woeser Choekhortshang (historian) in personal communication with the author, 21 October, 2014, 
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Nepal’s unique ethnic and cultural diversity was assimilated and Sanskritized6 
by centralized governmental structures and policies. The process of marginalization and 
subjugation can clearly be observed historically, socially, culturally and politically.7 
During the period after unification, several communities of the Eastern and Western 
regions of the country were excluded from a participatory role in politics. Women were 
not treated any better. During this period, traders, Zamindars (landlords), and the elites 
of the country were busy with their own money-making transactions where the 
Indigenous Peoples were used either for loans, taxation, heavy bonds, or slaves.  
Dolpa8, including Dolpo, was not free of the taxation that began and continued 
under the regimes of Jumla, Mustang, the Shahs and the Ranas.9 The people of Dolpo 
supplied shawls, wool and other products to the Kings as taxation. All of these products 
are still made by women, limiting their roles and experiences to household chores. 
Taxes were also collected from individual Limbu10 and Dolpo households by various 
officials. Dolpo men were especially used by the state agencies to collect those taxes.11 
Collection of taxes also assisted Dolpo men to become political agents without any sort 
of exchange of information with the women of the community. This directly damaged 
their religious lives, as their simultaneous economic decline was clearly visible due to 
the loss of their communal land. The loss of communal land also affected their 
customary governance system, mainly the gapu (village headman) system. The gapu 
system led by the headman is pivotal in resolving conflicts, feuds, marriages, divorces 
and deciding the harvesting time.12 This provides strong evidence that intentional 
dehumanization of Indigenous Peoples was exercised by the state, while the state 
simultaneously enforced unequal gender relationships within these communities.   
                                                 
6 The term made popular by Indian sociologist M. N. Srinivas, Sanskritization is a form of social change 
that can also be found in Nepal where the ‘lower’ castes are forced to emulate the rituals of the dominant 
castes. This has also nullified the diversities of the country.  
7 Kumar Pradhan, “Consequences and Conclusion,” in The Gorkha Conquests: The Process and 
Consequences of the Unification of Nepal with Particular reference to Eastern Nepal (New Delhi, India: 
Oxford University Press,1991), 154-204; Pratyoush Onta, “The Growth of the Adivasi Janajati Movement 
in Nepal after 1990: The Non-Political Institutional Agents,” Studies in Nepali History and Society 
11(2006), 303-354.  
8 Dolpa is the largest district of Nepal and falls now in Province No. 6 under the new Federal structure of 
Nepal. Dolpo is one of the Indigenous communities falling within the geographic boundary of Dolpa. 
9 Tashi Ghale, “Nepal’s Exclusionary Democracy” Journal of Indigenous Nationalities 13 (2014), 153-
177. 
10 Limbu is one of the 59 listed Indigenous communities under NEFIN that reside in the eastern p art of the 
country. “The word Limbu means archer, or bearer of bow and arrows. Their ancestral and original 
stronghold, popularly known as Limbuwan, spans Nepal from Arun River to the east and Sikkim and the 
West Bengal states of India to the west. In Nepal, Limbus live and work in the districts of Sankhuwasabha, 
Tehrathum, Dhankuta, Taplejung, Panchthar, Ilam, Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari. Their scripture is called  
Mundhum. Phedangma, Shamba and Yeba-Yema are their sacred specialists. The population of the Limbus , 
according to the census of 2001, is 359,255.” (http://www.chumlung.org.np/page.php?page=6).  
11 Norbhu Ghale (chairperson of the Dolpo Indigenous Development Center) in personal communication 
with the author. 
12Kenneth M. Bauer, High Frontiers: Dolpo and the Changing World of Himalayan Pastoralists, (New 




Likewise, the xenophobic nationalism of the country was also formed and 
aggressively promulgated during this time. The state only prioritized Bhanubhakta13 to 
renew Asli Hindustan14 (the pure Hindu State) and the state’s idea of a Hindu 
Kingdom.15 While renewing these forms of ‘pseudo-nationalism,’ Onta implicitly 
confirms that several Indigenous Peoples’ cultures, beliefs and customs were also 
shattered. Under Jumla Kings, the region became part of the Gorkha domain as Khas 
kura (the dialects of the Khas community) became the lingua franca of the whole Dolpo 
region. This also affected the Dolpo locals in terms of their language and culture as they 
lost their mother tongue and were forced to learn the non-Dolpo languages. It further 
affected the women of Dolpo, who remained the guardians of culture and tradition, 
while silencing their voices typically expressed via songs and language. Those songs 
and language never made it into the curriculum of any school. Many writings, including 
a poem written by Bhanubhakta, were only introduced by the Panchayat16 education 
into the syllabus, which was disseminated to all parts of the country. Jha discusses King 
Mahendra’s idea of “Nation” and how it materialized via an education policy excluding 
“other” peoples’ cultures and knowledge: 
 
An education policy, with the primary objective of perpetuating the royal 
regime and its version of nationalism, was introduced. Nepali was the sole 
medium of instruction. Textbooks told children that Nepal was the creation of 
the Shah Kings, conveniently glossing over the fact that the unification was 
seen as a conquest by most indigenous people who cherished their own tale of 
resistance, and that much of the Tarai’s inclusion in Nepal was a result of 
arbitrary border demarcation after the Anglo-Nepal War of 1816.17 
It also reconfirmed the state’s authoritarianism and narrow understanding of how to deal 
with Indigenous Peoples and their languages. Amidst the reality of continuing 
discrimination and marginalization of Indigenous Peoples, the rise of the Indigenous 
                                                 
13 Bhanubhakta is a poet and a writer belonging to the upper class Brahmin family. He has contributed a lot 
in the Nepali literary scenes with his Nepali translation of the religious epic book from Sanskrit, Ramayana. 
According to Onta (1999), “Literary history pivoting around Bhanubhakta, and celebrations (in various 
modes) of Bhanubhakta as the second ‘unifier’ of Nepal via the medium of the Nepali language are two 
important aspects of the dominant national culture… the transportation of the nationalist ide ology built 
around Bhanubhakta to Nepal from Darjeeling, the textual cultivation of Bhanubhakta as the Nepali adikavi 
(poet with an essence in writing as said by his fellow poet, Motiram Bhatta), the audio -visual dissemination 
of Bhanubhakta, the celebrations of his birthday as Bhanujayanti and the development of Bhanubhakta’s 
birthplace in Chundi Ramgha in the present day Tanahu district of central Nepal—Bhanujanmasthal—as a 
site for national pilgrimage” helped to make him the most recognized icon that in turn helped the 
nationalistic agenda of the king flourish.   
14 Hachhethu (2003) argues “for the successor of P.N. Shah, as Asli Hindustan had become mantra in the 
state-designed project of national integration. It also manifested the source of legitimacy o f the Hindu king, 
derived from divine right.” 
15 Pratyoush Onta, “The Career of Bhanubhakta as a History of Nepali National Culture, 1940-1999,” 
Studies in Nepali History and Society 4, no. 1 (1999), 65-136. 
16 Panchayat is the name of a rule which briefly ended democracy in Nepal while banning several political 
parties of the country during the 1960s and helped provide a fertile ground for the authoritarian rule of King 
Mahendra and King Birendra until 1990. In this context, the education syllabus was also o riented and 
directed by the appointed chiefs of the former King Mahendra, which basically prioritized the nationalistic 
agenda that presented the King as a supreme being.  




Peoples’ movements in Nepal was inevitable. Nonetheless, for nearly thirty years, the 
country’s roads and streets were silenced to prevent any organized protest against the 
autocratic monarchy. Similarly, any organized effort to preserve and promote 
Indigenous languages, religions and cultures was charged as “anti-King,” “anti-
constitutional,” “anti-national,” and “communal.”18 The last 235 years of monopolistic 
policies of the ‘Hindu’ state created marginalized groups.19 While identifying the 
processes of the state’s homogenization of Indigenous Peoples, the various ethnic/tribal 
groups were constructed as matwali (alcohol drinkers) and their nationalities changed 
into castes. The matwali group of ethnicities was again divided into masine 
(enslaveable) and na-masine (non-enslaveable) castes, based on their political relation 
with the Hindu regime. The intention of the Muluki Ain20 was clearly aimed at internally 
colonizing the various communities and nationalities interpreted as species (jat).  
III. Post-1950s 
The state continues to jeopardize Indigenous communities. This is clear through 
an analysis of the post-1951 period of Nepal and its relationship with the Dolpo people, 
especially how the pastoral system changed because of Chinese politics and Nepal’s 
rhetorical actions. Bauer discusses both of these relevant social and political relations.21 
He stresses that Dolpo’s “trade relationships were based on kinship, language, culture 
and ecology” and were also affected because of the Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet as 
Nepal shared its northern borders with Tibet.22 The Dolpo people used to maintain their 
relations with the Thakali subba23and agents of the King of Lo. Nevertheless, the killing 
of one Nepali frontier guard in Mustang by Chinese guards also affected border 
relations. Subsequently, with the issue of Sagarmatha (Mount Everest) where China 
also claimed its ownership, Dolpo borders were sealed within Nepal, mainly along the 
                                                 
18K.B. Bhattachan, Minorities & Indigenous Peoples of Nepal  (Kathmandu, Nepal: Sayami’s Studio, 
2008) 9.  
19Harka Gurung, Trident and Thunderbolt: Cultural Dynamics in Nepalese Politics (Kathmandu, Nepal: 
Social Science Baha, 2003), 12.  
20  The first national legal code, pioneered by the Jung Bahadur Rana in 1854, contained a five -tiered 
national caste hierarchy in which the people of Nepal were divided into the following categories according 
to ascribed ritual purity: wearers of holy cord (tagadhari), non-enslavable alcohol-drinkers (na masine 
matwali), enslavable alcohol-drinkers (masine matwali), impure but touchable castes (choi chito halnya na 
parne), and impure and untouchable castes (choi choi halnya parne). This code put the high caste hill 
Hindus (Bahun, Thakuri and Chhetri) at the top and the traditionally non-Hindu groups, today’s Janajati, 
as matwali, below the Hindus. Those close to the rulers such as Gurung, Magar, Newar, and others, were 
kept as non-enslavable mmatwali while other peripheral groups, such as Bhote, Chepang, and Tharu, were 
made to be enslavable matwali (Onta, 2006). Following the Kot Massacre of 14-15 September, 1846, in 
which Jung Bahadur Rana had most of his political rivals killed, real political power of Nepal passed onto 
the family of the Ranas, who became hereditary Prime Ministers even though the Shah descendants of 
Prithivi Narayan continued to rule as kings.   
21 Kenneth Michael Bauer, High Frontiers: Dolpo and the Changing World of Himalayan 
Pastoralists(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) 99. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Subba is a tag given by the central king which denotes where the tax collectors for the region are 
appointed. For this function, mainly the influential people of the region were chosen. Thakali was, 
therefore, an influential group of Mustang and still continues to remain one. They are also one of the 59 




Panzang River (the current Tinje VDC). The designation of the area as a “restricted 
area” prohibited the movement of foreigners in Dolpo and also limited the locals’ trans-
Himalayan trade, especially dominated by the Dolpo men. This halted the free mobility 
of Dolpo men across the borders for trade.  
 
Furthermore, under the Panchayat system, government teams were sent to the 
northern border regions “to check Nepal’s borders, expel Indian personnel from military 
checkpoints, and move Tibetan refugees to camps for their eventual transfer to 
settlements around the globe.”24 These teams also forced the ethnic enclaves into the 
centralized state. In 1975, under the village panchayats, small local units were created 
by King Birendra. This development divided Dolpo into four village panchayats: Do-
Tarap, Saldang, Tinje, and Chharka. Examining the current complex relations, one 
needs to look to the bureaucratization and standardization of the state in the 1970s, 
implemented by the central state. During that era of Panchayat, representatives who 
came to power during the local elections appointed district officials and agents of the 
state to collect taxes. According to Lal, this also continued under the Chandra 
Shumsher25 regime, and only benefited the old elites and privileged people, even during 
the reign of Birendra. These village panchayats were turned into the Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) after the institutionalization of multiparty democracy 
in 1990. Moreover, elections were also conducted to bureaucratize the administration in 
rural areas. According to Bauer, “the first local elections for Nepal’s newly formed 
Parliament, village- level political offices were held in Dolpa District in 1964…, and the 
local political lineages retained power.” This election also affected the political relations 
of the Indigenous community, mainly in Tarap, while reconstituting the “old village 
assemblies within the Nepali state’s administration.”26 These institutional offices were 
filled by centrally appointed elected representatives, district chiefs and agents of the 
state and many were encouraged to continue even after the end of Panchayat era.27 This 
further motivated the Dolpo men to become politically active. None of the Dolpo 
women were included in these village level committees meant for economic 
development of the community28.  
Dunai became the headquarters of Dolpo and also the headquarters for the Dolpo 
peoples. The ban was only lifted during the 1990s and after that, several programs were 
                                                 
24 Supra note 20, at 101. 
25 Chandra Shumsher Rana, Jung Bahadur’s nephew and son of his brother, Dhir Shumsher, became the 
Prime Minister of Nepal in 1901 and controlled the country through authoritarian rule. Chandra Shumsher 
not only consolidated his family’s rule in Nepal through  affiliation with the British, but also opened Nepal’s 
closed borders to western influence in a tactical manner, one that consisted of a selective imitation of 
western cultural and political forms. He is also the first Rana Prime Minister to receive an Eng lish  
education. Chandra Shumsher’s inauguration of the Tri-Chandra College in 1918 remained, until the 
abolition of Rana rule in 1951, the only college in Nepal. He also made attempts at social reform and limited  
development of bureaucratic and administrative infrastructure, abolishing slavery and the sati system, 
where women were forcibly burned after their husband’s timely or untimely death. Later, Chandra 
Shumsher realized, however, that these reforms could prove to be dangerous to the autocratic rule. He even 
later restricted the promotion of the Nepali soldiers, who served the British, to the rank of a non -
commissioned officer (Uprety, 2011); C.K. Lal, To be a Nepalese (Kathmandu, Nepal: Martin Chautari 
Press, 2012), 10. 
26102 Supra note 20, at 102. 
27Lok Raj Baral, Nepal: Problems of Governance (New Delhi, India: Konark Publishers Pvt., 1993), 12. 




proposed and implemented from the center of the country. Subsequently, the natural 
resources including the Community Forestry Act and Forest User Groups (FUGs) 
organized under the Forest Act of 1993 put the same old elites in power while excluding 
the locals. The exclusion of the locals continued even after the decade-long Maoist 
insurgency and two constituent assembly elections. There is not a single representative 
from the communities of Dolpo currently in the bureaucracy, the army, the police, or the 
National Planning Commission (NPC).29 There is no single individual who understands 
the culture, language and religion of Dolpo in the district offices, nor in the buffer zone 
management committee (BZMC), revealing an exclusive situation in the bureaucratic 
structure of the country. Pandey states:  
 
According to data available from the Public Service Commission, 87 percent 
of those that passed the exams to enter government service in 2002 were 
either Bahuns or Chhetris while 8.7 percent were Newars. There was not a 
single Dalit while Muslims were only 0.5 percent. Similarly, the proportion 
of ethnic groups in the judiciary in the year 2001 indicates that 87 percent 
were Bahuns or Chhetris, 9.7 percent were Newars; and Rai, Tharu, Gurung, 
and Tamang together were 3.6 percent. Among the ministers in the cabinet 
in 2006, 70 percent were Bahuns or Chhetris from the hills and the Taria 
while Tharus, Newars, Rais, Thakali, Limbu, and Kami were 5.0 percent 
each.30 
 
According to Norbhu Ghale Dolpo, the government has not tried to include these 
Dolpo locals even in security positions of the region. Norbhu argues that it would be 
better if the locals were trained and recruited for security. The method would also make 
the youth more responsible towards their community and make the community safer 
from external threats.31 The Dolpo Joint Struggling Committee (DJSC) asked the 
government to educate or train the security or district officials regarding the local 
culture, religion and language, and also to make the BZMC inclusive. The census of 
2011 also recorded fewer local people than actually reside in the area.32 On the other 
hand, there are several oral narratives of the local Dolpo, which clearly show that this 
marginalization and suppression also materialized in the region vis-à-vis citizenship.  
The use of non-Dolpo language also stopped local Indigenous Peoples from 
having meaningful participation in the second constituent assembly election. During the 
time of the second constituent assembly election, Indigenous Peoples suffered due to a 
lack of voting ID cards, a lack of understanding of the voting process, and from being 
unaware of the candidates, voting papers and party signs and symbols on voting 
booths.33 Such structural exclusion and illicit practices were clearly seen in the last local 
                                                 
29 Tashi Tewa Dolpo, The Contested Local Elections and the customary laws: the case of Dolpo , Paper 
presented at the Fifth Annual Youth Researchers Conference , (2015) 
(http://www.martinchautari.org.np/files/Schedule_FifthAnnualYoungResearchersConference-2015.pdf).  
30Ramesh Nath Pandey, New Nepal, The Fault Lines (New Delhi, India: Sage Publications, 2010), 43. 
31Norbhu Ghale in personal communication with the author.  
32The census report of 2011 shows the population of Dolpo as 4,107 persons. It is the first time that the 
community member numbers have been recorded. According to Norbhu Ghale Dolpo, chairperson of the 
the Dolpo Indigenous Development Center (DIDC), the number is contestable as many people are put 
under either Ghale or Gurung surnames, which automatically puts them into those ethnic groups. Dolpo 
estimates the population to be more realistically between 12,000-14,000 persons.  
 
33Amidst all of these problems, Dhan Bahadur Buda of Sahartara VDC won the second constituent assembly 




election. Though the country was declared a a Federal Democratic Republic in 2008, the 
remote Himalayan Indigenous community of Dolpo was rarely allowed to practice their 
political rights, at least in terms of voting. A political party from the center, namely the 
Community Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Lennist (CPN-UML), ensured that Dolpo 
men could not could not practice their free will and choose their own candidates. The 
party forcibly intervened in every major decision-making opportunity the community 
had. Women were consequently controlled with the forcible limitation of their political 
rights in addition to those of men. Any men willing to resist was threatened with future 
repercussions. On the voting day, voting booths were monitored by the political agents 
and the party got who they wanted as a winner, while clearly restricting the effective 
participation of Indigenous men and women.      
 
IV. Conclusion  
The relationship of the state and Indigenous communities has usually remained 
tension-ridden. Gendered tensions within this relationship are frequently neglected, as 
are gender relationships within the community, thanks to the state’s continuous political 
intervention. Both men and women from Dolpo were first restricted in their mobility 
and, later, their culture and language were completely negated. The state’s domination 
has continued in every major election that has taken place up until today. Dolpo’s 
participation and the role of Dolpo women in the 2017 local election were clearly 
thwarted, in particular because of this historically non-inclusive relationship. Dolpo 
continues to remain a structurally excluded remote Himalayan Indigenous People. To 
what extent they will be able to assert their political rights in coming times is yet to be 
seen.    
 
 
                                                 
locals alleged that Buda and his cadres threatened and beat the locals to vote for h im, and his competitors 
blamed him for giving bribes to the locals to vote for him. Most of the locals complained that the security 
officials did not do anything to stop these cadres from beating the voters. In this atmosphere and context, 
including both the discriminatory and dehumanizing policies and the attitudes and behavior exercised by 




A Continuation of a Vision for Indigenous Governance through the United Nations 
 
Deanne L. Grant 
 
 The Indigenous Studies Summer Program with the Center for the Study of 
Ethnicity and Race at Columbia University in the summer of 2017 provided me with a 
unique opportunity to appreciate the longstanding efforts of Indigenous Peoples to 
articulate a vision for the future. To be honest, my prior educational background heavily 
criticized the United Nations (UN) as a bureaucratic, normative framework that was 
unhelpful to Indigenous Peoples, especially for those living in settler colonial states, 
such as the United States. This charge was based on the lack of a legally binding aspect 
to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration, 
or UNDRIP) for those who might seek recourse, causing a skewed and limited 
perspective that allowed little to no discourse on the benefits of the UN and, more 
specifically, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.   
 
 Despite these presumptions, I learned many things to contradict these ideas, and 
left with an appreciation for Indigenous visioning through the UN. One key point I 
would like to stress through this chapter is the recognition that, although there are legal 
limitations of UNDRIP for member states who have approved the Declaration, the 
Indigenous vision that exists within the Declaration is authentic and meaningful in the 
way it repeatedly articulates a better world, not only for Indigenous Peoples, but the 
entire world. Of course, we must acknowledge the reality that the United States has 
endorsed the Declaration, yet has failed to implement it. The shortcomings of the United 
States becomes the key talking point on the Declaration, where once again the 
colonialist view obscures Indigenous perspectives. It is essential to remain critical of 
these fallacies, while at the same time separating out the views that exist within the 
Declaration itself and the contrasting perspectives of those countries who fail to 
implement it. We should not overlook the important fact that the articles articulated 
within UNDRIP come from Indigenous Peoples’ time, energy, knowledge, and 
visioning. The second point this chapter stresses is the need to continuously criticize 
settler states when they fail to abide by their international agreements. I specifically 
draw from the ideas of American exceptionalism to demonstrate how ideologies of 
exceptionalism cloud the ability to believe injustice towards Indigenous Peoples in the 
United States continues today. 
 
Indigenous Peoples from around the world have contributed to, and built upon, a 
significant effort to clarify commitments from member states to recognize the unique 
rights of Indigenous Peoples, starting with Cayuga Chief Deskaheh, who traveled to 
Geneva in 1923. Once a person begins to imagine the representation and momentous 
efforts on the part of Chief Deskaheh to articulate Cayuga visions and perspectives at 
the League of Nations in the 1920s, it is easier to put a meaningful image behind these 
efforts. For those of us for whom this matters, one should not overlook the fact that this 
image is that of an Indigenous face. 
 
UNDRIP represents Indigenous visions which, upon reading, should invoke a 
certain hopefulness for any Indigenous activist. Imagine a world where every article in 




The articles represent a variety of powerful rights to live as Indigenous Peoples with 
topics ranging from the right to determine their own identity or members (Article 33) to 
having the right to the dignity and diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and 
aspirations (Article 15.1).1 This paper calls for Indigenous activists and Indigenous 
activist-scholars to recognize the potential of the Declaration to hold settler colonial 
states accountable to the rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
 
 To understand how Indigenous Peoples’ advocacy at the United Nations began, 
one must begin with Haudenosaunee Chief Deskaheh who remains a symbol of 
Indigenous sovereignty for many. In 1923, Chief Deskaheh traveled to Geneva to 
denounce Canada because Canada had violated the rights of the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy to be independent.2 It is remarkable to review this powerful historical 
move, especially as Chief Deskaheh expressed various types of appeals that are 
represented in UNDRIP, some 85 years after his visit to the League of Nations in 
Geneva. It should be noted Chief Deskaheh was not admitted into the League of Nations 
during his visit in 1923 and waited one year, but still received no hearing.3 Regardless, 
it is worth the effort to read his last speech given in 1925 to understand how Chief 
Deskaheh’s key points compare to what manifested 85 years later in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). His efforts were not in 
vain and we know that he believed in the potential political power of the League of 
Nations.  
 
 Within this final speech on March 10, 1925, in Rochester, New York, Chief 
Deskaheh represents the Haudenosaunee Confederacy as separate from both Canada and 
the United States. This same sovereign representation of the Mohawk nationhood is 
present and alive today. Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson states, “Like many other 
Iroquois people, the Mohawks of Kahnawà:ke refuse to walk on some beams, and 
through this gesture they refuse to be Canadian or American. They refuse the ‘gifts’ of 
American and Canadian citizenship; they insist upon the integrity of Haudenosaunee 
governance.”4 This is an important expression of self-governance and separate political 
identity that has continued in today’s Haudenosaunee self-governance and current 
themes within Native American and Indigenous Studies.  
 
 Chief Deskaheh acknowledged a legal separation as well, by stating that “we 
want none of your laws and customs that we have not willingly adopted for ourselves. 
We have adopted many. You have adopted some of ours—votes for women, for 
instance. We are as well behaved as you and you would think so if you knew us 
better.”5 It should not be overlooked that Chief Deskaheh was well aware of the lack of 
women involved in settler colonial politics, yet the Haudenosaunee continue to 
recognize the influence of clan mothers upon tribal politics today.  
 
                                                 
1 Walter R. Echo-Hawk, In the Light of Justice: the Rise of Human Rights in Native America and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Golden, USA: Fulcrum Publishing, 2013), 285-296.   
2 Akwesasne Notes, “Akwesasne Notes; Rooseveltown,” Akwesasne Notes (September 1995), 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/2029 52723?accountid=14503 
3 Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, “V World Congress of the Finno-Ugric Peoples,” Speech in Khanty-Mansiysk 
(28 June 2008), www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/statement_vtc_finnougric08.doc  
4 Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interrupts: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2014), 7.  




Throughout this incredible last speech, Chief Deskaheh expresses a desire for 
his people to be left alone, to live separately from the Canadians and Americans. He 
clarifies that Haudenosaunee people have their own laws and governance systems and 
are not asking for Canadian or American citizenship. All of these key points—ranging 
from acknowledging a political designation that is separate from settler states to 
observing ways of being that have been adopted by other cultures (such as providing 
women the right to vote)—are part of a political platform meant to be shared with the 
world based on Haudenosaunee ways of being. The desires for distinct political 
representation from settler states and practices, such as the continuation of clan mothers, 
are still very present in today’s Haudenosaunee belief systems. For Indigenous Peoples 
to simply disregard these efforts by Chief Deskaheh does not encourage respect for the 
founding Indigenous political battles that have been fought, nor does it allow one to see 
the long history of articulating a unique, or in this case Haudenosaunee, perspective to 
the world that continues today.  
 
 There are numerous accusations within Chief Deshakeh’s last speech of 
dishonesty on behalf of the Canadian and American governments, as well as attempts to 
demolish the Haudenosaunee form of government. Chief Deskaheh outlines numerous 
plans made by colonial governments to end the Haudenosaunee system of governance, 
and the numerous trips to Ottawa and London by the Haudenosaunee to demand their 
right to be treated as separate people according to established treaties.  
 
 Chief Deskaheh accounts the attempts to go to the League of Nations in Geneva 
to present these disputes, but recalls patiently waiting to be seen for over a year without 
a hearing. All of these actions demonstrate the deeply held desire of the Haudenosaunee 
people to keep their forms of governance in operation and to keep them separate from 
both Canadian and American systems. Chief Deskaheh is so emphatic in this belief that 
he states, “Our people would rather be deprived of their money than their political 
liberties—so would you.”6 Again, Chief Deskaheh reinforces political separation as his 
overarching grievance and primary concern. This demand to be treated and see as 
politically separate from the dominant state is inherent in the Declaration.   
 
 The Declaration reflects many of these same views regarding separate political 
recognition, because it was heavily guided and informed by Indigenous Peoples 
themselves. For example, Article 4 of UNDRIP clarifies this belief by stating, 
“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.”7Arguably, the 
majority of articles in UNDRIP relate to the rights to Indigenous self-governance, 
ranging from development of political systems to the right not to be forced into 
assimilation. Specifically, Articles 5, 18, 20, and 34 of UNDRIP relate to modes of 
Indigenous governance.8 Indigenous Peoples’ ability to self-govern is represented 
throughout UNDRIP. As described through Chief Deskaheh’s early actions, Indigenous 
self-governance has been articulated by Indigenous Peoples since the League of Nations 
if not earlier. Today, in the United States, tribes have “inherent but limited rights of 
self-governance over their reservation lands and tribal members and exercise these 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Supra note 1, at 285. 




through various forms of tribal government.”9 In the United States, Indian law is 
imperfect and very complicated, yet one would rarely call for a complete disregard of 
Indian law as there have been major successes in its implementation. In a similar 
manner, UNDRIP should not be neglected as a useful tool for Indigenous Peoples in the 
United States. As a basic premise, UNDRIP can serve as a vision for legal futurity for 
Indigenous Peoples. The important point being there is a continuous thread of advocacy 
for Indigenous self-governance that began with Chief Deskaheh on his trip to the 
League of Nations that has lasted up to and beyond the creation of UNDRIP. This 
thread signifies a central component to engaging the United Nations as a possible site of 
justice for Indigenous Peoples, while also serving as a significant origin point for 
Indigenous advocacy on the worldwide stage. 
 
 Justice is certainly a complicated matter. One of the key criticisms of UNDRIP 
is that it is unable to be enforced by Indigenous Peoples when their respective states 
violate the Declaration. Pawnee legal scholar Walter Echo-Hawk says, “After the 
president’s endorsement in 2010, the provisions of the Declaration must be 
incorporated by the U.S. government, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, into our law and policy.”10 Echo-Hawk repeatedly argues that the Declaration 
is an “authoritative statement” regarding Indigenous rights in the United States, building 
upon standards set by the United Nations, as the Declaration  advances the larger 
obligation of the United States to forward human rights under the UN Charter.11 Simply 
stated, since the United States has signed this Declaration, there are ways to build legal 
recourse when the U.S. violates the Declaration, even if the Declaration itself is not 
legally binding.  
 
 It is important to critically think about the way the United States treats 
Indigenous Peoples today, especially when egregious acts continue under settler 
colonial rule. The United States projects an image of its exceptionalism around the 
world. These discourses of exceptionalism are part of the history of American nation-
state formation.12 This is problematic because American exceptionalism can be used to 
disrupt any dissent within the American political sphere. If the United States claims it is 
the most free country and treats its people with adherence to the highest standard of 
human rights, then it makes it difficult case to say otherwise. This perception of the 
United States is an incredibly powerful force both internationally and domestically, 
functioning as an image that does not reflect reality.  
 
 If the United States touts itself as the most politically exceptional nation-state in 
existence, this should be tested by Indigenous Peoples. One idea of American 
exceptionalism could involve the successful implementation of UNDRIP, allowing 
America to serve as a model to other members states of how to politically interact with 
domestic Indigenous Peoples in respectful and meaningful ways that recognize tribal 
authority and all other aspects of the Declaration. Until then, Indigenous Peoples must 
continue to articulate their rights, even if the legal recourse for violating the Declaration 
are limited. Some cases, such as that of American exceptionalism, must be challenged 
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Human Rights,” California Law Review 102, no. 173 (2014): 216. 
10 Supra note 1, at 65. 
11 Ibid,, 67. 
12 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham and London: Duke 




for the falsehood that it represents not only for Indigenous Peoples in the United States 
but for many groups of people in America who lack power and respect. This broader 
visioning allows for the potential between and amongst other groups of people, which is 
important considering the small population of Indigenous Peoples and the changing 
racial demographics of the United States.  
 
 The creation of the Declaration was monumental and does carry international 
political power. One example of how these actions hold political recourse and challenge 
American exceptionalism is through the visit to the United States by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz. Tauli-Corpuz 
visited the United States, making sure to visit with the Standing Rock Sioux tribe, 
which was thoroughly engaged with the Dakota Access Pipeline issue. This important 
study by Special Rapporteur Victoria Tauli-Corpuz from February 22-March 3, 2017 
brought her to multiple states and tribal nations across the United States. She gathered 
information to be presented to the United Nations Human Rights Council in September 
of 2017. Acting as a monitor, Tauli-Corpuz aimed to ensure the United States is 
maintaining its human rights obligations as a signatory to the Declaration.13 In her 
preliminary report, Tauli-Corpuz recounts a thorough understanding of this issue, noting 
the neglect of Indigenous Peoples by extractive industries and energy development 
corporations. She details these issues by noting that the United States has a commitment 
to consultation with tribal governments. Despite this commitment marked by the 
signing of the Declaration, Tauli-Corpuz explains that there are still significant 
violations to UNDRIP in the United States, due to the neglect of the right to obtain free, 
prior, and informed consent.14 This visit from the Special Rapporteur is significant and 
surely her interactions allow for assessment of the ways the United States treats 
Indigenous Peoples, particularly when they disagree with corporate actions. American 
exceptionalism is hardly on display with the case of significant police violence that 
occurred at Standing Rock against many protectors who are in fact American citizens 
and citizens of tribal nations.  
 
 In closing, Indigenous activists and activist-scholars who critique the UNDRIP 
should consider the longstanding Indigenous history and involvement that exists 
between the United Nations and Indigenous Peoples. Well after Chief Deskaheh’s visit 
to Geneva, it took several decades to write and agree upon the articles presented in 
UNDRIP, which is a monumental task within itself when we consider the vastly 
different cultures, state interests, and beliefs represented around the world. Successfully 
achieving this undertaking is quite the monumental task, as well as a testament to 
Indigenous collaboration and negotiation. Since the League of Nations, the common 
thread of articulating forms of Indigenous self-governance to the global community 
have continued to be expressed. Expressing Indigenous self-governance matters because 
Indigenous self-governance is represented throughout the entirety of the Declaration, 
serving as a foundational and meaningful aspect to maintaining Indigenous identity. 
Additionally, visits to the United States of America from the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples allows for independent review of the conditions in which 
Indigenous Peoples live. Discord between the treatment of Indigenous Peoples in the 
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United States and the Declaration were no doubt apparent and should be taken seriously 
by the international community as a challenge to American exceptionalism, as well as 
the responsibility of the United Nations to hold states accountable under a unifying 









Human rights in Australia are inadequately protected. Lying dormant between 
the jurisdictions of international and domestic protection, Australians’ rights are not 
sufficiently enforced or safeguarded under either system. While a signatory to all main 
international human rights treaties, Australia consistently fails to incorporate these 
commitments into legislation, rendering the commitments non-justifiable before the 
courts. Although Australia’s non-compliance to international law is often justified under 
the façade of its dualist legal structure, this assumption is inconsistent with multiple 
international principles and treaties pertaining to the implementation of international 
law. 
 
    This paper will discuss the difference between dualist and monist structures of 
power, explaining how international law and domestic law theoretically remain separate 
in Australia. This paper will look at Australia’s international legal obligations and its 
failure to ensure these commitments are justiciable before the courts. The paper will 
draw upon the dismissal of the treaty body authority advice regarding the Northern 
Territory Emergency Response Act1 as a case study to highlight the negative impact 
Australia’s approach to international law has had on the rights of its Indigenous 
Peoples. This paper will conclude that until Australia adheres to its international legal 
commitments or, alternatively, implements more solid domestic human rights 
provisions, its citizens’ rights are not genuinely protected.  
 
I. The Relationship between International and Domestic Law 
 
Although Australia has ratified all major human rights treaties to date, the 
nation’s politicians and most jurists claim they are not technically bound by these 
commitments. Due to the dualist structure of Australia’s legal system, it is said that 
international law is not justiciable until it is expressly stipulated in municipal law.2 This 
may contribute to the fact that Australia has seemed willing to sign onto most major 
human rights treaties, yet continues to have a heavily criticized human rights record. 
This lack of consistency between a nation’s international and domestic commitments is 
not experienced in all nations, but rather can be traced back to the structure of power 
introduced by the British.  
 
When incorporating international law into a state’s jurisdiction, most nations fall 
into the category of either monism or dualism.3 The monist system, as its name implies, 
takes the approach that there is a single or monistic body of law. Monism, common in 
many European, American and Asian nations, stems from the natural law philosophy 
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that sees law as universal and “all law as one.” This means that international treaties can 
become domestic law easily, and not requiring domestic legislation to incorporate 
treaties.4 The United States is an example of a monist system, whereby the “entry into 
force of a treaty has direct domestic law consequences.”5 This structure is set out by the 
Constitution of the United States of America, which holds that the President “shall have 
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two 
thirds of the senators concur.”6 Nations under this system are similarly bound by their 
international treaty commitments as they are by their domestic law. Although exact 
interpretations in each country will vary, in the event that the laws in these two bodies 
clash, Anton et al. write that international law will most often prevail.7 Monism 
maintains that all laws are part of one universal order, and will favor international law 
under the assumption that “it rests at the pinnacle of the posited unitary system.”8 
 
Australia, on the other hand, is a dualist nation. This enables Australia’s 
international legal commitments to remain non-justiciable in domestic courts. Dualism 
treats domestic and international law as two separate entities, and requires parliament to 
directly legislate incorporating international law before it can be legally enforced.9 
According to Shearer, dualism rejects the monist theory of natural and universal law in 
lieu of positivism, a belief that law must be written down in order to be true.10 Dualism 
sees the two bodies of international and domestic law as entirely separate entities, and 
as “fundamentally different in their competences, legal sources, and in the subjects to 
which (or to whom) their norms are addressed.”11 Gummow expressed the commonly 
held belief of Australian courts in Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v. Magno12 
that it is the responsibility of the Australian parliament and not the executive to make or 
alter domestic law. Gummow reiterated that, although the executive is responsible for 
signing treaties, it requires the legislature to react in order “to render international 
obligations enforceable in courts.”13  
 
The separation of powers doctrine in Australia maintains that the legislature, 
judiciary and the executive must remain separate. This theoretically limits corruption 
and abuses of political power, as it prevents a concentration of public power in one 
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individual or institution.14  This can, however, have negative consequences on 
Australia’s treaty obligations, as there can be a clash between the executive’s official 
commitments and the legislature’s reciprocal actions.15 There is a lack of domestic 
legislation implementing international human rights treaties in Australia, which 
Piotrowicz and Kaye believe may indicate that by signing a treaty the executive is not 
sufficiently responsible to parliament.16 The cooperation and coordination between both 
bodies is crucial to render international protection effective, as while the legislature fails 
to transpose the executive’s commitments into domestic law, Australia’s international 
commitments are superficial.  
Although Australian courts and politicians embrace dualism, the legitimacy of 
the system is internationally contentious. While international law does suffer from a 
lack of enforceability mechanisms, the dualist system in itself undermines the raison 
d’etre of international law.17 According to Piotrowicz and Kaye, international law relies 
on states recognizing something above state sovereignty, a philosophy which dualism 
rejects outright.18 According to Opeskin and Rothwell, states are obliged to ensure 
consistency in domestic and international law. If states fail to ensure this, they are liable 
“towards other states for its failure to carry out its duties under international law.”19  
Human rights integration methods evidently vary from state to state, however, by 
signing a treaty, a state is bound to follow its commitment in “good faith,” regardless 
whether from a monist or dualist structure.20 In England, the creator of Australia’s 
dualist system, courts are increasingly open to embracing various regional and 
international human rights standards21 that highlight Australia’s approach as 
increasingly outdated in modern times. 
II. International Legal Principles 
  
The principles of international treaties were set out in 1949 in the United 
Nation’s Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States.22 This declaration maintains 
in Article 13 that states have the “duty to carry out in ‘good faith’ its obligations arising 
under treaties and other sources of international law.” It also declares that a state “may 
not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform 
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this duty.”23 Under these provisions, it could be argued that Australia and other 
traditionalist dualist nations are in constant violation of Article 13.  
 
Another important instrument, to which Australia is a party, is the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.24 This convention was developed more recently than 
the aforementioned Declaration, and adds to the contemporary understating of treaty 
obligations. This Treaty introduces the notion of “pacta sunt servanda,” meaning “the 
agreement must be served” and that states have a duty to enforce their Treaty 
commitments.25 The convention outlines in the preamble that in addition to “pacta sunt 
servanda,” the principles of “free consent” to treaties and implementing them in “good 
faith” are universally recognized rules.26 In Article 26, the principle of “pacta sunt 
servanda” is further defined, stating “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to 
it and must be performed by them in good faith.”27 Again, this notion seems to 
contradict Australia’s judicial and political understanding of its obligations and has 
accordingly earned Australia great amounts of international criticism.  
 
Charlesworth et al. strongly maintain that Australia is bound by its international 
legal commitments, stating that all states are required to have a reasonable response to 
treaty body recommendations.28 As a liberal democracy, Australia has entered into its 
international treaties voluntarily. Charlesworth et al. believe that with voluntary 
ratification comes a contract to uphold certain obligations.29  
 
III. Australia Signing Treaties in “Bad Faith” 
 
Australia ratifies a large number of international treaties, in an attempt to appear 
as a “good international player.”30 To date, it has signed all major UN human rights 
treaties.31 This has meant that “on paper” Australia appears as a champion of the 
international human rights regime, however in practice the nation is by and large void of 
enforceable human rights.32 While it is estimated that Australia is party to well over 
1000 international treaties, it has applied corresponding domestic legislation to very few 
of these commitments,33 and various judges and academics have offered an explanation 
for this situation.  
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Government officials have claimed that because Australia is party to so many 
human rights treaties, it is too difficult to keep track of them all.34 This issue arose 
during the High Court case of Minister for State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v 
Teoh.35 At that time, Australia was party to around 920 international treaties and it was 
disputed whether there was a “legitimate expectation” for the courts to follow these. 
French declared that the court saw it as a near impossible expectation, due to the sheer 
amount of unlegislated treaties.36 French also noted that a federal minister had stated 
Australia was party to so many enacted treaties it is inconceivable that “any official 
decision maker could be expected to know them all.”37 In a separate High Court case, Al 
Kateb v. Godwin,38 McHugh claimed that due to the amount of international law, it was 
impossible for parliament to consider it all when legislating. Excusing inconsistencies 
between international commitments and domestic practices, McHugh saw legislating in 
harmony with international obligations as nearly impossible for anyone other than a 
legal expert in international law.39  
 
In line with the judicial fear of international law, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade appears reluctant to encourage the incorporation of international law 
domestically. The government website states that in Australia “treaty obligations can be 
implemented progressively and without radical change to existing laws.”40 The 
government continues to sign human rights treaties without creating corresponding 
domestic legislation, believing that the existing Commonwealth or State/Territory 
legislation is often “sufficient to implement the provisions of the convention.”41 The 
significant amount of individual complaints filed regarding violations of Australians’ 
human rights, however, would suggest that domestic law is not providing sufficient 
protection.42 
 
 Australia’s signing of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides an 
example of the reluctance towards implementing international legislation at a domestic 
level.43 As the most well received and widely ratified human rights international 
convention to date, the provisions in this Convention were uncontroversial.44 According 
to Piotrowicz and Kaye, more than 190 states accepted domestic obligations under this 
convention.45 Although Australia is a signatory to this convention, they have still not 
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adopted any domestic legislation or obligations related to this convention. French 
claims the Australian government believes its citizens’ human rights are inherently 
protected “by virtue of the constitution, its institutional arrangements under the 
constitution, its statute law and the traditions of common law.”46 On the contrary, Kirby 
writes that as a nation without a Bill of Rights and no regional human rights court, the 
importance of international human rights institutions cannot be overstated.47 If Australia 
fails to incorporate legislation domestically, the action of signing treaties is entirely 
superficial.48 It also means that there is no justiciable outlet for human rights violations 
provided for citizens, a great anomaly for a developed democracy in the 21st century. 
 
An authority in this area of law, Richard Falk, refers to this situation as a 
“human rights paradox.” This paradox concerns developing nations signing up to 
human rights treaties while believing these standards are only applicable to nations and 
jurisdictions other than their own.49 He describes this paradox as impinging on the 
successful operation and mutual ownership of human rights globally.50 Australia is 
described by Howell as one of the main offenders of Falk’s paradox, setting different 
standards for human rights domestically as opposed to internationally.51 Howell writes 
that when contrasting Australia’s approach to its domestic human rights issues with 
Australia’s open condemnation of other nations’ standards (namely Afghanistan, Iraq 
and Zimbabwe in recent times), Australia sees “human rights as an item produced 
purely for export.”52 
 
IV. Human Rights in Other Jurisdictions 
 
While Australia’s aforementioned dualist system is the result of English 
influence, the two nations have gone about international legal obligations in separate 
ways.53 England, among other commonwealth dualist nations, now readily embraces the 
international law as a legitimate source of power.54 As Kirby stated in the case of Al-
Kateb v. Godwin, when confronted with Australia’s engagement with international law, 
“whatever may have been possible in the world of 1945, the complete isolation of 
constitutional law from the dynamic impact of international law is neither possible or 
desirable today.”55 Other nations sharing a commonwealth past, namely South Africa, 
Canada and India, are also more willing to interpret international law in constitutional 
courts, according to Kirby.56 In Australia, however, judges and politicians remain 
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increasingly cynical of international law, and the “deep-seated judicial attitudes toward 
international law have proved difficult to dislodge” in the Australian context.57 
Australia has a clear lack of domestic human rights protection, which has been criticised 
by internal and external voices.58 However, French claims that criticisms of human 
rights protection are “not unusual in modern democratic societies with a traditional 
respect for individual liberty.”59 Yet it is alarmingly clear that when it comes to human 
rights, Australia behaves differently than other “modern democratic societies.”  
 
Australia’s mismatch of human rights protection allows judges and politicians to 
“cherry pick” their rights. Australia engages in a tokenistic relationship with 
international human rights obligations to gain international legitimacy, yet solid and 
consistent commitments do not exist. 
 
V. Threatening the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
 
Australia’s willingness to blatantly reject international law was revealed in 2007 
regarding the domestic legislation contradicting the ratification of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.60 The Northern Territory 
Emergency Response Act of 2007 was made in response to a report detailing the high 
level of sexual abuse suffered by Aboriginal children. Only six days after the report 
titled Little Children are Sacred was released, the government announced the “national 
emergency intervention” and special measure for Indigenous communities.61 Within 
seven weeks, blanket measures restricting the rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
Northern Territory had been rolled out, and one of Australia’s few domestic statutes that 
touches on human rights, the Racial Discrimination Act, was temporarily suspended.62 
 
The Emergency Response Act contained various measures to restrict Indigenous 
Peoples’ rights. These include preventing the purchase of alcohol and pornography, 
blocking access to welfare payments, and dismissing the consideration of customary 
law in sentencing.63 The government also assumed five-year lease control over 
aboriginal lands and increased federal law enforcement power over aboriginal children 
victim to abuse.64 Many of these measures were justified by the government under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Section 4, 
pertaining to “special measures.” While Australia restricted the domestic provision of 
human rights by postponing the Racial Discrimination Act, it claimed validity of the 
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Act through claiming affirmative action. This again reveals Australia using international 
law to claim legitimacy in its actions, even though these claims were rejected entirely in 
the official communication of The Committee on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination.65 
 
The Committee’s Concluding Observations bluntly condemned the Emergency 
Response Act, stating the Act “continues to discriminate on the basis of race including 
through the use of so-called ‘special measures.’”66 It criticized Australia’s claims of 
acting using “special measures,” emphasizing this measure is for preferential treatment 
for marginalized groups and not the current negative discrimination it was being used to 
justify.67  
 
Australia’s actions fell short of “special measures” for various reasons.  Firstly, 
special measures require prior consultation with the affected community, which was 
impossible due to the tight timeframe in which the Act was implemented. Secondly, 
according to the act special measures must be “legitimate, proportionate and necessary,” 
which is questionable given the extreme and blanket nature of this restriction of rights. 
Finally, special measures can only used for positive treatment of marginalized groups, 
as Vivian states the interpretation is for “preferential or favorable” treatment.68   
 
The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples was openly scathing about the Australian 
government’s actions, as were multiple major human rights committees and the 
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Social Justice Commissioner.69 As the United 
Nations’ expert on Indigenous issues, the Special Rapporteur stated that the policies 
brought severe stigmatization and indignity to the aboriginal people, which only 
heightened racist attitudes in Australia.70 Due to various other reasons, the Special 
Rapporteur deemed the Act to be entirely illegitimate under international law.71 The 
treaty body’s criticism fueled the conservative government’s rejection of international 
law and, contrary to the principles of international law, the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
aggressively responded that “if a UN committee wants to play domestic politics here in 
Australia, then it will end up with a bloody nose.”72 The rejection of international 
pressure was echoed by the then-Prime Minister John Howard. In response to the 
Committee’s comments, the Prime Minister said, “Australia decides what happens in 
this country through the laws and the parliament of Australia, I mean in the end we are 
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not told what to do by anybody.”73 The case of the Northern Territory intervention 
reveals that Australia is not only willing to disregard its international human rights 
obligations, but it can also “suspend” the very limited domestic human rights 
protections that do exist. If neither international nor domestic protections are justiciable 
in Australia, then there is genuinely no functional framework for upholding citizen’s 
human rights.  
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
The protection of human rights in Australia is alarmingly weak as both the 
limited domestic and numerous international mechanisms can be easily ignored by 
politicians and courts. While Australia consistently rejects its post-treaty ratification 
obligations, it does so in violation of various internal legal principles, including the 
“good faith” provision in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. While other 
dualist nations have embraced the proliferation of universal human rights codes, 
Australia remains politically and judicially conservative to this change. The Northern 
Territory Intervention reveals Australia’s willingness to reject treaty body authority, as 
well as how to suspend its limited domestic human rights legislation on a political 
whim. The calls for a domestic charter of rights in the Constitution are frequently 
ignored and parliament continually fails to translate executive commitments into action. 
Until international or domestic mechanisms are embraced in earnest in Australia, the 
rights of the citizens will remain dangerously vulnerable. While no serious action is 
taken to address this deficiency, human rights violations will occur in Australia almost 
entirely unrestricted.    
  
                                                 









E noho akiko ana ahau, he rawaho ahau. 
I am living at a distance from home, I am an 'outsider'. 
 
   Polynesian peoples are increasingly having to face the migration and 
displacement of members of their communities. It is estimated that at least one in six 
Māori now live outside of New Zealand, with most settling in Australia. The 
governments born out of colonisation dictate the terms of citizenship to the Indigenous 
communities of the lands over which they rule. For many countries, “citizenship by 
descent” only applies to one generation beyond the generation that are citizens “other 
than by descent.” Those members of the Polynesian dispora who are not citizens of their 
ancestral lands are named at the border as “visitors.” They can have that status revoked 
at any time. Māori who are not citizens of New Zealand can effectively be denied access 
to their ancestral lands and kinship communities. This is problematic as there is often a 
continued bond to the homeland and a subsequent natural desire for an eventual return. 
Essentially, it is a conflict of world-views as Māori emphasize whakapapa (genealogy), 
including ancestral links to land, as the foundation of identity and formal membership in 
Māori society, not national identity legislation. 
 
    This paper will explore issues at the intersection of diaspora, identity, and 
citizenship, specifically, should overseas-born Māori who are not New Zealand citizens 
be granted an automatic right to citizenship or a multi-generation citizenship by descent 
clause? This will go some way towards answering the overarching question of what 
rights, if any, Indigenous people have when they are not citizens of the state that 
governs their ancestral homeland. 
 
I. Māori world-view 
 
   World-view is at the core of culture. It is both the influencing factor in the values, 
customs, and belief system of a people, and the sum of those values, customs, and belief 
system. The term can be applied to an individual or group when discussing the lens or 
point of view of that individual or group, that is, world-view acts as a type of filter 
system. The inherent nature of world-view means that it is difficult to separate oneself 
from one’s world-view.1 
 
   Jackson argues that a culture cannot be understood without reference to its world-view 
as it is the basis for core values: 
  
Because each culture is unique, the behavior exhibited by its 
members has certain unique characteristics. No members of a 
culture can be understood in isolation from the cultural forces which 
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shape them, and no culture can be understood unless account is 
taken of the attitudes, expectations, beliefs and values on which it is 
based.2 
 
    The issue of diasporic Indigenous communities being denied an automatic right 
to citizenship is essentially about conflicting world-views. For Māori in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, the emphasizes is on whakapapa, including ancestral links to land, as the 
foundation of identity and formal membership in Māori society.3 This is at odds with a 
Western world-view which emphasizes national identity and associated citizenship 
legislation.  
 
    Jackson argues that the descriptions of Māori identity are commonly determined 
by Pākehā (non-Māori New Zealander of European settler descent) and that there is 
truth in the old adage that “the namer of names is the father of all things.”4 This is 
particularly relevant when considering national identity legislation. Gamlen states; 
 
Some groups might argue that current national identity legislation 
neither reflects nor affects who is and who is not Māori, and that all 
Māori in diaspora should be able to return to Aotearoa, their 
turangawaewae (home ground), even if they are not New Zealand 
citizens. Without necessarily advocating this view, one can discern 
both legal and normative arguments which might sustain it.5 
 
Tūrangawaewae refers to a person's “standing place,” a place where one has rights of 
residence and belonging through kinship and whakapapa.6 Māori tradition dictates that 
all Māori have a right to return to their tūrangawaewae. That right is based on 
whakapapa, which is considered to be the bedrock of Māori tradition.7 It is also the 
condition for being recognised as “Māori.”8  
 
    Māori identity is also reflected in the term tangata whenua, or “people of the 
land,” which is used to define the people native to a particular area. Tangata whenua 
refers to people born of the whenua (land, placenta), that is, "of the placenta and of the 
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land where the people's ancestors have lived and where their placenta are buried."9 This 
connection to the land cannot be severed.  
 
II. New Zealand citizenship 
 
     It is a feature of the governments born out of colonisation to dictate the terms of 
citizenship to the Indigenous communities of the lands over which they rule. In 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, as with many other states, “citizenship by descent” only applies 
to one generation beyond the generation that are citizens “other than by descent.” 
    
In one of the most comprehensive breakdowns of the situation to date, Overseas-
Born Māori and New Zealand Citizenship, Waldron states “While most Māori living in 
Australia have automatic rights to live in New Zealand, some people with Māori 
ancestry living outside New Zealand do not have automatic rights to become New 
Zealand citizens or reside permanently in New Zealand.”10 Waldron cites a 2006 
unpublished internal paper by the Identity and General Policy Team of the Department 
of Internal Affairs, “Citizenship issues for Māori born outside of New Zealand,” which 
analysed New Zealand citizenship law, focussing on the implications for overseas-born 
Māori. According to Waldron, the paper questions "whether the current restrictive 
approach to citizenship by descent fails to recognise multi-generational cultural and 
spiritual attachments to New Zealand" which then “raises the question of whether 
people who can make a claim to be the Indigenous people of the land should have an 
automatic right to be citizens of that country no matter where they were born.”11  
 
    The Citizenship Act of 1977, and the amendment to the Act in 2006, are the 
basis for citizenship rights in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Under the Act, any person born in 
New Zealand, Niue, Tokelau, or the Cook Islands, before 1 January 2006 is considered 
a New Zealand citizen by birth. The 2006 amendment added the criteria of one parent 
also being a New Zealand citizen for those born on or after 1 January 2006.12 
 
    A person born outside of New Zealand on or after 1 January 1978 is a citizen by 
descent if one (or both) of the parents is a New Zealand citizen otherwise than by 
descent (for example, a citizen by birth).13 Waldron suggests that the principle that 
underpins this rule in relation to citizenship by descent, is jus sanguinis which translates 
to the “right of blood.”14 However, this “right” is only upheld for one generation, as 
citizens by descent cannot automatically pass on their citizenship to their children if 
those children are born outside of New Zealand.  
 
    Currently, if a citizen by decent wishes to pass on their citizenship to their 
overseas-born children, they would first have to apply for and receive a grant of 
                                                 
9 Supra note 6. 
10 H. Waldron, Overseas-Born Māori and New Zealand Citizenship  (Wellington, New Zealand: Institute 
of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011), 1. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
12 Citizenship Act 1997, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1977/0061/ latest/whole.html. 
13 Ibid. 




citizenship, at which point, they would no longer be a citizen by descent, but a citizen 
by grant.15  
 
When the restriction on citizenship by descent was being 
considered in 1977 there was no consideration of the effect on 
Māori...Not only does this restriction fail to recognise the 
strong cultural and spiritual relationship that Māori may have 
with New Zealand, but it also goes against tikanga (Māori 
customary practices).16 
 
III. Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
 
    The law regarding New Zealand citizenship not only contradicts tikanga, it may 
also be at odds with Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Treaty of Waitangi, which is often referred 
to as Aotearoa/New Zealand's founding document as it marks the beginning of the 
“official” Māori-Crown relationship.17 
    
Te Tiriti o Waitangi was signed on the 6th of February, 1840, between 
representatives of the British Crown and rangatira Māori (Māori leaders, chiefs) as the 
Indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand. One text was written in English and the 
other was written in te reo Māori (the Māori language).  
 
Since its signing it has been the focus of controversy and 
scrutiny due mostly to the fact that two versions of the Treaty 
were produced. The Māori text, which was signed by both 
Māori and the Crown, was translated from the English text by a 
Pākehā missionary. However, the translation was not at all a 
correct interpretation of the English text. It is the English text 
which has been used by the Crown as the definitive version and 
this is the cause of contention to this day between Māori and 
the Crown.18 
 
     Te Tiriti o Waitangi was signed under the pretense that it would act to protect 
Māori rights. Māori also considered Te Tiriti o Waitangi as a charter that was meant to 
form the foundation of a national dual planning system, a partnership based on power-
sharing, incorporating both Māori and Pākehā values into every aspect of decision-
making in Aotearoa/New Zealand.19 According to Jackson, “to many Maori people, the 
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terms of the Treaty provided the ultimate protection for their way of life, their 
institutions, and their culture: they were mechanisms to protect their taonga.”20 
 
    However, the Crown failed, almost immediately, to honor the terms of Te Tiriti 
o Waitangi. “The colonists had gained the benefit of the Treaty by being allowed to 
emigrate to this country under the British flag, but they were not willing to accept the 
burden of the bargain from which they had gained so much.”21 From when it was first 
signed, the Treaty was largely regarded by Pākehā as being null and void and was 
dismissed as irrelevant. In fact, the Treaty was intentionally dishonored when Captain 
George Grey became governor of “the colony.” One of Governor Grey's first acts was 
the establishment of the office of the Commissioner for the Extinguishment of Native 
Title.22 Then, in 1877, during the case of Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington, Chief 
Justice Prendergast ruled that the Treaty was “a simple nullity.”23 This judgment was 
unfathomable to Māori. According to Jackson, “the law's eventual dismissal of the 
Treaty confirmed the Maori sense of betrayal.”24 
 
    In considering the question of the right of the Māori diaspora to New Zealand 
citizenship, Gamlen suggests that “a legal argument for non-citizen Māori return could 
begin from articles two and three of the Treaty of Waitangi.”25  
 
    Under Article Two of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Māori text), Māori are guaranteed 
tino rangatiratanga (the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship, self-determination, 
sovereignty) over their land, homes, and taonga (treassured possessions—both tangible 
and intangible).26 The Māori relationship to tribal land is a key cultural concept that 
should have been protected, under the Treaty, from external decisions regarding 
national identity legislation.27 Furthermore, Article Two applies to all Māori; however, 
without an automatic right to citizenship, some Māori may be prevented from asserting 
the claim to tino rangatiratanga.  
 
    As discussed earlier, there are marked differences between the two texts of the 
Treaty, particularly in Article Two. Under Article Two of the Treaty (English text), the 
Crown,  
 
...confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New 
Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof 
the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and 
Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may 
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collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish 
and desire to retain the same in their possession...28 
 
Article Two explicitly mentions “the respective families and individuals thereof” which 
acknowledges that the rights are tied to whakapapa. Furthermore, Article Two suggests 
that property rights are protected for as long as Māori wish them to be. Gamlen posits 
that “this clause might be interpreted as a guarantee that Māori customs of kin-based 
membership and property rights will be protected in perpetuity by the state.”29 
  
According to Temm, “The second article is the most far-reaching. It assures 
Maori New Zealanders that the Crown will protect all their cultural and property rights - 
this is no mere protection; it is an explicit guarantee of those rights.”30 
 
    Article Three of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Māori text) is recognised as a fair 
translation of the English text31 which states that “Her Majesty the Queen of England 
extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the 
Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.”32 
 
    At the signing of the Treaty, British subjects in New Zealand had the right to 
come and go as they pleased. The idea of a “New Zealand citizen” was conceptualised 
in the mid-twentieth century, 
 
...through decisions by the British and New Zealand 
governments, and confers more restricted mobility rights. It 
might be argued that these decisions did not honour the 
agreements in the Treaty, were not preceded by adequate 
consultation with Māori, and therefore do not legitimately limit 
the ability of non-citizen Māori to reside on their lands.33  
 
Under the third article of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and the promise of the rights and 
privileges of British subjects (at the time of the signing of the Treaty, in 1840), Māori 
should not be limited by the current New Zealand citizenship requirements.  
 
    Gamlen suggests that the technical arguments regarding citizenship based on the 
Treaty are far from “clear cut,” but that they draw “emotive strength from norms about 
post-colonial reparative justice, which underpin broadly similar claims in New Zealand 
on a regular basis.”34 
 
IV. Māori diaspora 
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    Diaspora is the dispersal of a people, that is, people who either by choice or by 
force have left their homelands. Essentially, it encompases forced or voluntary 
population mobility. In 2013, it was estimated that at least one in six Māori live 
overseas.35 Kukutai and Pawar suggest that it is closer to one in five.36 As such, it is “no 
longer tenable to ignore the implications of a growing global Māori diaspora.”37 
 
    The vast majority of the Māori diaspora lives in Australia.38 According to 
Winitana, Māori migration to Australia in recent decades has escalated at “an alarming 
rate.”39 However, estimates of the Māori population in Australia vary significantly. In 
2008, Hamer wrote: “Recent census practice has improved the quality of data, but still 
undercounts the number of Māori in Australia by a considerable margin.”40 In that same 
article, Hamer provides the following estimates: In 1986, there were approximately one 
in 17 Māori living in Australia.41 In 2001, there were around one in seven.42 By 2006, 
there were as many as one in six Māori living in Australia.43 
 
    The Australian-born Māori population has experienced the most rapid growth in 
recent years. Hamer states:  
 
Another proxy measure for the growth of the Australian-
resident Māori population can be found in the ongoing 
increases in the number of Australian-born Māori living in both 
Australia and New Zealand. While the New Zealand aspect of 
this is probably more reflective of patterns of return migration 
than actual population growth, the combination of the figures 
indicates significant growth in the Māori population in 
Australia. Indeed, the number of Australian-born Māori in both 
countries increased 44.6 percent from 2001 to 2006.44  
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Kukutai & Pawar support this notion, suggesting that between 2001 and 2011, the 
Australian-born Māori population more than doubled in size, and since 2006 one in 
three Māori living in Australia was born there.45 
 
    In terms of citizenship, it is the third generation of Māori diaspora, that is, those 
individuals that do not inherit citizenship by descent, that are of particular interest. In 
2013, the third plus generation made up 5% of Māori in Australia.46 While this 
percentage is small, the rapid increase in the number of Australian-born Māori suggests 
that it will grow in coming years. As Hamer posits, the figures regarding Australian-
born Māori “appear to confirm that Māori society has, in part, an increasingly 
Australian future.”47  
 
    This is common across the Pacific as Indigenous Peoples are increasingly having 
to face the migration and displacement of members of their communities. As a result of 
these migrations, there are now several generations of Polynesian diaspora and a 
growing number are not citizens of the states that govern their ancestral lands.  
 
    The situation of Kānaka Māoli, or Hawaiians, is comparable with that of Māori. 
Aotearoa/New Zealand and Hawai'i are the two largest Polynesian homelands that also 
share commonalities in their colonial histories and contemporary challenges, 
specifically the fact that the Indigenous people are the minority both in terms of 
ethnicity and government within their respective homelands. It is estimated that at least 
one in three Hawaiians live outside of the islands.48 Again, it is difficult to estimate the 
number of Hawaiians in the diaspora, especially as many Hawaiians move to other 
states in the United States and, therefore, do not cross internatioal borders. It has also 
been suggested that more Hawaiians live outside of Hawai'i than at home. In discussing 
what she labels as outmigration that amounts to diaspora, Trask states: 
 
...so great is the oppression caused outmigration of Hawaiians 
from their island homes that, despite the highest birthrate in 
Hawai'i, we remain only twenty percent of the resident 
population. Some estimates report that more Hawaiians now 
live on the West Coast of the United States than in their Native 
land.49  
 
In a discussion of “deracination” in the context of Hawaiian migration and mobility, 
Kauanui points to the generations of Hawaiians who never “left” Hawai'i, but were 
actually born abroad.50  
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    Deracination is “to displace a people from their own territory, place, or 
environment—literally, to uproot.”51 Kauanui suggests that “this is an enduring problem 
for off-island Hawaiians, because forms of Hawaiian deracination are produced through 
out-migration from Hawai'i and Hawaiian diaspora.”52 Kauanui goes on to state: 
 
The complexity of Hawaiian out-migration necessitates the 
development of multiple frameworks for studying Hawaiian 
diaspora. The stakes in understanding out-migration are 
connected to political recognition, which has become 
increasingly urgent given the contemporary context of hostility 
to Hawaiian sovereignty claims - all of which is further 
complicated by the existence of off-island Hawaiians and their 
claims to Hawaiian nation(ality).53 
 
Indigenous people are often the most vulnerable to displacement as they usually make 
up the most disadvantaged in society. In discussing the effects of colonisation on Māori, 
Waldron suggests that it could be argued it has encouraged migration outside of New 
Zealand, notably to Australia.54  
 
    The reasons behind the growth of Indigenous diasporic communities differ from 
one community to another, however, the common thread that runs through them all is 
the search for a perceived better quality of life, that is, the reasons are largely a result of 
ecomomic pressures and opportunities.55 In many cases there is a lack of employment 
opportunities and/or it has become too expensive to stay at "home." The only option left 
then, is to leave in order to improve economic circumstances, and ultimately, to survive.  
 
V. Implications for Māori 
    There are many social, cultural, and political implications regarding 
transnational Indigenous communities. For third (plus) generation Māori living 
overseas, that is, those who do not inherit citizenship by descent, there is the reality of 
being prevented from contributing to decision-making regarding issues that have the 
potential to affect all Māori. In order to vote in a New Zealand general election, one 
must be a New Zealand citizen or a resident in New Zealand for at least one year. The 
consequence of the growing population of Māori diaspora who are not New Zealand 
citizens, is the elimination of their Indigenous voices which could otherwise impact 
important Māori issues. Hamer's research on Māori in Australia indicates that for those 
overseas-based Māori that are eligible to vote, “continuing to vote in New Zealand is an 
important element of both maintaining one’s connection to New Zealand and expressing 
one’s Māori identity.”56  
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    Those members of the Polynesian dispora who are not formal citizens of the 
states that make up their ancestral lands, are usually named at the border as "visitors." 
As such, they can have that status revoked at any time. For Māori, being named at the 
New Zealand border as a “visitor” contradicts a Māori world-view and the terms 
tangata whenua and tūrangawaewae. Furthermore, it is at odds with the customary 
question “nō hea koe?” or “where are you from?” which is traditionally answered with 
the tribal affiliation of the respondent and, to this day, is the way many choose to reply 
to the question despite being born and raised outside of their tribal areas.     
    
The process of naming Indigenous people at the border is another example of the 
power that the state can wield in erasing Indigenous Peoples from their homelands. It 
could be argued that it is a surreptitious form of ethnic cleansing and continues the 
colonial tradition of the elimination of the “native problem.” Māori who are not citizens 
of New Zealand can effectively be denied access to their whenua (ancestral lands), 
marae (gathering place of cultural significance to a community), and kinship 
communities. This is problematic as there is usually a continued bond to the ūkaipō, to 
the homeland, and a subsequent natural desire for an eventual return “home.”57       
 
When discussing the markers of diaspora, which include the homeland as a place 
of eventual return, Winitana argues that Māori living in Australia “have always 
considered going back to their home” and that they “maintain continuing relationships 
with whanau at home.”58 However, the current New Zealand citizenship restrictions fail 
to acknowledge and foster these connections.  
 
    Many members of Polynesian diasporic communities continue to fly back and 
forth, to cross the boundries of states, in their quest to maintain the connections to 
“home.” Kauanui argues that Hawaiians who may never have lived in Hawai'i can and 
do cultivate vital links to Hawai'i, as “home.”59 This process often works both ways as 
Māori in Aotearoa/New Zealand find ways to reach out to Māori in Australia, to be 
inclusive, and to strengthen the ties to “home” on this end. Some iwi (tribe/s), such as 
Ngāi Tahu, have established formal taura here (binding ropes--refers to a group of 
people from one iwi living in a town or city outside of the tribal area) in many 
Australian cities to ensure that their people living in those places retain their tribal 
identity and maintain links to home. Furthermore, those who work for Ngāi Tahu fly to 
Australia on an annual basis and hold hui (meeting/s) with the taura here to update 
them on what is happening with the iwi and what resources and programmes they can 
access. Another example of Māori in Aotearoa/New Zealand being inclusive of the 
Māori diaspora is the inclusion of Australian kapa haka (haka group/s, or Māori 
performing group/s) in Te Matatini, the national Māori performing arts festival, which is 
the most prestigious and competitive event for kapa haka. For over a decade, Australian 
groups have been involved on a competitive level. In 2016, the Executive Director of Te 
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Matatini, Carl Ross, stated that “kapa haka is an important way of connecting with our 
language and culture for Māori overseas.”60 
    
Ensuring that the Māori diaspora maintain the connections to home and have a 
right to return is important both from a Māori world-view, and in light of the Māori 
sovereignty movement. According to Kukutai & Pawar, “Trans-Tasman migration not 
only has implications for Māori migrants and their descendants but also has broader 
relevance for Māori self-determining aspirations in New Zealand.”61 This is supported 
by Kauanui in the Hawaiian context. Kauanui posits that “recognising” Hawaiians 
living outside of the islands “can help to strengthen sovereignty rights based on 
indigeneity, by acknowledging that even those not in residence have national and 
citizenship claims.”62 
 
    Nationality and citizenship affect not only the rights of an individual, but can 
also have a profound effect on identity and a person's sense of belonging. For example, 
identity is not formed in isolation, but rather in relation to kinship and social groups. 
This is particularly true for Māori, as it is for other Indigenous Peoples, who place the 
collective ahead of the individual. Furthermore, identity is developed continually and, in 
this sense, it is “active.” Freire suggests people must “name the world” for themselves.63 
This highlights the fact that identity is not fixed, but rather it is a process of creation and 
ongoing transformation. In this way, it is an expression of tino rangatiratanga.  
 
    Indigenous identities are often challenged, both from within the Indigenous 
community and from outside of it, by displacement and by being in the diaspora. All of 
these issues contribute to the growing discourse regarding the politics of identity, 
particularly in relation to migration and the diaspora.64   
 
    It should be noted that this argument, for an automatic right to citizenship, is not 
intended to disregard the complex cultural relationships and tensions between rāwaho, 
or those that live away from home (diasporic communities), and ahikā, those who keep 
the home fires burning (“on-island” identities). That is an important issue, however, it is 
quite separate from the issue at hand, that is, advocating for rāwaho to have the right to 
go “home” in the first place.  
 
VI. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 
    What rights, if any, do Indigenous diasporic communities and individuals have 
when they are not citizens of the state that governs their ancestral homeland? Further, 
do Indigenous rights under international law, based on whakapapa and ancestral links to 
land, suggest an automatic right to citizenship be established for Māori from 
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Aotearoa/New Zealand? The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 




    Under Article 3, Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination and “by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”65 This is in line with the tino 
rangatiratanga guaranteed to Māori under Article Two of Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Self-
determination is further emphasized in Article 4: “Indigenous peoples, in exercising 
their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs.”66 At present, Māori who are not 
citizens of New Zealand may be prevented from exercising their rights with regard to 
local, Māori affairs.  
  
Participation and decision-making 
 
    Articles 5 and 6 of UNDRIP are particularly interesting when considering the 
rights of Indigenous diasporic communities. Under Article 5:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen 
their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if 
they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural 
life of the State.67 
 
The “state,” as a term, is ambiguous as presumably states only have responsibilities to 
the peoples Indigenous to the territories within their borders. Therefore, which "state" is 
responsible for Indigenous diasporic communities, specifically those individuals who 
are not citizens of the state that governs their ancestral lands? It seems that those 
individuals and communities could be without protection under UNDRIP, with no rights 
as Indigenous People/s in their adopted home and no rights, through lack of recognition, 
in their ancestral home. 
 
However, while Article 5 does not provide specific details regarding Indigenous 
diaspora, it could be argued that, when taken in conjunction with other articles in the 
UNDRIP, it points to the choice for citizenship resting with Indigenous people, not with 
the state. Article 6 is similarly ambiguous, when considering the Indigenous diaspora, as 
it states that “every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.”68 
  
    Then, in Article 18, “Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in 
decision-making in matters which would affect their rights.”69 Māori were never 
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consulted about New Zealand citizenship law, particularly the danger of lost citizenship 
rights for third (plus) generation diaspora. Under Article 18, and the guarantees set out 
in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, Māori should be consulted and the appropriate amendments 
should be made to New Zealand citizenship requirements to rectify the situation.  
 
Whakapapa and identity 
 
    Article 9 states that “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong 
to an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of 
the community or nation concerned.”70 Māori traditions and customs dictate that 
whakapapa trumps everything else when it comes to the right to belong to an 
Indigenous community or nation. Article 33 (1) goes on to state that “Indigenous 
peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance 
with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous 
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.”71 Again, this 
reinforces the right for Māori to determine their own membership and identity. 
However, the reference to obtaining citizenship of the states in which Indigenous people 
live disregards the plight of Indigenous diaspora and their right to citizenship of the 
states that occupy their traditional homelands. 
 
Access to whenua, tūrangawaewae, and marae 
 
    Under Article 8 (2b & 2c), “States shall provide effective mechanisms for 
prevention of, and redress for any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 
them [Indigenous Peoples] of their lands, territories or resources” and “any form of 
forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any 
of their rights.”72 Indigenous diaspora who do not have an automatic right to 
cicitizenship are effectively dispossesed of their traditional territories and resources 
through restricted access. In addition, it could be argued that the current New Zealand 
citizenship regulations for third (plus) generation diaspora amount to forced population 
transfer, which has the effect of violating and undermining Indigenous rights. 
 
    Similarly, Article 10 states that:  
 
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands 
or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior 
and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after 
agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with 
the option of return.73  
 
   Overseas-born Māori who do not qualify for citizenship by descent are effectively 
being “forcibly” removed from their lands, perhaps not in a physical way, but certainly 








in a legal sense. What is of particular interest in Article 10 is the “option to return,” 
which seems to reinforce the idea of “the right to return” with regard to citizenship.  
 
    Article 11 (1) and Article 12 (1) refer to historical, religious, and cultural sites. 
Article 11 (1) states that “Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize 
their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and 
develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as 
archaeological and historical sites.”74 Then, under Article 12 (1), “Indigenous peoples 
have...the right to maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and 
cultural sites.”75 Once again this reinforces the right of Māori, no matter where they 
were born, to access and return to their tūrangawaewae and marae. 
 
    Article 25 states that:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or 
otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal 
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to 
future generations in this regard.76 
 
The right to maintain and strengthen the distinctive Māori spiritual 
relationship with the environment goes back to the argument for access, in 
the first instance. Furthermore, the reference to the responsibility of 
Indigenous Peoples to future generations does not explicitly exclude those 
generations who are a part of the diaspora, therefore, the presumption is 
that they are included.  Article 26 (1) supports articles 11 (1), 12 (1), and 
25: “Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used 
or acquired.”77 
 
Indigenous Peoples divided by international borders 
 
    Article 36 (1 & 2) is probably the most relevant article in terms of the rights of 
diasporic Indigenous communities, despite the likelihood that this article was actually 
drafted for the purpose of protecting the rights of Indigenous groups still residing on 
their ancestral lands, only separated by artificial, colonial borders. Under Article 36: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international 
borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations 
and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, 
economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as 
other peoples across borders. 








2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, 
shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the 
implementation of this right.78 
 
An automatic right to citizenship or a multi-generation citizenship by descent clause 
would go some way to uphold this right for Māori diasporic communities.  
 
VII. Reflections 
    Displacement and the migration of Polynesian peoples have created issues 
around space and place, identity, culture, citizenship, and rights, not just in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, but also throughout the Pacific.79 Furthermore, the growth of 
these diasporic communities over coming decades is only going to emphasize these 
issues in the future and the politics of place and identity will become even more 
significant. This raises the question of whether Indigenous people who are not citizens 
of the states that constitute their ancestral homelands should be granted an automatic 
right to citizenship or a multi-generation citizenship by descent clause, regardless of 
where they were born. It is important to note that a “right to return” in the form of a 
special route to citizenship for Indigenous people would not be unique as Israel's 
nationality law includes such a clause for Jewish diaspora,80 and some self-governing 
Pacific Islands have recently implemented a similar process.  
 
    Implementing an automatic right to citizenship or a multi-generation citizenship 
by descent clause for Māori would acknowledge the special status of Māori as the 
Indigenous people of Aotearoa/New Zealand and would align with the promises set out 
in Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Furthermore, it would be in the spirit of the UNDRIP. 
 
    As the dominant and governing majority, Pākehā have defined the place of the 
Treaty, along with the place of Māori in Aotearoa/New Zealand.81 
 
The fact that the law, the education system, and other bases of 
power in New Zealand have been subject to Pakeha control, has 
meant that Maori socio-cultural status has been defined by 
monocultural processes unwilling or unable to adequately serve 
different cultural needs.82 
 
This has led to the current situation of some Māori having to apply for citizenship by 
grant, along with every other “immigrant” to New Zealand, should they want 
unrestricted access to their own homeland.  
    Epeli Hau'ofa suggests that our future “lies in the hands of our own people, not 
of those who would prescribe for us.”83 With that in mind, it may be time for Māori to 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Supra note 57.  
80 Supra note 10, at 19. 
81 Supra note 4.  
82 Ibid., 173. 




test New Zealand citizenship law by lodging a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal. The 
Waitangi Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975. It is a 
permanent commission of inquiry that “makes recommendations on claims brought by 
Māori relating to legislation, policies, actions or omissions of the Crown that are alleged 
to breach the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi.”84Alternatively, a claim 
regarding citizenship and the Māori right to return could be a small part of a larger 
claim regarding the return of political power, or tino rangatiratanga. 
                                                 






‘Forced’ Prior Informed Consent at the Barrel of a Gun: A Case of Indigenous 






Similar to several alleged human rights abuses documented across various parts 
of India, the events that were recorded in the years 2011 and 2016 in the eastern and 
western parts of the state of Arunachal Pradesh drew mass criticism of the growing 
tendency of the state government to impinge upon the rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
These two separate events—where Indigenous Peoples were shot and tortured—were 
seen as the result of the state’s underlying failure to address the principle of free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) in relation to the construction of several micro and mega 
hydroelectric power projects planned by the state. While states are under obligation to 
comply with various international laws and national laws including The Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA 
2006) to respect and ensure prior and informed consent, free from intimidation and 
coercion, the state’s strategy of discrediting environmental protestors and resorting to 
violence has led to widespread concerns that such projects are being forced upon 
Indigenous Peoples without their consent. 
I. Introduction  
The right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is an extension of the right to self-
determination enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) of 2007 as well as various other international human rights 
instruments. This principle is an integral part of international customary practices that 
allow Indigenous Peoples or tribal, ethnic or local communities around the world to 
decide their own affairs of life. The aim of this article is to highlight the human rights 
situation of the Indigenous Peoples of Arunachal Pradesh in the context of violations of 
FPIC and how these violations are used as a means to implement development projects. 
First, this article shall attempt to explore the Indigenous Peoples in the region through a 
historical lens in order to understand their status and how certain special laws that still 
exist in the state have evolved. This article will also focus on two events that occurred 
recently in the state as case studies, in light of implementation of FPIC under various 
international laws and national laws, and especially within the context of UNDRIP and 
the FRA 2006. 
II. Indigenous Peoples of Arunachal Pradesh and their Traditional Land 
Rights: Historical Background 
According to Kingsbury, by the end of the Second World War the idea of Indigenous 
Peoples as an international legal concept had been shaped by various factors; these 
include elements of commonality in respect to distinct cultures, historical dispossession, 
autonomy, lands and territories, and the shared effects of modernity, historical and 
group priority becoming a part of the international consciousness.1 Some argue that the 
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definition provided by the José Martinez Cobo report2 is believed to be the most widely 
used understanding of Indigenous Peoples, describing this group as having “…historical 
continuity with pre-colonial society, possessing some distinctiveness, forming non-
dominant sectors of societies, having determination to preserve, develop and transmit 
their ancestral and ethnic identity in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems.”3 However, this understanding has been deemed 
unacceptable by many countries.4 India has dismissed the concept of Indigenous 
Peoples, arguing it is not applicable to this country.5 While the term “Indigenous 
Peoples” was conveniently avoided in international forums for decades, the fundamental 
criterion of “self-identification” provided in both the Martinez Cobo study and by the 
International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No. 169)6 is visible within Indian law and 
policy measures. Though criteria such as “primitive” traits, distinctive culture, 
geographical isolation, and proximity of contact with community are not legally set out 
in the Constitution of India, nevertheless these criteria have become well-established 
and accepted by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs.7 “Indigenous Peoples” are not 
mentioned in the Constitution of India but rather the term “Scheduled Tribes” (ST) is 
used.8 STs are those tribes or tribal communities or groups which the President9 may 
specify by a notification and which Parliament10 has the choice to include or exclude 
from the list of notifications issued by the President.  
In the case of Arunachal Pradesh, legal and political status of Indigenous 
Peoples in the pre-independence era provides an understanding of their present way of 
life and their relationship with the land. Arunachal Pradesh is the land of several 
Indigenous Peoples.11 It is argued that until the 19th century it was neither part of India 
                                                 
2 Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations , Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, United Nations Document 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1986), Paras. 379-382.  
3 Ibid., Paras. 379-382.  
4 Megan Davis, “Indigenous Struggles in Standard-setting: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples,” Melbourne Journal of International Law  9, no. 2 (2008), 4-5. 
5 “Universal periodic review (UPR) 2017: India stakeholder’s submission,” Mizoram: Zo Indigenous 
Forum (2017), 1, https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/ 
document/india/session_27_-_may_2017/universal_periodic_review_upr_2017.pdf. 
6 “The International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (No. 169),” 76th ILC session (June 1989), Article 2, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:3
12314. 
7“Annual Report 2016-17,” Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Government of India, Para. 5.10, 38, 
https://tribal.nic.in/writereaddata/AnnualReport/AnnualReport2016-17.pdf. 
8 The Constitution of India, Part XIX, Article 366 (25), http://lawmin.nic.in/olwing/coi/coi-english/coi-
indexenglish.htm. 
9 Ibid., Part XVI, Article 342 (1). 
10 Ibid., Part XVI, Article 342 (2).  
11 There are twenty-six major tribes and more than one hundred sub-tribes each having distinct dialects 




nor China nor Tibet, but rather a region of independent tribes with their own institutions 
inimical to the outside world. Locals other than Indigenous Peoples were hardly allowed 
into the region, except for some records of occasional presence of the then-Ahom kings 
of the undivided State of Assam and Tibetan rulers.12 With the rise of imperialistic 
ambitions of the British administration and the industrial revolution’s necessity to feed 
their industries, discovering new colonies became pertinent to British policies.13 Having 
occupied a vast part of Assam after the treaty of Yandaboo in 1826, the “discovery”14 of 
independent Indigenous tribes in the remote northeastern hill tracts (between Assam 
valley to the south, Tibetan Autonomous Region to the north, Bhutan to the west and 
Burma or Myanmar to the east forming the British northeast frontier) was a result of 
their journey towards finding the place that Kapadia calls “Shangri-La,” the popular 
notion about Tibet that had woven its way into British literature.15 It is believed that due 
to the commercial interest of the British East India Company (EIC) in these hilly 
regions for tea production, forest resources such as timber, rubber and wild animal 
species were suffering major losses and the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act 
187316 (BEFRA) had to be put into place. This also came to be known as the Inner Line 
Regulations, as it demarcates a territorial line or boundary line preventing the 
acquisition of land, control of trade and entry of non-natives—including British subjects 
of certain classes—into the hill tracts beyond the “Inner Line”17 territory of the Assam 
region without valid permission (Inner Line Permit) or pass from the district 
                                                 
Government of Arunachal Pradesh, (Itanagar, India: August 2017), 3-4, 
http://www.arunachalplan.gov.in/html/docs/1_profile_arp.pdf. 
12 For instance, according to Phukan, one of the oldest historical records dating back to 1524 A.D. found 
on the Sadiya Stone Pillar inscription indicated that the Mishmi tribe had an agreement with the Ahom 
King Chao-pha Siu-hum-mong (also known as Dihingia Raja), who granted them rights to reside in the 
present day Dibang region within certain terms and conditions. See: J. N. Phukan, “The Date of the 
Sadiya Stone Pillar Inscription,” Sadiya Stone Pillar Inscription , ed. Jayanta Bhusan Bhattacharjee 
(Shillong, India: North Eastern Hill University), 87, 
http://dspace.nehu.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/13018/1/The%20date%20(JN%20Phukan).pdf. 
13 Sudatta Sikdar, “Tribalism vs. colonialism: British capitalistic intervention and transformation of 
primitive economy of Arunachal Pradesh in the nineteenth century,” Social Scientist 10, no. 12 (1982), 
19. 
14 Mackenzie argued that the independent frontier tribes were discovered as a larger part of British 
expedition under the imperialistic ambition of the then-Governor General Lord Cornwallis. See: 
Alexander Mackenzie, “History of relations of the government with the hill tribes of the north -east 
frontier of Bengal,” The Home Department Press: Government of India (Calcutta, India: 1884), 7.  
15 Harish Kapadia, “The promised land,” The Himalayan Journal 63, no. 5 (2007), Para 24, 
https://www.himalayanclub.org/hj/63/5/the-promised-land/. 
16 The Act was part of the regulations that were made under the then-federal legislations, namely the 
Government of India Act, 1870, and the Government of India Act, 1915. The regulation that was 
initially enacted, with the motive of protecting British commercial interests and administration, was 
later framed as a policy that aimed to protect the hill tribes’ way of life until Indian independence and 
beyond. See: Robert Lyngdoh, “Vision for democratic and progressive Meghalaya,” Vision for 
Meghalaya on and beyond the inner line permit, eds. H. Srikanth et al. (Shillong, India: ICSSR-NERC, 
2012), 10-11. 
17 This line extended to the foothills of Assam up until which British India exercised their regu lar and 
ordinary jurisdiction of the courts of law and claimed their suzerainty. However, in the territory beyond 
the Inner Line to the Outer Line surrounding the Burmese, Chinese and the Tibetan borders 
(undetermined or undefined boundaries), British India did not exercise any regular administration 




administration.18 Sir Robert Reid argued that, according to the Government of British 
India, the jurisdiction of the hill tracts between the Inner Line and the Outer Line was of 
“loose” control.19 The setting of frontier limits was a matter of the British 
administration’s own arbitrary approximation planned according to what suited their 
purposes.20  
The Assam Frontier Tract Regulation (Regulation 2) of 1880 was another law 
that sought to exclude the operation of any existing Act in the inhabited frontier tracts of 
Assam.21 These frontier tracts, namely the Balipara Frontier Tract, the Lakhimpur 
Frontier Tract and the Sadiya Frontier Tract, were declared as “Backward Tracts”22 
under the Government of India Act of 1919, wherein no Act of Provincial Legislature 
was permitted to apply except at the governor’s discretion.23 In 1935, these “Backward 
Tracts” were divided into “Excluded Areas” and “Partially Excluded Areas” whereby 
Arunachal Pradesh was brought under “Excluded Areas” and therefore excluded from 
the general administration and application of laws made by provincial legislature, with 
the governor taking direct control.24 In other words, while administrative divisions of 
                                                 
18 Supra note 16, at 30-32.  
19 The then-Viceroy of British India, Lord Hardinge, wrote in December 1910: “…We only claim 
suzerainty up to the foot of the hills. We have an inner line and an outer line. Up to the inner line we 
administer in the ordinary way. Between the inner and the outer lines we only administer politically. 
That is, our Political Officers exercise only loose jurisdiction, and to prevent trouble with the frontier 
tribes, passes are required for our subjects who want to cross the inner line. The country between the 
two lines is very sparsely inhabited and is mostly dense jungle.” See: Robert Reid, History of the 
frontier areas bordering on Assam from 1883-1941 (Delhi, India: Eastern Publishing House, 1942), 
221. Similarly, Lord Minto, the predecessor of Lord Hardinge, wrote on 23 October, 1910: “The 
question of future arrangements for controlling and safeguarding the area between the administrative 
boundary and the new external frontier remains to be considered. We consider that our future policy 
should be one of loose political control, having as its object the minimum of interference….” Ibid., 228.  
20 Ibid., 227. 
21 Section 2 of the Regulation excluded operation of enactments relating to civil and criminal procedure. 
See: J.N. Das, Land System of Arunachal Pradesh  (New Delhi, India: Indian Law Institute, 1989), 6,  
http://14.139.60.114:8080/jspui/bitstream/123456789/725/7/Arunachal%20Pradesh.pdf 
22 Until 1914, these tracts were administered under the name of three separate sections: Central Section 
and Eastern Section (for the administration of Abor, Mishmi and Bor Khampti tribes); Western Section 
(between Subansiri and Tawang region for the rest of the tribes such as Aka, Dafla and Miris); and the 
Lakhimpur Frontier Tract. These tracts were renamed as “Backward Tracts.” In 1919, the Central and 
Eastern Sections were renamed as the Sadiya Frontier Tract and the Western Section was renamed as 
the Balipara Frontier Tract. In 1943, by carving out certain portions of Sadiya and Lakhimpur Frontier 
Tract, the Tirap Frontier Tract was created. Supra note 19, at 237-249. 
23 Supra note 21, at Section 52A. 
24 While partially excluded areas could send representatives to the legislature, the excluded areas had no 
representatives in the legislature and their administration was therefore vested in the hands of the  
governor. See: Chai-fong Chan, “British colonial policy in the Naga Hills: With special focus on control 
area policy,” The Komaba Journal of Area Studies, no. 3 (1999), 80. Some argued that such policies did 
not go well with some of the “mainstream nationalists” who believed that these designs were part o f a 
larger “divide and rule policy” of British India. However, the Constituent Assembly of independent 
India decided to keep them the way they were after the Administrative Reforms Commission in 1967 
interacted with the tribes of the Excluded Area in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). See: S. 
Baruah, “Minority policy in the north-east: Achievements and dangers,” Economic and Political Weekly 




the state continued, this area retained its loose administrative character.25 The tribes, 
adverse to the advent of outsiders, therefore resisted strongly and were met with 
punitive expeditions by the British administration.26 The overall objective of these 
missions remained the same: to explore and map the region in order to determine 
suitable international boundaries between Tibet and British India, and to collect taxes. 
Describing the status quo of the tribes’ territories, Hudson argues that since tribes, under 
international law, coped poorly in transactions as sovereign states, their tracts of land 
were conceived as res nullius. These tracts of land were consequently annexed, deeming 
them uninhabited despite the obvious presence of Indigenous Peoples.27  
Further administrative divisions continued years after the British had left. Post-
independence India renamed all the tracts and districts together with the Naga tribal area 
as the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) on January 5, 1954, and several 
administrative units were reconstituted accordingly.28 Thereafter, the three-tiered 
Panchayati Raj decentralization system for local governance was introduced in 1968 
based on the recommendations of a federal committee. Accordingly, in 2001, the 
Arunachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act of 1997 came into force. It is argued that, while 
it introduced the three-tiered system at local levels based on systems prevalent in 
mainland India and alien to NEFA, it diminished the primacy of traditional local 
systems of governance that existed prior to the new system.29 Some argued that India 
                                                 
25 Holdich argued that these unadministered tracts with loose political control acted, in a way, as a buffer 
zone for British India. See: T.H. Holdich, “The north-eastern frontier of India,” Journal of the Royal 
Society of Arts 60, no. 3092 (1912), 379-392. 
26 Some of these punitive expeditions included the Abor Expedition of 1893-1894, the Aka Expedition of 
1833-1884, the Apa Tanang or Apatani Expeditions of 1896, the Miri Mission of 1911 and the Bebejiya 
Expedition of 1899 against the Abor (now known as Adi), Aka, Apatani, Miri and Idu Mishmi tribes 
respectively. Punitive measures included burning down of whole family homes and villages, including 
food crops and properties, with great disproportionate use of military force. For instance, in the case of 
the attack on Damroh village during the Abor Expedition, the military forces never determined who was 
the true culprit even though the villages of Bomjir, Dambuk, Mimasipu, Silluk and Damroh were 
shellfired, attacked and burned with the help of a large army . Supra note 19, at 197. Similarly, during 
the Aka Expedition, granary and livestock of the Dafla tribe (now known as Nyishi) in Yefan (or Effa), 
the houses of three village leaders of the raid were set ablaze. Supra note 19, at 272-273. In the case of 
the Bebejiya Mishmi Expedition, 100 men, 90 Maddras (Madras) Sappers, 900 Infantry, 95 police and 
two rocket artilleries were deployed. Eventually, four small villages were burned down, with crops and 
properties destroyed. According to Reid, the intention of the officers was to punish the whole tribe 
rather than the main culprit. Supra note 19, at 204-205. These measures stood contrary to England’s 
highly esteemed image in the seventeenth century in the Western hemisphere. 
27 G.F. Hudson, “The frontier of China and Assam: Background to the fighting,” The China Quarterly, 
no. 12 (1962), 203-206. 
28 J.N. Das, Supra note 21 at 7. 
29 The Monpa tribe of Tawang and Kameng districts has their own process of selecting village heads 
known as Tsorgens, indicating traditional political institutions. Similarly, Indigenous Peoples in the 
state have their own system of administering justice. These judicial systems are still in existence among 
the Abbala of Idu Mishmi tribe, the Pharai of Kaman Mishmi tribe, the Kebang of Adi tribe, the 
Builiang of Apatani tribe, the Ngojowa of Wancho tribe, the Jungblu of Shertukpen tribe, the Mokchup 
of Khamptis, the Mele of Hrusso tribe, and the Nockthung of Tangsa tribe respectively. These 
institutions vary in their forms such as direct democracies, republics, monarchies or chieftain systems. 




followed an assimilationist and integrationist approach with top-down federal planning, 
rendering local self-governance a nominal presence.30 Arguably, the loose 
administrative control and the space for self-consciousness of tribes to live in their own 
predetermined cultural, political and economic ways gradually shrunk in the larger 
discourse of an assertive nation-building process after the 1962 Indo-Chinese War.31 
This included imparting Hindi compulsorily in schools through Hindi medium schools; 
renaming persons and places with non-Indigenous names; couching traditional folklores 
in alternative narratives in order to “mainstream” them; hero worshipping of war 
martyrs; blocking traditional economic trade routes with Tibet; and overhauling the 
whole sociocultural, economic and political structure of the region. Bhattacharjee sums 
up this “colonization of psyche” that began with the systematic demolition and 
dispossession of values, traditional cultural beliefs in inanimate, animate and the human 
worlds, institutions, and languages of the Indigenous Peoples in the state all through 
modern statecraft imposition.32 In 1972, the State attained Union Territory status after 
bifurcation from Assam. It was rechristened as NEFA, and subsequently proceeded to 
become a full- fledged state on February 20, 1987, under the name of Arunachal 
Pradesh.33  
                                                 
the selection of village elders for the administration of justice was subjected to the Deputy 
Commissioner’s discretion.  
30 The challenge of maintaining the balance between assimilation of tribal peoples into the “mainstream” 
and securing their identity without changing their way of life and compromising “development” has 
always been present, even before the Union of India. These challenges are implicitly reflected in the 
policies of different political parties depending upon who comes in to power, and yet they are seldom 
discussed. See: Apoorv Kurup, “Tribal law in India: How decentralized administration is extinguishing 
tribal rights and why autonomous tribal governments are better,” Indigenous Law Journal 7, no. 1 
(2008), 87-126. 
31 Major restructuring of administrative, legal and policy measures were undertaken in order to “connect” 
the administratively excluded Indigenous Peoples with the “mainland.” See: V. Bijukumar, “Social 
Exclusion and Ethnicity in Northeast India” The NEHU Journal 11, no. 2 (2013), 19-35. It is believed 
that, to a large extent, scholars like G.S. Ghurye and N.K. Bose had wider roles in accelerating 
assimilation and integration processes, as they strongly criticized and denied that the tribes in India 
were Indigenous Peoples. See also: V. Xaxa, “Tribes as indigenous people of India,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 34, no. 51 (1999), 3589-3595. Some Indian writers even criticized the writing of 
British officers such as Robert Reid, believing their ideas to be a part of the “divide and rule” policy. 
The barter system of economy was replaced by the monetized economy. Hindi was “imposed” in the 
boarding schools of remote villages without any policy option to formally study o ne’s own mother 
tongue even as a third language, except for the Bodhi language in a few districts in government schools. 
The current general situation is that almost all tribes in the state speak Hindi as a medium of inter-tribe 
communication. Many children and parents no longer speak their own dialect at home however in some 
communities, the revitalization of local dialects is currently in process. Xaxa uses the term 
“acculturation” for such phenomena whereby tribes adopt the ideas and values of the dominant 
community rather than being part of that society. See: V. Xaxa, “Transformation of tribes in India: 
Terms of discourse,” Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 24 (1999), 1519-1524. See also: E. 
Mukhopadhyay, “Arunachal: The changing profile of closed cu lture,” Social Scientist 20, no. 3/4 
(1992), 68-74.  
32 Sukalpa Bhattacharjee, “Understanding the ‘tribal’: Postcolonial identity and creative writing,” Man 
and Society: A Journal of North East Studies, ed. Udayon Mishra (Shillong, India: ICSSR-NERC, 
2011), 1-12.  
33 The naming of the State also resembled the general integrationist mood of mainstream 




While some of the laws enacted during the British period of rule continue to 
exist as instruments of “positive discrimination,” there are State laws that have been 
created in recent years that arguably cede the rights of Indigenous Peoples to the 
government. The Arunachal Pradesh (Land Settlement and Records) Act of 2000 
invoked the concept of state lands34 and forest35 that reduced Indigenous Peoples’ 
traditional ownership rights to mere “use rights” and made them subject to formal proof 
of occupancy.36 Similarly, the Industrial Policy of 2001 sought to significantly lease out 
land, giving a hundred percent equity ownership to the non-native entrepreneurs if they 
set up such units.37 This policy also dropped the requirement for securing business 
licenses, which once had been difficult to obtain. Such initiatives were seen as 
bypassing land rights provided for Indigenous Peoples by the State and therefore 
weakening their claims to land in favor of ever-increasing development projects.  
III. Dams and the Conflicts in Arunachal Pradesh 
Some experts claim that while the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) had 
identified the northeastern States as a “future powerhouse” in 2001, Arunachal Pradesh 
has the maximum share of hydropower potential.38 According to the State government’s 
own report, by 2015 the State government had signed 159 Memoranda of 
Understanding (MoUs) and Memoranda of Agreements (MoAs) with various public and 
private companies and received 1495.62 crores (US $230.09 million) since 2005.39 
Another report stated that hydroelectric power projects were allegedly sold out to the 
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) in lieu of a 225 crores (US $34.62 
million) loan in 2007 in order to revive public sector banks like State Apex Banks in 
Arunachal Pradesh.40 There were no debates or open competitive bidding ever reported. 
                                                 
that lays in the lap of sunlight or the region which first  receives the sunlight in India. Similarly, when 
Nagaland, a separate state, was being proposed for the Naga tribe, objections were raised in the 
parliament about the suffix “land” and different terminologies were being suggested. See: S. Nag, 
“Nehru and the Nagas: Minority nationalism and the post-colonial state,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 44, no. 49 (2009), 54. 
34 The Arunachal Pradesh (Land Settlement and Records) Act (2000), Sections 9 (1) and (2), 
http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/arunachal_pradesh/2000/2000AP10.pdf. 
35 Ibid., Section 10 (1) and (2). 
36 While the law does not outright reject community ownership and the role of village councils, it does not 
confirm them either in explicit terms. See: D. Greiger, Turner in the Tropics: The frontier concept 
revisited, Doctoral Thesis (Universität Luzern, Switzerland: 2009), 154. 
37 Ibid., 155. 
38 N. Vagholikar and P.J. Das, “Damming the Northeast,” Briefing Paper (Pune/Guwahati/New Delhi: 
Kalpavriksh, Aaranyak and ActionAid India, 2010), 3. 
39 “‘Arunachal Pradesh received Rs 1,495.62 crore as upfront money for hydel projects’: CM Nabam 




40 These projects included the highest megawatt projects, such as the 2880 megawatt (MW) Dibang 
Multipurpose Hydroelectric Project (DMP), the 600 MW Tawang I and the 800 MW Tawang II HEPs, 




The human rights abuses that ensued in subsequent years related to several 
Hydroelectric Power projects (HEPs) raised further questions about the authority’s 
transparency in leasing out natural resources. 
It was reported that on October 5, 2011, paramilitary security forces in Roing 
town, of the Lower Dibang Valley District of Arunachal Pradesh, shot nine students 
with automatic assault rifles while they were celebrating an annual local festival.41 
While the district administration alleged that Maoist outfits had infiltrated the town, the 
Indigenous Peoples of the district claimed that the context behind the shooting was the 
frustration and inability of the state government to obtain the consent of the local 
community through due process of public hearing, as mandated by law, for the 
upcoming 2880 MW DMP. The hearing was postponed for the tenth consecutive time as 
Indigenous Peoples opposed it.42 The subsequent public hearing was slated for October 
24 of that same year. Locals alleged that the Maoist stereotyping of Mishmi Indigenous 
Peoples was a preemptive plan of the district administration to instill terror; increase 
large paramilitary forces in a sparsely populated town; and conduct the public hearing 
process forcefully.43 Several letters and memoranda were submitted to the Public 
Hearing Panel of the DMP and to the concerned ministry in New Delhi regarding the 
vulnerability of the project as per the scientific study undertaken and related 
seismology, biodiversity and ecology concerns.44 However, despite all concerns 
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Times (October 2011), http://www.arunachaltimes.in/ 
archives/oct11%2008.html. The authority claimed that the bullets used against the victims were rubber 
pellets. However, on close examination of medical reports of one of the victims by the author, it was 
found that metallic pellets were in fact used. The allegation of intrusion of Maoists into the festival area 
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authority is pending in the court of law. 
42 “Public hearing is an imposition on the will of the people: Idu society,” The Arunachal Times, (October 
2011), http://www.arunachaltimes.in/ 
archives/oct11%2025.html. 
43 According to a report, similar tactics were reported in the State of Odhisa when the state government 
failed to overturn the Gram Sabha or Village Council decisions with regard to bauxite mining in the 
Niyamgiri hills. Before approaching the Supreme Court in 2016 to overturn its earlier decisions, 
villagers were reportedly harassed, imprisoned and even killed by armed police forces. See: A. Kothari, 
“Decisions of the people, by the people, for the people,” The Hindu (May 2016), 
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44 The dam originally proposed was 3000 MW. Twice, the MoEFCC Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) 
rejected it, arguing that the project would result in the destruction of more than 4,000 hectares (9,900 
acres) of forests. Some experts argued that construction of this project would lead to threatening 
important species such as the Bengal Florican, identified as critically endangered by the Intern ational 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), as well as different tiger species and several others. 
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) studies of NHPC reportedly miscalculated and denied the 
existence of any major wildlife in the area despite the existence of the Mehao Wildlife Sanctuary in the 
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Minister’s Office. See: T. Wilkes, “India approves projects in dash for growth, alarming green groups,” 




expressed by experts and Indigenous Peoples, the project was finally given clearance by 
the state government.45 The then-Prime Minister’s inauguration of the foundation stone 
for the project in 2008 in the state capital, far from the project site, was criticized as a 
breach of law since public hearing processes had not even started in the project-affected 
area.46  
A similar incident of human rights abuses emerged in May 2016 in Tawang, the 
westernmost district of the same state, resulting in the death of two monks by gunshots. 
Both the nineteen-year-old and the thirty-one-year-old victims were protesting with 
several other monks for the release of their arrested leader Lama Lobsang Gyatso, who 
was spearheading the anti-dam movement under the banner of Save Mon Region 
Federation (SMRF).47 SMRF, under its leader, had been campaigning against the 780 
MW Nyamjang Chu HEP proposed to be constructed at Zemithang village in Pancheng 
Valley by Bhilwara Energy Limited (BEL) and against corruptions and malpractices 
that followed project allotments.48 Locals argued that the project, if commenced, would 
affect forty-seven families in Tawang alone. While the project was granted 
environmental clearance on April 19, 2011, by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and 
Climate Change (MoEFCC), the National Green Tribunal (NGT) suspended it on April 
7, 2016. A shooting incident ensued during the subsequent month of the suspension of 
the project, as authorities refused to release the SMRF leader on bail. In both instances, 
authorities have attempted to discredit local movements and disregard the local 
community’s relationship with their land in order to facilitate development. A recent 
report released by Global Witness estimated that the criminalization, victimization, 
physical assault, intimidation and state repression of environmental protestors and civic 
activists around the world has risen in recent years and 40% of these victims are 
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Indigenous Peoples.49 According to the report, India stood as the fourth peak country 
among twenty-four others that were surveyed in 2016.50 As per the same report, the root 
cause of such violence is believed to be the imposition of projects on communities 
without their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) around their land resources.51 
 
IV. The Principle of FPIC under International Law and Indian Law 
The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) has not been defined in any 
conventions under international law. However, it is linked to treaty norms such as the 
right to self-determination, the right to maintain culture and the principle of non-
discrimination existing under various international human rights instruments. It has also 
been widely interpreted through the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII) and the United Nations Expert Mechanism on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
(EMRIP), as well as human rights treaty bodies such as the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD)52 and the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).53 The basic and general understanding of FPIC is 
clearly elucidated in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) of 2007.54 According to the Declaration, states, without any 
coercion, intimidation or manipulation, sufficiently in advance before adopting and 
implementing legislative or administrative measures55 or undertaking projects,56 are to 
seek consultation or consensus of Indigenous Peoples where their land rights may be 
affected.57 While Indigenous Peoples themselves are to decide the representative 
institutions that are entitled to express consent on behalf of the affected community, it is 
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54 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2 
October 2007), A/RES/61/295. 
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the duty of States Parties under Article 32 to obtain FPIC in good faith for the approval 
of any projects affecting Indigenous Peoples’ lands and to ensure and verify effective 
mechanisms and procedures are followed for FPIC.58 Daes argued in her report as the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples59 that the right 
to grant or withhold consent is part of or an extension of the right to self-determination, 
including the right to pursue economic development under common Article 1 of both 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)60 and the International 
Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (ICESCR).61 While interpreting Article 27 of 
ICCPR in General Comment No. 23, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) has called upon States to protect the rights of ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic minorities that are connected to the control over use of lands and resources.62 
Similarly, CESCR has called upon States Parties to respect the principle of FPIC and to 
ensure protection of Indigenous rights to own, develop, control and use their communal 
lands, territories and resources under Article 15(1)(a) of ICESCR in General Comment 
No. 21.63 The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), in its interpretations of the rights of Indigenous Peoples in applying the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD),64 has called upon States Parties in General Recommendation No. 23 to not 
only consult Indigenous Peoples but also to obtain their informed consent with regards 
to development and resource exploitation within their traditional lands.65 The CERD has 
also urged States Parties to recognize the right to own, develop, control and use 
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Indigenous communal lands, territories and resources.66 While the right to FPIC under 
various provisions of UNDRIP is not to be regarded as bestowing a “veto power” to 
Indigenous Peoples, the same principle should also not be a mere formality of informing 
Indigenous Peoples their lands will be used for an exploitative purpose.67 In cases where 
development projects have significant and direct impact on Indigenous Peoples’ lives, 
there must be a strong presumption of considering Indigenous Peoples’ consent.68 
However, Indigenous Peoples in international forums have interpreted the FPIC 
principle as having the right to say “no” to a proposed project during negotiations with 
the given government.69 While it is argued that the UNDRIP and general 
recommendations and comments of the treaty bodies might be short of attaining the 
status of customary international law in explaining the status of FPIC, they are slowly 
shaping and challenging state practice which eventually could lead to attainment of 
legal status for this concept.70 The minimal consensus demonstrated by international 
human rights treaties is, nonetheless, the requirement of consultation in good faith 
towards achieving the objective of consent. In clear terms, it is understood that FPIC is 
a pathway for Indigenous Peoples to exercise the right to self-determination and 
participate in public affairs.  
India voted in favor of UNDRIP and ratified ILO Convention 107. Apart from 
from these instruments, India voted in favor of the outcome of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 (also known as the Rio 
Declaration), which plays a significant role regarding India’s obligation to reflect its 
basic principles in order to support and enable Indigenous Peoples’ and local 
communities’ effective participation on matters affecting them, especially those related 
to environment and development.71 As a result, public consultation was made one of the 
mandatory legal requirement in the environmental clearance process for projects 
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through a notification in 2006.72 Public hearings at project sites and obtaining written 
responses consequently became two mandatory components of public consultations.73 
The Indian Supreme Court and the High Courts of various states have observed that the 
public hearing process must ensure wide participation of the public in decisions 
affecting them. However, the criticism of this process has been that, while it seems to 
act as a “democratic” valve, this consultation typically only comes at a later stage in 
project cycles, when space for meaningful participation of those affected by the project 
is not guaranteed.74 There are no options for public participation in site selection at an 
earlier stage.75 Similarly, there is no mechanism to ensure either effective responses by 
project proponents to queries raised during a public hearing, or to make final 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) reports public in order to check whether 
concerns raised at hearings have been accounted for, despite NGT guidelines.76 In other 
words, meaningful public consultations through public hearings remain a mere 
consultation exercise, especially where protests are taking place. Where there are strong 
laws to ensure certain rights in decision-making, there is an attempt by the state to dilute 
them. For instance, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act of 2006 (also popularly known as the Forest Rights 
Act or FRA) provides a number of rights to Scheduled Tribes (STs) and traditional 
forest dwellers (TFDs). These include protection from eviction or being removed from 
land until the recognition and verification process is complete;77 the right to live in state 
forest land under individual or common occupation for livelihood;78 the right of 
ownership access to collect, use and dispose minor forest produce;79 the rights of 
settlement and conversion of all forest villages into revenue villages;80 the right to 
protect, conserve or manage community forest resources;81 and any other traditional 
right customarily enjoyed82 with minor exceptions to some of their uses. One of the 
significant provisions of this Act is Section 6, which confers powers on the Gram Sabha 
(Village Assembly) to determine the nature and extent of “individual” or “community” 
forest rights within the local limits of jurisdiction. This right was exercised by 12 Gram 
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Sabhas unanimously in 2013 in the Niyamgiri hills in the state of Odhisa, namely to 
withhold the consent where Vedanta Aluminum Limited (VAL) had started bauxite 
mining even before the consultation process began.83 In August 2013, the Supreme 
Court of India banned bauxite mining after it found violations of several laws, including 
the right of tribal groups to be consulted under FRA.84 In determining the cultural, 
spiritual, historical and customary rights of STs and TFDs with regard to their land, this 
Court also delved into UNDRIP very specifically.85 Paragraph 38 quotes UNDRIP as 
the source of rights for Indigenous Peoples, STs and TFDs: 
The necessity to respect and promote the inherent rights of indigenous 
peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures 
and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, 
especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources, have also 
been recognized by United Nations in the United Nations Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. STs and other TFDs residing in the 
Scheduled Areas have the right to maintain their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and 
used lands.86  
It stated that the Act did not in any way take away or interfere with the right of the state 
over mines or minerals lying underneath the forestland, but rather that the state holds 
the natural resources as a trustee for the people.87 However, many scholars and 
Indigenous activists have argued that this significant legislation faces risks of being 
diluted.88 The government of Arunachal Pradesh in particular has officially denied 
FRA’s relevance and its applicability in the state, even though it is federal legislation 
that is legally binding on all states.89  
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Public sector companies, like the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation 
(NHPC), have been critical of the World Commission of Dams’ (WCD) report of 
2000,90 for it concludes that dams built in this region have systematically failed to 
address negative impacts and how project-affected people must be treated not just as 
passive victims but as negotiating partners; furthermore, the report concludes that FPIC 
should form part of the basic guiding principles for these projects.91 The state 
administrations’ attempts to link homegrown movements with rebel outfits have only 
indicated that such strategies are commonly used to deny land rights and discredit 
environmental concerns. It also indicates the concern that the welfare state would be 
required to defend the marginalized against the effects of markets that arbitrarily 
encourage the leasing of this source of livelihood for the interests of the few. With 
special reference to dam projects in northeast India, CERD, in its concluding 
observations on reports submitted by India in 2007, expressed its concern that large 
scale projects like the dams in the northeast are carried out without free, prior and 
informed consent and have the potential to forcefully resettle people.92 Therefore, the 
Committee urged the government of India to fully respect and implement such rights in 
its practice concerning tribal peoples, in accordance with ILO Convention 107 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Populations of 1957, the FRA, and other relevant legislations.93 It 
also urged India to repeal the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 (AFSPA) that 
gives arbitrary power to shoot civilians based on mere suspicion, and provides no legal 
remedy against armed forces.94 The ratification of the Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) needs to be on the 
government of India’s agenda without delay, as urged by CESCR in its concluding 
observations on reports submitted by India in 2008.95 India’s ratification of ILO 
Resolution 169, endorsement of UNDRIP, ratification of CAT and repeal of AFSPA 
would encourage Indigenous Peoples and tribal peoples to exercise their land rights 
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without any fear of torture.96 Questioning the existence of Indigenous Peoples through 
terminological complexities in systematic terms would only lead to further denial of 
human rights.97 Considering these factors, it is clear that serious issues regarding tribal 
peoples, ethnic minorities or Indigenous Peoples in India need urgent redress, as the 
case of violation of FPIC from Arunachal Pradesh would indicate how consent is not 
obtained voluntarily but, instead, forcibly.  
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Our Unique Historical Opportunity: Indigenous-State Relations 
 
Rachael Grace Patten 
 
Relationships between States and Indigenous Peoples have made substantial and 
significant strides towards harmony in the last twenty-five years. These changes were 
brought about by Indigenous Peoples’ extraordinary efforts, focused via the Indigenous 
Peoples’ movement and fueled by their resilience and dedication. Due to the strength of 
the Indigenous Peoples’ movement, there now exist dynamic models for peaceful and 
just State-Indigenous People relations. In addition, through the work of Indigenous 
Peoples within international bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the world now has 
unprecedented international instruments at its disposal to guide and ameliorate relations. 
Improved relationships have never had such momentum and moral obligation, as 
humanity must urgently find solutions to climate change. Multip le international legal 
instruments have acknowledged Indigenous Peoples’ sciences, including, but not 
limited to, effective methods to maintain and enhance biodiversity. For these three 
reasons—the urgency of our time, the international legal instruments now available, and 
current models that provide valuable case studies—we live in a unique time wherein we, 
as citizens, States, and Indigenous Peoples, have the historic opportunity to improve 
State-Indigenous Peoples’ relations. In this paper, I will explore these three phenomena 
by examining where we have come from, where we are now, and where we can go.  
 
I. Where We Have Come From 
 
Before the United Nations came to be, the League of Nations was its 
predecessor. Two Indigenous leaders came to the League of Nations in 1923 and 1925 
to advocate for their Peoples. Chief Deskaheh, a Cayuga Chief from the Six Nations of 
North America (also known as the Haudenosaunee Confederacy), was the first.1 While 
he was not received by the League of Nations, he developed important relationships 
with the people of Geneva.2 One such person Deskaheh influenced was a future mayor 
of Geneva who later helped ensure that the city would honor its pledge to recognize the 
Haudenosaunee passport.3 This policy of Switzerland remains true today.4 The second 
Indigenous leader was Maori religious leader W.T. Ratana, who visited Geneva to 
discuss violations of the Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori peoples and the British 
Crown. He was also rejected.5 And yet, through Indigenous Peoples’ sustained efforts to 
have their claims heard, the UN established the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations in 1982 featuring the voices of Indigenous Peoples’ leaders.6 In 2000, the 
                                                 
1 The Secretariat of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), Introduction to 
State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples (SOWIP), ed. United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs (New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009), 2. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Sharon H. Venne, “NGOs, Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations,” in NGOization: Complicity, 
Contradictions and Prospects, eds. Aziz Choudry and Dip Kapoor (London: Zed Books, Ltd., 2013), 78. 
4 Ibid., 78. 
5 Supra note 1, at 2. 




UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues was established with a landmark 
configuration of eight State-nominated members and eight members nominated by 
Indigenous Peoples.7 And in 2001, the UN established a Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These crucial developments (along with many others that 
are beyond the scope of this article) were the results, decades later, of the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Movement continuing Deskaheh’s and Ratana’s work. 
 
The pivotal moment, however, for the Indigenous Peoples’ Movement was the 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) in 2007. It was birthed in 1977 when Indigenous leaders from many parts of 
the world, but mainly from the Americas, demanded the UN’s attention in Geneva; and, 
unlike Deskaheh or Ratana, they were not ignored.8 Thirty years later, the Declaration 
was overwhelmingly adopted by the UN General Assembly and nearly all UN member 
states.  
 
II. Where We Are Now 
 
The Declaration is an extraordinary international instrument that both affirms the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples as well as provides the normative framework for future 
relations between States and Indigenous Peoples. While previous international 
instruments, especially the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, had made reference to or defined these rights, UNDRIP 
was, and remains, the strongest and most comprehensive of them all. The Declaration 
consists of 46 articles that cover topics ranging from, but not limited to, land, territory, 
and resource rights (LTR), intellectual property rights, free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC), the right of self-determination and cultural rights. UNDRIP is a normative 
framework that sets the minimum standards of Indigenous Peoples’ rights and provides a 
foundation from which these rights can expand and Indigenous Peoples can thrive.9 Its 
power lies in its wide acceptance amongst nearly the entire international community, 
combined with the fact that Indigenous Peoples vitally shaped its content. Thus, the 
Declaration has legitimacy with both States and Indigenous Peoples, and indeed within 
the international community.  
 
While UNDRIP does not supply a definition for “Indigenous Peoples,” it does 
define many important fundamental rights, such as FPIC and LTR. Nevertheless, non-
Indigenous persons, organizations, corporations and States, either wittingly or 
unwittingly, still often violate many of these rights, sometimes citing contradictions 
they regard to be true. Thus, it is important to note that Article 46 places the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples within the international human rights framework (46.2), while 
simultaneously protecting a State’s territorial integrity (46.1).10 These two topics—
balancing Indigenous Peoples’ rights with human rights and a State’s rights with self-
determination rights of Indigenous Peoples—can be misconstrued as obstacles to 
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9 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples , 
United Nations Document A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007), Article 43.  




improved relationships. However, the Declaration makes clear that established human 
rights supersede Indigenous Peoples’ rights precisely because human rights are defined 
and understood as inherent and universal. Likewise, the Declaration also distinctly 
claims that self-determination rights of Indigenous Peoples do not equate to secession. 
Understanding Article 46 is a useful tool when encountering skeptical or dissenting 
audiences. 
 
Furthermore, since UNDRIP is a declaration and not a treaty, some may conflate 
its “soft-law” classification with a lack of power in the legal system. Yet, within 
international law, declarations serve as international legal instruments that can exercise 
binding legal power. In 2007, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues adopted a General Comment on Article 42 of UNDRIP that demonstrates how 
this is so. The Permanent Forum states that “the binding value of the Declaration must 
be seen in the wider normative context of the innovations that have taken place in 
international human rights law in recent years,”11 and that “the Declaration forms a part 
of human rights law.”12 Definitively, they conclude (italics added): 
 
A number of the articles are based on the human rights covenants and other 
conventions, or they may already today have the quality of customary law by 
virtue of policies implemented in national jurisdictions. As expressions of 
international customary law, they must be applied regardless of the nature of the 
document in which they are stated or agreed.13 
  
This legal opinion serves as a useful legal instrument in understanding the significance 
and power of the Declaration in international law. It helps clarify UNDRIP’s legal 
weight in the international system for those unfamiliar with how international law is 
formed. More specifically, this Comment states how the importance of international 
customary law and the existence of UNDRIP’s content in other legal expressions, such 
as treaties, results in a de facto legally binding quality of the Declaration. 
 
    In addition, the emergence and success of the UN Human Rights Council and 
regional courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have provided a 
pivotal development for the Indigenous Peoples’ Movement. The Declaration has been 
used to successfully argue for Indigenous Peoples’ rights with the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights and, as such, proves itself to be a powerful international legal 
instrument.14 The combination of UNDRIP and the other international legal instruments 
concerning Indigenous Peoples’ rights with their proven legal weight in domestic, 
regional and international courts gives the Indigenous Peoples’ movement an 
unprecedented strength. This strength is the foundation for today’s historical 
opportunity for peaceful and just State-Indigenous Peoples’ relations. 
 
III. Where We Can Go 
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    As referenced above, UNDRIP clearly addresses Indigenous Peoples’ rights to 
self-determination, FPIC, and LTR. As such, it is an excellent resource for States, and 
also businesses, to navigate their interactions with Indigenous Peoples. Corporations, 
especially trans-national corporations (TNCs) and those in extractive industries, can 
make a significant difference to the lives of Indigenous Peoples by implementing 
UNDRIP through their corporate policies. While States have been found to be legally 
responsible for how TNCs conduct themselves within their boundaries, cases can take 
many years, even decades, to resolve, and the damage can be irreparable. Far better an 
alternative is for companies to become aware of and understand the rights enshrined 
within UNDRIP and actively pursue compliance. This is of grave importance because a 
significant portion of land, “undeveloped” in the eyes of the mainstream development 
paradigm, overlaps with Indigenous Peoples’ territories and the effects of displacement 
of Indigenous Peoples can be devastating for them. With the internet and the current 
information age, citizens and consumers are pushing for more socially conscious 
business practices that are both ecologically friendly and respectful of human rights. If 
consumers and investors demand that the businesses they support adhere to these 
internationally-accepted human rights norms, corporations can be swayed. Furthermore, 
the corporations who proactively implement UNDRIP within their policies and practices 
stand to gain financially from the emerging market of eco- and socially-conscious 
consumers.  
 
    Not only will TNCs acting in alignment with UNDRIP help Indigenous Peoples 
at risk of possible rights’ violations; it will also benefit non-Indigenous populations. 
Respecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples goes hand-in-hand with battling climate 
change. In their judgment on November 25, 2015, in the case of the Kalinã and Lokono 
Peoples v. Suriname, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated:  
 
…in principle, the protection of natural areas and the right of the indigenous and 
tribal  peoples to the protection of the natural resources in their territories are 
compatible, and it emphasizes that, owing to their interrelationship with nature 
and their ways of life, the indigenous and tribal peoples can make an important 
contribution to such conservation.15 
 
    Conclusions such as this, which recognize, protect and promote Indigenous 
sciences and traditional knowledge, are echoed across multiple international 
instruments. One example is Article 8(j) of the Convention on Biological Diversity, a 
legally binding international treaty, which explicitly recognizes that “…the knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities…” are “…relevant for 
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”16 Biological diversity is a 
key factor in combatting climate change, an existential threat to our species. 
Collaboration, based on FPIC, LTR and the other fundamental rights outlined in 
UNDRIP between States and Indigenous Peoples, is crucial for revitalizing biodiversity 
globally and ensuring humanity’s future on Earth. Thus, climate change is a formidable 
motivator for improved, peaceful and just relations between States and Indigenous 
Peoples.  
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Thankfully, many peoples have fought to create models for these types of new 
relations. In New Zealand, thanks to the advocacy of the Maori people, a law is 
currently being considered to require all people in New Zealand to learn both English 
and the Maori language until the age of sixteen.17 In addition, guidelines for bilingual 
public signage are readily available and used, further proving the strides they have made 
towards better relations.18 Language rights are solid indicators of how well Indigenous 
Peoples’ rights have been honored, and these developments are very welcome. Of 
course, each case is dependent on the context of their history and demographics; 
nonetheless, the Maori people’s relationship with the New Zealand state provides a 
useful model.  
 
    Individuals comprise groups of people and it is because of individuals’ efforts 
within collective movements that we find ourselves with this unique historical 
opportunity for creating peaceful and just State-Indigenous Peoples’ relations. 
Individuals make up the Indigenous Peoples’ movement and are responsible for its 
incredible gains. Just as those individuals have had such an international impact, so too 
can non-Indigenous state citizens have an impact in creating positive State-Indigenous 
Peoples’ relations based on human rights and fundamental freedoms by using their 
voice to advocate for Indigenous Peoples’ rights within their workplace, community, 
and government. Our current era and opportunity is unprecedented, for we now have at 
our disposal multiple international legal instruments through which Indigenous Peoples 
and States have defined the rights of Indigenous Peoples and States’ responsibilities 
towards these rights. Furthermore, due to the strength and sustained efforts of 
Indigenous Peoples, we now also have multiple models for how to shape these types of 
relationships. Finally, due to the urgency and gravity of battling climate change, there 
exists a moral obligation for these types of relationships to be pursued by all parties, 
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Rigoberta Menchú and Dayamani Barla:  
A New Normal in the Hegemonic World 
 
Saket Suman Saurabh 
 
 The present paper proposes to look at two “texts” from India and Latin America: 
Dayamani Barla and Rigoberta Menchú. I use the word “texts” as a generic term 
referring to all of their activism through life experiences, struggles and their writings. I 
submit that each of these elements complements each other to comprise what I call a 
“text.” Rigoberta is from Guatemala and belongs to the Maya-Quiché community and 
Dayamani represents the Munda tribal community from Jharkhand, India. Their 
communities have always lived on the fringes of society, eking out a living with modest 
means. An entire civilization, the Mayans, were defeated and labelled as “Indian.” 
Colonizers attempted to destroy their histories and started doing so by burning their 
religious icons and other kinds of records. Their peoples were mass-murdered and few 
survived the European diseases with which they were infected thereafter. Similarly, and 
in more contemporary times, in India, the government has not provided decent 
education and healthcare to its Indigenous Peoples and has dishonoured its 
constitutional guarantee to provide for the “adivasis.”1  
 
      Colonization has left a devastating impact on Indigenous Peoples both in Latin 
America and India under the Spanish and English colonizers respectively. The Mayan 
civilization flourished throughout much of Guatemala and the surrounding regions long 
before the Spanish arrived. However, the Spanish conquistadores, led by Pedro de 
Alvarado, conquered this civilization in 1523-1524 (the “Spanish Conquest”). Similarly, 
English Colonizers used the written word in order to warp the relationship of tribes to 
their means of production of agricultural products in India. As a consequence of the 
forests laws introduced by the British, and continued by the governments of 
independent India, “the tribal who formerly regarded himself as the lord of the forests, 
was through a deliberate process turned into a subject and placed under the forests 
department.”2  
 
      Both in Jharkhand and Guatemala, colonialism changed the lives of the 
Indigenous Peoples because now these Indigenous and tribal communities had to 
sacrifice their land, forest and water resources in order to facilitate the “development” of 
the whole country as unpaid unskilled laborers. Such development did not serve any 
purpose for the Indigenous Peoples of India and Central America and led, instead, to 
their complete pauperization. Rigoberta’s people had to shift to other forms of work, 
and mostly shift to cities and towns to work, so in a way they are on the verge of losing 
their “Indigenous” identity. Dayamani’s Munda people are also losing their sources of 
livelihood and are on the verge of collapse. Rigoberta Menchú, an Indigenous woman 
and a prominent speaker on behalf of the struggles of her community in Guatemala, is 
the “writer” of the testimony entitled Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la 
conciencia (I Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Women in Guatemala). It is among the 
most famous testimonies written by a Latin American writer in the last twenty years of 
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the 20th century. In her book, Menchú provides a vivid account of the hardships and 
exploitations she has faced, reflective of the situation of her community at large. In her 
testimony, she also gives detailed accounts of their customs and traditions, highlighting 
the unique cultural identity of the Indigenous communities of Guatemala. Indigenous 
Peoples have no decisive role in the political economy of the country dominated by a 
small number of wealthy elite classes. 
 
      Similarly, Dayamani Barla used to write in Prabhat Khabar, a leading regional 
newspaper of Jharkhand. Through her writings, she gave voice to the thousands of 
adivasis/tribals who have been exploited for years. There she writes about the plight, 
sufferings and related struggles due to the displacement of the adivasis; the rampant 
corruption of the State administration; and the environmental degradation due to 
exploitation of natural resources and construction of dams. 
 
     Dayamani describes that the Indigenous Peoples of Jharkhand and working 
masses have a mother-son relationship with Nature. Their social, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, economic and historical existence continues to live in water, forest and land. 
These communities will exist as long as they are linked with water, forest and land. 
When adivasis and Indigenous societies are displaced from their land, forests and water, 
they are not only displaced from their dwellings and livelihoods but also from their 
social values, language and culture, economy and history. Dayamani considers the land 
as “heritage” and not “property.” 
 
      If we look at the global history of Indigenous Peoples, it becomes clear that 
Indigenous communities remain alive only in those places where there is water, forest 
and land, mountains and waterfalls. Indigenous society is part and parcel of nature. By 
separating them, we can neither conceive of adivasi or Indigenous society, nor of 
forests, rivers, waterfalls and mountains. 
 
      The case of Guatemala is historic in the sense that it gives us an in-depth 
understanding of the Latin American suffering which has put their perpetually 
discriminatory society in focus, where Rigoberta Menchú is representing her ethnic 
Maya community. By giving a human face to her community struggle, her testimony I, 
Rigoberta Menchú received international support and huge sympathy, earning her the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1992. She has been associated with many books; I say 
“associated” because the aforementioned book was Menchú’s testimonial which was 
given in interview format to Elisabeth Burgos Debray in Paris when Rigoberta was in 
exile from Guatemala. Due to her limited Spanish fluency, which was of course the 
colonial language that she had to learn separately from her mother tongue Maya-
Quiché, this testimonial represents the perpetual reality of her life which is similar to the 
realities of other Mayas of her community. Their myopic government has not been able 
to see these realities for what they are. Crossing Borders, Rigoberta: La nieta de los 
Mayas, The Honey Jar and The Girl from Chimel are prominent books that tell similar 
stories. 
 
      Her struggle did not start abruptly but rather, since childhood, Menchú suffered 
alongside other members of her family. Menchú said her father Vicente Menchú Tum 
was very poor and worked very hard. After getting married, he came to settle in 
altiplano, which was in the mountains. “The land up there belonged to the government 




Through all my parents’ efforts in the fincas, they managed to get enough money 
together to pay the fee, and they cleared the land.”3 Her parents had six children, 
although two of Rigoberta’s brother died due to scarcity of food. Her parents had to 
work in fincas that were down near the coast in the coffee/cotton plantations. They 
worked in the fincas for eight months and went back to the altiplano to sow maize and 
beans, which could only be produced after eight to nine years of hard work on that 
mountainous soil. Rigoberta also started accompanying her mother to the finca, first as a 
baby and then as a worker in the cotton plantations as early as eight years of age. 
 
      The death of Menchú’s friend Maria, due to poisoning from spraying pesticide 
in the cotton fields in the finca, led to Menchú’s realization that the harsh life she and 
her community lived surrounding the finca served only to support the wealthy Ladinos. 
This particular incident put little Menchú in total shock, especially after having 
witnessed the death of her brothers as well. Meanwhile, due to the distressing economic 
conditions faced by her family, Rigoberta’s elder sister had to go to the city to work as a 
maid. These incidents, all one after the other, made Rigoberta Menchú desperate to 
work and earn more so that she could leave the filthy conditions of the finca as early as 
possible. She also went to be a maid in the capital, Guatemala City, at the age of 
thirteen. She suffered there also, this time at the hands of a mistress who scolded her 
frequently for petty reasons. Menchú was not very well versed in Spanish at the time. 
After months of work, Menchú said, “I was pleased because I now understand Spanish 
very well. But since nobody taught me to memorize word by word, I couldn’t say a lot. I 
could say the main things I needed for my work but I couldn’t start a conversation, or 
answer back, or protest about something.”4     
 
 The land being harvested by Menchu’s family in altiplano was finally producing 
a harvest after many years of hard work by her family members along with other 
community members. Large tracts were now under cultivation, however suddenly big 
landowners appeared: the Brols. Alongside engineers and inspectors, the Brols started 
measuring the land, saying that they were from the Guatemalan government. After 
collecting the signatures of all community members who were living in the altiplano, 
Vicente Menchú Tum went to the Instituto Nacional de Transformación Agraria de 
Guatemala (INTA). The officials at the INTA gave a piece of paper to Vicente for him 
to sign, which he did since he could not read or write. “In fact, the paper said that the 
peasants confirmed, once again, that they would leave their land. This gave the 
landowners power, since he, the community’s representative, had signed the paper.”5 
Explaining further, Rigoberta Menchú said the Guatemalan Government was in 
collusion with landowners: 
 
The Government says the land belongs to the nation. It owns the land and gives 
it to us to cultivate. But when we’ve cleared and cultivated the land, that’s when 
the landowners appear. However, the landowners don’t just appear on their 
own—they have connections with different authorities that allow them to 
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manoeuvre like that. So, the first time they threw us out of our homes was, if I 
remember rightly, in 1967.6  
 
As a result of these skirmishes, the families in the community suffered and were 
living in a perpetually hostile environment. The Menchú family had to work in finca 
and then in altiplano to manage their daily needs; meanwhile the landowners were 
adamant about taking away their lands. Vicente said: “We were the first families to 
come and cultivate this land and nobody can deceive us into thinking that this land is 
theirs. If they want to be the owners of more land, let them go and cultivate the 
mountains. There is more land but it is not land where things grow.”7 This is also very 
much true in the Indian case, where in the state of Jharkhand the original landowners are 
those who were the first settlers according to the Khuntkattidari system in the Munda 
tribe and the Bhuinhari system in the Oraon tribe. There are clear similarities in the 
words of Vicente Menchú and the ancestors of the Munda tribe, which cements the 
author’s comparative work. However, there are ebbs and flows to these two tropes as 
well.  
 
 There was yet another raid on the village of altiplano in 1967 to move out the 
alleged settlers from their hamlets. INTA came to the village and told everyone they 
were being given their original land, if only they would sign a few papers. Even small 
children were made to stamp these papers. The papers were, in actuality, documentation 
that the community had to vacate the land within the next two years. When Rigoberta 
Menchú’s father protested and started attending union meetings, he was arrested on 
charges of compromising the sovereignty of the state. Those days were the most 
difficult days for the family of Menchú because they had to somehow manage the 
advocate’s fees, witnesses, documents, and interpreter fees to fight the case, since the 
lawyer was ladino and not able to understand the Maya-Quiché language. Rigoberta 
remembers, “That was when I told myself: ‘I must learn to speak Spanish, so that we 
don’t need intermediaries.’”8 Here we can recall the masterpiece of Gayatri Spivak, the 
essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”9 One can see through the words of Rigoberta Menchú 
that she is very much willing to learn Spanish, which was the language of the ladinos, 
aside from her knowledge of Maya-Quiché.  
 
 Vicente Menchú had to live in prison for one year and two months. He was 
beaten up for actively pursuing the land holding case with other community members. 
Again in 1977, he was arrested as a political prisoner. But due to union pressure, the 
Guatemalan government released him within fifteen days. Only after that did he begin 
to join up with other peasants to discuss the creation of the Comité Unidad de 
Campesina (CUC). Rigoberta says: 
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The CUC started growing; it spread like fire among the peasants in Guatemala. 
We began to understand that the root of all our problems was exploitation. That 
there were rich and poor and that the rich exploited the poor—our sweat, our 
labour. That’s how they got richer and richer. The fact that we were always 
waiting in offices, always bowing to the authorities, was part of the 
discrimination we Indians suffered. So was the cultural oppression which tries to 
divide us by taking away our traditions and prevents unity among our people.10  
 
      Likewise, we see similar happenings in various countries of the world that are 
categorized in the binary of “developed” and “developing” countries. The famous 
Standing Rock and Dakota Access Pipeline case is from the United States of America 
itself. The schemes of exploitation are the same everywhere, whether in the U.S., 
Guatemala, India or elsewhere.  
 
 As in those days in the altiplano, between 1980 and 1983, army attacks were 
very common in the village and government soldiers would frequently rape the local 
women and torture the local men; the community would stay in mountain tents as a 
result, leaving their homes at night. After General Kjell took power, he set into action 
“agrarian reforms” in which he divided the land into small plots for each community 
member and finally set up the INAFOR (Instituto Nacional de Forestación de 
Guatemala), an institution looking after trees and forests in Guatemala. Through this 
institution, the army metaphorically tied the community’s hands—community members 
could not cut down trees without INAFOR permission and each tree cost five Quetzales. 
“And we used practically to eat wood—we have no stoves, no gas, nothing. Many of the 
peasants cut trees down and the INAFOR arrived and took them prisoner because they’d 
killed a tree.”11 However, the situation for rich businessmen was different, as Rigoberta 
Menchú12 narrates: 
 
But when big businessmen come to cut, I don’t know, huge quantities of wood 
to sell, to export, of course they were free to cut five thousand, six thousand 
trees. This made our people even more conscious of their situation. We protested 
against our little plots, we wanted to grow crops on our own land but not have it 
divided up. We could not use the wood and we had nothing to sow.13  
 
The CUC was formed as a clandestine organization but, due to the demands of 
the suffering community in the altiplano, it became more prominent in May of 1978. 
Apart from Vicente Menchú, who was its foundational member, Rigoberta Menchú had 
also joined the group to demand fair wages from landowners; respect for the 
community; decent treatment as equals to the ladinos; and respect for the Indigenous 
religion, customs and culture. 
 
The following paragraph will give an account of the gruesome tortures and 
deaths of Menchú’s family members one by one. On 9 September 1979, Menchú’s 
brother, Petrocinio Menchú Tum, only sixteen years old, was kidnapped and tortured for 
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sixteen days on charges of being a member of a guerrilla army. He was burned alive in 
front of family members in Chajul. In November of the same year, there was a march on 
the capital organized for the removal of the army from El Quiche. Vicente Menchú was 
part of that march, where the group first tried to occupy the Swiss Embassy and then the 
Spanish Embassy. “The objective was to tell the whole world what was happening in 
Guatemala and inform people inside the country as well.”14 In the Spanish Embassy, an 
event took place that nobody could have foreseen: many of the protestors, including 
Vicente Menchú, were burned to death, but it is not clear who set the fire as many 
Spanish nationals were also killed in the event. The kidnapping and death of Rigoberta’s 
mother occurred in April 1980. “My mother was kidnapped. And from the very 
beginning she was raped by the town’s high-ranking army officers. And I want to say in 
advance that I have in my hands details of every step of the rape and torture suffered by 
my mother.”15  
 
Similarly, land had been snatched from Dayamani Barla’s parents, and to 
retrieve back that very land the Sahu, or moneylenders, took all the villagers’ thumb 
impressions on plain paper; what was written there, nobody knew. “Only when the land 
had been taken away, people realized what they had signed and, to take it back, my 
father had to approach the court. They had put their own name in that paper. Before in 
our village, there were no Sahu (moneylenders) people, ours was a very big village 
named Arahar in the Gumla district in the state. That person was the first Sahu who took 
away my father’s land. When we were fighting the case in the court, during the trial 
there were witnesses who had been called but nobody went. Due to the power of local 
musclemen, people were afraid and some gifts like radio, wristwatch, and alcohol had 
been offered to them to abstain from the trial process. When the verdict came, we lost 
the case. During the process to fight the case we had to sell small plots, our cattle, 
etc.”16 After that, Barla’s father had to go to another village to work in the field as an 
agricultural laborer. Her mother became a maidservant; two elder brothers had to 
venture out in the city to work. They had to leave school to work in Ranchi City. Back 
home, she says, “I and my third brother were left only. My mother used to send money. 
There was food scarcity and we used to eat fruits from the trees. After passing 8th 
standard from the village school, I came to Ranchi as well. My mother used to work in 
the household of a Punjabi family. There was the problem, how to continue the studies 
and where to live? Temporary accommodation had been arranged in the workers’ shed 
where on one side there were cattle and on the other side we were located. I know that’s 
how the family breaks up. How the children become homeless and orphan in spite of 
living parents.”17  
 
Dayamani Barla is a vociferous writer, as she started writing about the problems 
faced by tribal people due to the politico-corporate nexus and their pet project of 
“developmental works” in Jharkhand. The first confrontation was about the Keol Karo 
dam and, later, the Nagri protest. February 2, 2001, is a date etched in blood in Tapkara. 
It was the first major incident of violence in about three decades of protest against the 
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proposed Koel-Karo dam in the Torpa block of Ranchi district, Jharkhand. Police 
opened fire on around 2,000 tribal people who had gathered to protest at Tapkara 
village. Five people died on the spot and three in the hospital. This event, along with the 
Nagri protest, paved the way for the successful channelling of Barla’s inner suffering 
into activism for her people. Here it should be noted that “her people” are not only the 
Munda community but also all Indigenous Peoples who are facing injustices. She asks: 
 
Last six years are the testimony of sufferings of Jharkhandi people. Dozens have 
died in the firing. Those who are raising voices for the freedom from 
suppression are being tortured. Mass leader Mahendra Singh’s murder itself put 
a question mark on the democracy. Why the Jharkhand state has been turned into 
the privy purse of mafia cartel, capitalists and criminals? 18  
 
  Carrying forward the struggle, these days Barla is leading the protest against the 
so-called “developmental works” of the government. The regular confrontations with 
the government and corporations make the tribal people in general, and the Munda tribe 
in particular, aliens in their own homeland. The situation is more or less the same in 
Guatemala as well, as we have just seen through the history of Rigoberta Menchú. 
 
According to Dayamani Barla, “development” has displaced a major chunk of 
the population of Jharkhand from their land. The actions of the adivasis who agitate, 
struggle and resist development projects and land acquisition processes have irked the 
government and thus initiated an onslaught against the adivasis who oppose these 
projects. The adivasis are being arrested on forged cases, tried in an unjust court of law, 
and typically subsequently incarcerated. They are arrested for murder and for “Maoist 
activities” and kept in jail or harassed on a regular basis on flimsy grounds. 
 
      In Jharkhand, Barla is protesting against the forceful land grab, plundering of 
forests, damming of rivers and other such activities which are putting her Munda people 
in particular, and tribal communities in general, at the crossroads of society. She 
highlights the notoriety of so-called development projects in the area: 
 
Today Mittal Company is trying to establish them in this area in the name of 
making availability of public utilities. So, they are talking about opening of 
school, college, hospital, industrial training institutions. If these measures are 
meant to bring the tribal people in the mainstream in a selfless manner then it is 
a welcome step. But the company is talking about these developments because 
they need the land, forest and water of tribal-Indigenous people where they will 
establish their plant and industry. Where the population of million will be 
displaced from their livelihood, society, language-culture, identity including 
their ancestors’ heritage. We all know that once the tribal-peasant is uprooted 
from their forest land, then their existence vanishes simply.19  
 
Jharkhand has one of the largest mineral reserves of India, from metals to non-
metals, from coal to iron and from uranium to mica. Such a mineral-abundant state is 
still lying in neglect. There are railways and roads but these are not to serve the people; 
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rather, they are meant to transport the minerals from mines to the port or to relevant 
industries. There is electricity for the industry but not for the common people, as they 
are still living in the dark near the electricity-producing thermal power plants. There is 
coal not for the local people, but rather for the industries and thermal power plants. 
There are rivers but due to many dams, these rivers are choking and not able to maintain 
their flow, and so the adjoining flora and fauna is dying, just as important life-sustaining 
natural resources needed for the tribal people to survive are dying. In such a scenario, 
when basic life amenities are not being fulfilled at the local level because of forced land 
grabbing and the destruction of forests, the local populace has to look for other 
opportunities for survival and other support systems. Here, in Jharkhand, they have 
become open to performing odd jobs instead of peasantry or sharecropping; they have to 
migrate towards the cities near their village and most of the time they move towards a 
bigger metropolis like Kolkata or Delhi to try their luck, moved by hardships suffered 
back home.  
 
Bina Agrawal rightly said the following, when it comes to the relationship 
between Indigenous Peoples and their forests: 
 
Moreover for forest dwellers, the relationship with forests is not just functional 
or economic but also symbolic, suffused with cultural meanings and nuances, 
and woven into their songs and legends of origin. Large-scale deforestation, 
whether or not due to irrigation schemes, has eroded a whole way of living and 
thinking.20 
 
 All these conditions are forcing these poor tribal people of Jharkhand to leave 
their ancestral homes and move towards the “greener pastures” of towns and cities with 
their family, which itself is creating a particularly vulnerable situation for the females 
amongst those migrating. Similar perpetually induced subversion and oppression has 
been taking place in different parts of the world, for example in Africa and Latin 
America as well.  
 
There was a looming threat to Rigoberta Menchú’s life in Guatemala as one 
after another of her family members perished. Taking this into consideration, her 
compañeros made their way to exile in Mexico and from there to Paris. Paris was 
where, during taped interviews with Elisabeth Burgos Debray, Menchú explained all the 
aforementioned sufferings which were compiled in book form and named Me llamo 
Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia. 
 
      As Rigoberta Menchú is letting the entire world know what is happening in 
Guatemala by using Spanish language as a tool to assert herself, aside from her regular 
use of Maya-Quiché; similarly, Dayamani Barla is writing in Hindi in addition to her 
own Mundari language to make both the people of Jharkhand and those outside aware 
of the reality her people are facing. Here, I would like to highlight an observation made 
by Professor Sharmila Rege: “Can reading and teaching of Dalit autobiographies 
radicalize the perception of readers? Do readers conveniently consume these narratives 
as narratives of pain and suffering refusing to engage with the politics and theory of 
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Ambedkarism? Translator and teacher Arun Prabha Mukherjee argues that 
autobiographies are not ‘sob stories’ but stories of anger against injustice.”21 This means 
that the narratives written in these contexts are loaded with resistance to the hegemonic 
bourgeoisie that attempts to throttle the marginal discourse and toss a blanket over a 
rotten society simply to present a utopian image to the rest of the world.   
 
      The theoretical perspective of John Beverley in his monumental work 
Testimonio: On the Politics of Truth can be a possible departure point through which 
one may try to understand the testimony of Rigoberta Menchú and others. He says: 
The Spanish word testimonio translates literally as “testimony,” as in the act of 
testifying or bearing witness in a legal or religious sense. This connotation is 
important because it distinguishes testimonio from recorded participant 
narrative, as in the case of “oral history.” In oral history it is the resulting text 
that is in some sense “data.” Unlike the novel, testimonio promises by definition 
to be primarily concerned with sincerity rather than literariness. This relates 
testimonio to the generic 1960s practice of “speaking bitterness,” to use the term 
popularized in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Production of a testimonio 
generally involves the tape-recording and then the transcription and editing of an 
oral account by an interlocutor who is an intellectual, often a journalist or a 
writer.22 
In this sense, we can see that Beverley is very much concerned about the testimonio and 
its core idea, as we are familiar with how Rigoberta Menchú has used the testimonial 
mode to present her real story in a number of books. Her method of presenting her 
testimony demonstrates that: 
It is the intentionality of the narrator that is paramount. The situation of narration 
in testimonio involves an urgency to communicate, a problem of repression, 
poverty, subalternity, imprisonment, struggle for survival, implicated in the act 
of narration itself. The position of the reader of testimonio is akin to that of a 
jury member in a courtroom.23      
We can move further in our understanding of oral history with this analysis by 
Valerie Raleigh Yow: 
Oral history is the recording of personal testimony in the oral form. But what is 
the oral history? Is it the taped memoir? Is it the typewritten transcript? Is it the 
research method that involves in-depth interviewing? The term used here—such 
as in-depth interview, life history, life review, recorded memoir, etc.—implies 
that there is someone else who is also involved, frames the topic and inspires the 
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narrator to begin the act of remembering, jogs memory, and records and presents 
the narrator’s words.24 
 
      After analysing the above fragment, it is clear how oral history functions in 
general and in the context of Rigoberta Menchú in particular; her testimony is a form of 
oral history. Taking into account the tedious task carried out by Elisabeth Burgos-
Debray as the interviewer of the protagonist, compiling all answers in the written form 
to produce the output of a book is highly commendable. Here, I want to verify the 
truthfulness of oral history and compare it to written history, and explore the veracity of 
these two forms. As rightly said by Yow, oral history depends very much on the 
interviewer, for example on the agenda with which she/he is working. What exactly 
does she/he want to take out of this process? Which kind of ideology is she/he 
following? What message does she/he want to spread to the world? And who are the 
consumers of the final packaged product?   
 
       All this to say that “the narrator in testimonio, speaks for, or in the name of, a 
community or group, approximating in this way the symbolic function of the epic hero, 
without at the same time assuming the epic hero’s hierarchical and patriarchal status.”25 
The interviewer also takes the role of the protagonist, as happened in the case of 
Menchú, who struggled alongside her own family and other community members and 
now is a celebrated woman and social rights activist for her country. She funnels all of 
her oral account of her story into the book form, which nowadays we call the testimony, 
which itself is a new genre in the so-called literary world. However, this very form has 
been trivialized on a number of occasions regarding its truthfulness. American 
anthropologist David Stoll, in his book Rigoberta Menchú and the Story of All Poor 
Guatemalans, inferred that Menchú had exaggerated her narrative to gain sympathy. 
But I think she had been fighting against all odds and against false allegations in order 
to add to the cannon of resistance literature of Indigenous Peoples to attract the world’s 
attention to very real situations. Also if there are critics of Rigoberta’s testimony, there 
are conversely other intellectual supporters of her cause too, such as John Beverley, 
Lynda Marin and many more.  
 
      Likewise, many other marginal activists have emphasized the dire situation of 
the struggle of Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, among whom Domitila Chungara 
is also quite well known; she has talked about the conditions of the Bolivian mines 
through the same method of oral history in Deja me Hablar! This type of testimonial-
giving conserves the form of oral history which is, in today’s world, an endangered 
category of sorts to which the biggest threat is posed by written history, which has very 
deep roots in the colonial regime. In the Latin context, Cartas de Hernán Cortés and 
Diarios de Colón come to mind immediately. These were mediated histories and, since 
they were written by the dominant people in society at the time, the conquerors of 
Spanish America, we tend to accept them as the written literature/history of a particular 
space and time, thereby negating the oral form of history of the Indigenous Peoples of 
the same region. The passing on of history through oral narration has been practiced by 
Indigenous Peoples all over the world for thousand years.  
Valerie Yow continues: 
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Oral history reveals daily life at home and at work—the very stuff that rarely 
gets in to any kind of public record. It is through oral history that the dimensions 
of life within a community are illuminated. Oral history research thus becomes 
crucial to obtaining a picture of the total society because the viewpoints of the 
non-elite who do not leave memoirs or have biographies are presented. Oral 
history testimony is the kind of information that makes other public documents 
understandable.26 
 
     The views presented by Yow point towards a system where the downtrodden 
and the most marginalized people can have their oral accounts of histories validated. 
Any interviewer can record the statements of the protagonist and frame the questions in 
such a way so that the voices of the voiceless can be heard in the best possible way and 
the desired goal of the author can be achieved. This process is about analysing each oral 
account in conjunction with other oral accounts, where all the information provided and 
explained by the protagonist cannot be proven verifiable every time since these small 
details are not always possible to determine. Record keeping may not exist in a 
particular society, but quite possibly people remember entire incidents orally and have 
passed them on, generation after generation. Hence, oral history becomes a valid 
method to obtain information pertaining to community life and past histories, where the 
poor try to say whatever they have to say to the society at large. They are not affluent 
enough that their plight and community life can be presented in the form of memoirs 
and biographies, nevertheless their testimonies are frequently being added to the syllabi 
of various universities worldwide as they are recognized for the truth they contain. 
Hence, this point in time is an excellent opportunity for me to put forward the testimony 
of Rigoberta Menchú within this frame, as the intellectual community can go through 
the meanings and happenings of her life, her family life and her community life. Her 
testimony reveals the Mayan history, culture and civilization through an original 
inhabitant of that great civilization of Mesoamerica, not through the lens of the 
colonizers. 
 
      Edward Said is correct when he said that the discourse of Orientalism was 
created to highlight the “otherness” in society and always to subvert the unusual.27 He 
was speaking in the context of how the countries of the Global South, South-East and 
Middle East are deliberately not included in mainstream discourses and the intention is 
therefore to subvert their profound knowledge, history and cherished civilizations. The 
West considered themselves as the only saviors of humanity and so, before them and 
after them, nothing of value existed. That very dangerous notion is now taking a heavy 
toll on the whole of humanity. We see this in the animosity between various discourses, 
between religions and between sects. Similarly, I wish to argue that these writings of 
Menchú and Barla are marginal to the major discourses on the subject, however they are 
still very much in conformity with Professor Rege’s argument. “In consciously violating 
the boundaries set by bourgeois autobiography, Dalit life narratives became testimonies 
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that summoned the truth from the past; truth about the poverty and helplessness of the 
pre-Ambedkarite era as also the resistance and progress of the Ambedkarite era.”28  
 
      Walter D. Mignolo has argued that the project of Coloniality was achieved with 
the “Eurocentric” notion of dominating both historically and temporally, which was 
very much about power, structure of management, and hierarchy. All these were done in 
the name of modernity, which he considered to be a mere fiction and the rhetoric of 
salvation. Furthermore, Mignolo celebrates how Western domination is ending with the 
irony of “those who classify always forget but those who are classified never forget.”29 
This means that now the center of “Capital” and “Knowledge” is controlled by the 
colonies who were once in the hands of “white people” 500 years ago, or less. However, 
while these colonies are flexing their muscles in the international arena, at the same 
time in the hinterland of those very same colonies there exists a bipartisanship that in a 
way maintains the concept of centre and periphery, which is analysed by Angel Rama 
in The Lettered City.30 Pablo González Cassanova thus explains this concept in his 
famed article “Colonialismo Interno”: 
 
Con el triunfo mundial del capitalismo sobre los proyectos comunistas, 
socialdemócratas y de liberación nacional, la política globalizadora y neoliberal 
de las grandes empresas y los grandes complejos político-militares tiende a una 
integración de la colonización inter, intra y transnacional. Esa combinación le 
permite aumentar su dominación mundial de los mercados y los trabajadores, así 
como controlar en su favor los procesos de distribución del excedente en el 
interior de cada país, en las relaciones de un país con otro y en los flujos de las 
grandes empresas transnacionales.31  
 
Exactly the same case justifies the writings of Rigoberta Menchú and Dayamani Barla. 
Sharmila Rege says: 
 
My argument here is that Dalit life narratives are in fact testimonies, which forge 
a right to speak both for and beyond the individual and contest explicitly or 
implicitly the ‘official forgetting’ of histories of caste oppression, struggles and 
resistance. A testimonio is a narrative in book or pamphlet form, told in the first 
person by a narrator who is also the real protagonist or witness of the events he 
or she recounts and whose unit of narration is usually a ‘life’ or significant life 
experience (Beverley 1992: 92-93). In a testimonio, the intention is not one of 
literariness but of communicating the situation of a group’s oppression, 
imprisonment and struggle. The narrator claims some agency in the act of 
narrating and calls upon the readers to respond actively in judging the situation 
(94-97).32  
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These writings and their authors’ struggles are co-existent with the framework of 
testimonio, which is now very much acceptable in society because it does not demand a 
specific genre; rather, it is up to the reader to decide how she/he wants to read it. I think 
the readership has decided these testimonies deserve the respect to which they are 
entitled, as referenced in The Death of the Author by Roland Barthes.33 
 
Finally, we can say that both the women writers profiled here are iron pillars in 
their respective parts of the world. They do not need any intermediaries to explain their 
history. This has been explained earlier as well in the contexts of the Spanish and Hindi 
languages that they are using. Nevertheless, women are always active agents in 
discussions related to carefulness, which is not to be confused with docility and 
submissiveness. Referring again to the words of Bina Agrawal, “Women, especially 
those in poor rural households in India, on the one hand, are victims of environmental 
degradation in quite gender-specific ways. On the other hand, they have been active 
agents in movements of environmental protection and regeneration.”34 This explains the 
notion behind eco-feminism about which both protagonists of this paper have discussed. 
 
Joseph Stiglitz analyzed Globalization in his book Making Globalization Work, 
in which he writes: 
 
About 80 percent of the world's population lives in developing countries, 
marked by low incomes and high poverty, high unemployment and low 
education. For those countries, globalization presents both unprecedented risks 
and opportunities. Making globalization work in ways that enrich the whole 
world requires making it work for the people in those countries.35 
 
Similarly, globalization brings its own boon and bane. Policy makers should always 
keep in consideration the last person in the queue, who may belong to an ethnically, 
culturally or religiously marginal group; since our discussion revolves around the 
ethnicity and gender discourses, the activities discussed in this chapter are surely doubly 
marginalized. 
 
      Evidently, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) is one of the most significant developments in human rights. It recognizes 
that Indigenous Peoples throughout the world have the right to exist as peoples, nations, 
cultures, and societies. The UN Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on September 13, 2007. The journey to get it passed was not easy, but rather a very 
arduous one. The Haudenosaunee Chief Deskaheh was the first to go to the League of 
Nations in Geneva in 1923. He tried hard to get an audience for his voice about the 
plight of Indigenous Peoples, but it was all in vain. However, he was the first 
Indigenous leader to use an international organization to express his ideas and believed 
that this international organization would one day defend Indigenous Peoples’ rights. 
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Hence, step by step, progress was made in this regard since the 1970s and the result is 
now in front of us, presented as the UNDRIP.  
 
    Globalization has also provided a few mediums of social networking and micro 
blogging through which tribal and Indigenous activists are able to interact with others. 
A relevant example could be the interaction of Subcomandante Marcos with the people 
of Chiapas in Mexico through live radio telecasts. Likewise, I refer to Noam Chomsky, 
who wrote:  
 
The thing I consider inspiring is seeing people struggling: poor suffering people, 
with limited resources, struggling to really achieve anything. Some of them are 
very inspiring. For example, a remote very poor village in southern Colombia 
organising to try to prevent a Canadian gold-mining operation from destroying 
their water supply and the environment; meanwhile, fending off para-military 
and military violence and so on. That kind of thing which you see all over the 
world is very inspiring.36  
 
Rigoberta Menchú and Dayamani Barla are using their blogs and other 
peripheral modes of protest to sensitize those who are still not well-informed about the 
benefits of environmental protection and nature preservation. They are always in favor 
of peaceful methods to achieve their genuine and legitimate demands, because “an eye 
for an eye will make the whole world blind.” I here recall the words of Edward Said in 
an interview quoting Antonio Gramci in his Prison Notebook: “History has left us an 
infinity of traces (all kind of marks) but there is no orderly guide to it. Therefore, the 
task is to compile an inventory of the traces that history has left in us.”37 He was 
acknowledging the pain and oppression Indigenous Peoples have gone through over 
their lifetimes, however the appropriate revenge would not be to indulge in any violent 
activities. Any message or communication should be through peaceful means, using the 
same language that the outside community could comprehend easily. 
 
      Cultural homogenization is already making its presence felt, but the testimonies 
of various authors are first-hand examples of the experiences they have had, and there is 
no doubt that we cannot close our ears and eyes any longer. Therefore, the options 
available at our disposal vary from making the government of the day fully accountable 
for actions that negatively affect the lives of marginal and disadvantaged peoples, 
taming the bulldozing aspect of globalization and finally making the world sustainable, 
wherein there would be mutual cooperation between the state, market forces and civil 
society acting at the behest of a multi-actor paradigm. This would more importantly 
make this earth a holistically liveable earth. The United Nations has established the 
Human Rights Council, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and many other 
organizations and bodies which are working uninterruptedly day and night for the 
welfare of the affected. 
 
      The concept of globalization has affected the lives of many traditional dwellers 
of the planet in a more aggravated manner because of their dependence on nature. 
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Rigoberta Menchú and Dayamani Barla have admitted the same in their interviews as 
well. This awareness is now creeping into society in a very open manner, whereas it 
entered in the early 1990s in a very subtle manner. This author is not against 
globalization per se because without globalization it would be difficult to survive on the 
planet as it has already changed to adjust. However, globalization can and should be 
managed properly, with the inclusion of people affected the most, through a bottom-up 
approach, and using decentralized methods of decision making so as not to rob people 
of their lands, their forests and their water. 
 
 The debate of oral history versus written history and the testimonial form of 
writing versus other forms more prevalent in society, pushes us to think about why the 
societal structure is skewed and favorable only to the dominant sections of society. As 
we have seen in the case of Rigoberta Menchú and Dayamani Barla’s writings, these 
authors have talked about the protection of Nature and of Mother Earth. They are 
supportive of “development” in a holistic manner—without the ill effects of it—to be 
sustained by those who are dependent on land and nature. 
 
      We see that the testimonial form of writing is creating a well-recognized space 
for itself these days because, since the beginning of the recognition of the validity of 
testimony during the beginning of the 1980s, the following debate took place: Is this 
literature? As we know, literature is the mirror of a society. We can then say that 
testimony fits very much in that frame because, after all, it represents a fuller 
representation of society and does not merely refer to a fiction or a utopia. It is 
resistance literature, where the margins are re-claiming their space. Examples can be 
seen in Bolivian Domitila Chungara’s Let Me Speak or various “Dalit” writings, for 
example, those by Sharmila Rege or Kancha Ilaiah; Vivek Kumar has also expanded on 
this. 
 
      Both of the protagonists of this paper have struggled throughout their lives and 
stood for the peoples. We need to support them as they are not against “development” 
per se but only demanding that “development” be rolled out in a sustainable manner so 
that future generations will not be negatively affected as flora and fauna go extinct. The 
present generation should also have an opportunity to simply live their lives. However, 
the situation is challenging on the ground level where young people are involved; they 
have to face the wrath of the administration, of the state. These tellers of oral history 
are, through their writings, uniting people. They are also taking the help of various 
available forums to facilitate dialogues, such as through blogs, social networks and 
other online platforms. Here, we can see that globalization has been used in a positive 




Adivasi: A member of any of the aboriginal tribal peoples living in India before the 
arrival of the Aryans in the second millennium BC. 
Altiplano: The high tableland of central South America. 
                                                 




Bhuinhari and Khuntkattidari system: The Bhuinhari lands surveyed and recorded 
under the provisions of Acts of 1869 are tenures. Mundari Khuntkattidars are 
neither Raiyats nor tenure-holders. De facto, however, both these classes of tenants 
approximate to Raiyats; and, as the Bhuinhars and Mundari Khuntkattidari frequently 
hold Raiyati lands, in addition to their privileged tenancies, they are therefore regarded 
as Raiyats. All members of a Bhuinahri family and all male members of a Mundari 
Khuntkattidari family, who hold and have continuously held land in the village for 12 
years, shall be deemed to be settled Raiyats, in respect of any land which they may hold 
as Raiyats. 
Dalit: Dalit, meaning “oppressed” in Sanskrit and “broken/scattered” in Hindi/Urdu, is a 
“defiant” self-chosen political name for the members of lower castes in India. 
Finca: A ranch or large farm in a Spanish-speaking country, especially a plantation in 
tropical Spanish America. 
Ladino: From Spanish, Ladino means “sagacious, cunning, crafty.” It was originally 
“knowing Latin, Latin,” from Latin Latinus. The Spanish word has also appeared in 19th 
century American English in its senses as “vicious horse” and, in Central America, as 
“mestizo, white person.” 
Quetzal: Paper money and also a monetary unit of Guatemala, equal to 100 centavos. 
Raiyat: Someone who has acquired the right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating 
it, whether alone or by members of his family, hired servants, or partners. It also refers 
to succession rights. 
Sahu: Local moneylenders in villages, called by different nomenclature in different 







Ecology activism in the Sakha Republic: Russia's “Large -Numbered” Indigenous 






Over the past six years, I have had several opportunities to attend sessions of the 
United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in New York as a 
representative of various non-profit organizations from my homeland—the Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia).* My voluntary work was led by a desire to help participants with 
organizing their accommodations in New York, assist with transportation, and provide 
translation services to the many participants who were visiting the United States for 
their first time and amongst whom almost no one spoke English. 
 
During these years, I witnessed changes in my compatriots’ attitudes and 
expectations. First, Sakha people perceived their participation at the UNPFII sessions as 
“study tours.” Their main purpose was to gather information: learn about the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, meet Indigenous Peoples from around the 
world, and likely most importantly, to understand what place Sakha people have in the 
Indigenous world. This uncertainty among the Sakha is caused by the fact that legal 
definitions in Russia give little opportunity for self-identification.1 Under Russian 
legislation, ethnic groups are officially recognized as “Indigenous” with special 
protective status only when they are fewer than 50,000 individuals. Other native peoples 
whose populations exceed 50,000 are not considered as “Indigenous” even if they are 
within the scope of UN-accepted definitions of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, the Tatar, 
Buryat, Sakha, Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Komi and other native people of the Russian 
Federation are not formally recognized as “Indigenous” although many of them still 
preserve traditional lifestyles on their ancestral land, and have their distinct cultures, 
traditions, languages and religions. Instead, they are named by the state as “titular 
nations,” “majority in national republics,” “large-numbered,” and similar terms that do 
not offer the protective status belonging to Indigenous groups.  
 
As Poelzer and Fondahl note,2 northern Indigenous Peoples of Russia have 
greatly suffered from problems caused by Soviet assimilationist policies for decades. 
These policies negatively impacted all of Russia's ethnic groups. However, Small-
Numbered Indigenous Peoples (SNIP) were affected more severely due to their small 
population. High mortality, together with low rates of fertility, resulted in population 
loss, high homicide rates, decreased amounts of native speakers, and other social and 
economic problems that led to the deep demographic crisis among small-numbered 
northern ethnicities.3 In response to this formidable challenge, SNIP leaders united for 
political actions to protect their interests, as well as their cultural and linguistic rights. In 
                                                 
* Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is located in the north-eastern part of the Russian Federation.  
1 Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer, “Indigeneity, Land and Activism in Siberia,” Land, Indigenous People 
and Conflict, eds. Alan Tidwell and Barry Zellen (London, New York: Routledge, 2016:12).. 
2 G. Poelzer and Gail Fondahl, “Indigenous Peoples of the Russian North ,” Cultural Survival Quarterly 
21, no. 3 (1997), 30-33. 
3 Andrey Petrov, “Lost generations? Indigenous Population of the Russian North in the Po st – Soviet 




1990, the “Congress of the peoples of the North of the USSR” was created with Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s direct support.4 A few years later, when political conditions changed after 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, “Small-Numbered” Indigenous Peoples of the North, 
already being mobilized politically and already being considered as “Indigenous” under 
Russian legislation, could more readily join the Indigenous People's Movement. At the 
same time, relatively “Larger-Numbered” Indigenous Peoples, lured by different legal 
definitions, fell behind, despite the fact that they faced the same problems as Indigenous 
minorities throughout the world. These days, “large-numbered” ethnicities have become 
more aware of their rights, as they are outlined in the UN Declaration of the Rights on 
Indigenous Issues. This increased awareness is shown in various forms: 
 
1) The public movement “Indigenous women of Komi Republic” was created 
under the influence of the international Indigenous movement.5 
2) Tatar, Bashkir and Chuvash non-governmental organizations created the 
“Association of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Federation” in 2014. This 
association has the purpose of preserving and developing Indigenous Peoples’ 
lives in accordance with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) and the Constitution of the Russian Federation.6 
3) Russia’s legislation introduced the concept of “Indigenous People” in relation 
to the Sakha people by the Sakha Constitutional Court in 2016 as an attempt to 
protect Sakha people’s interests in land and nature management.7 
4) Meetings, protests, and pickets took place in Tatarstan, Bashkorostan, and 
Chuvashiya in defense of native languages8 as well as in the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) against industrial development without prior free and informed 
consent (FPIC), where people not only criticized the neglect of the interests of 
local people, but also appealed to the United Nations to influence the Russian 
government to endorse the UNDRIP.9 
5) Ms. Antonina Gavrilyeva’s speeches at the UNPFII sessions in 2016 and 
2017 included the statement that “Indigenous Sakha people face challenges from 
transnational corporations that cared only about profit and violated the rights of 
                                                 
4 Grigoriy Ledkov, “Living Arctic,” World of Indigenous Peoples, no. 31 (2015), 
http://docplayer.ru/30016279-Mir-korennyh-narodov-zhivaya.html. 
5 Olga  Kuzivanova, Korennie narody: dva podhoda, dve kontseptsii. [Кузиванова О.Ю. 2012:251., 
Коренные народы: два подхода, две концепции. Известия АлтГУ. №4-1 (76)]. 
6 Bashgolos.ru, website, http://bashgolos.ru/policy/2987-tatrskie-bashkirskie-i-chuvashkie-
obschestvennye-organizacii-obedinilis-v-associaciyu-korennyh-narodov-rf.html [Татарские, 
башкирские и чувашкие общественные организации объединились в Ассоциацию коренных 
народов РФ]. 
7Evgeniy Gunaev,  K probleme opredeleniya statusa “Korennih narodov”: pretsendent Respubliki Sakha 
(Yakutia), 2016.  [Гунаев Е.А. 2016. К проблеме определения статуса «Коренных народов»:  
прецедент Республики Саха (Якутия).  Вестник ИКИАТ. №2 (33). 
8 MariUver.ru, “V respublikah Povolzhia proshli piketi v zashitu natsionalnih yazikov,” (2012), 
https://mariuver.com/2012/12/02/pikety-nac-jaz/ [В республиках Поволжья прошли пикеты в защиту 
национальных языков] 
9 Regnum.ru, (2017), https://regnum.ru/news/society/2295707.html [ООН просят защитить коренной 






Indigenous Peoples.” She also appealed to the government of the Russian 
Federation to accept the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.10 
 
 In this article, I provide a short overview of the Indigenous movement around 
the world and in Russia. I also analyze general trends and individual examples of social 
involvement in my homeland, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), explaining the evolution 
of people's awareness, with more attention paid to little-known information on the 
Sakha people's ecological and social activism. I also emphasize the importance of 
applying the UN-recognized term “Indigenous Peoples” to all non-Russian natives 
regardless of their population size, which would allow them to better protect their rights 
according to the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
II. Overview of the Indigenous Movement Around the World and in the 
Russian Federation 
 
From the end of the 20th century, there has been a steep growth in global 
awareness of the vulnerability of Indigenous Peoples.11 , 12 Starting from that time, rights 
of Indigenous Peoples began to be considered and included in international law and in 
some court decisions.13,14 However, a strong movement for the recognition of the rights 
of Indigenous Peoples began only after the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples by the UN General Assembly in September, 2007.* Since then, 
significant success has been achieved in some countries. In February of 2008, the Prime 
Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, apologized for the past practice of forcibly 
separating Indigenous families in order to place children with white families or in 
religious/charitable facilities. Then, in June 2008, the Prime Minister of Canada, 
Stephen Harper, apologized for the abuse of Indigenous Peoples in state-funded, 
church-governed schools in Canada. The Australian Government officially endorsed the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in April 2009. In Bolivia, changes 
in their constitution granted Nature the same legal rights as people in 2009. This 
motivated new social actions in the country to protect their environment from industrial 
companies’ pollution. 
   In post-Soviet Russia, there was a rise in social activism of Indigenous Peoples 
as well. It occurred during a time of a huge change in ideology, both economic and 
political, that destroyed the communist governance system; improved relationships with 
Western countries; and instilled hope in building a truly democratic society in the post-
                                                 
10 “United Nations Mechanisms Handling Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Better Identify Strengths of 
Mandates to Increase Effectiveness, Speakers Say in Permanent Forum,” United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues (2016),  https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/hr5303.doc.htm 
11 V.AVladimir Kryazkov, “Prava korennih malochislennih narodov Rossii: Metodologiya regulirovania,” 
Gosudarstvo iI parvo, no. 1 (1997), 18-23. [Кряжнов В.А. 1997. Права коренных малочисленных 
народов России: Методология регулирования. Государство и право. 1997, #1.  c. 18-23] 
12 James D.Ford, “Indigenous Health and Climate Change,” American Journal of Public Health  102, no. 7 
(2012), 1260–1266.  
13 Siegfried Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International 
Legal Analysis,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 12m no. 58 (1999), 57-128.  
14 Peter Manus, “Sovereignty, self-determination, and environment-based cultures: the emerging voice of 
indigenous peoples in international law,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 23 (2005), 556. 
* United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples , 





Soviet Republics. The words “Glasnost” (openness) and “Perestroyka” (reconstruction) 
were not just words. People believed in change, believed that their rights would be 
protected, and believed that they could benefit from land management based on free, 
prior and informed consent. 
 
On the crest of these hopes and expectations, the Russian President’s decree “On 
urgent measures for protection of the places of residence and traditional economic 
activities of Indigenous Peoples of the North” was issued in April 1992. This decree 
outlined territories of traditional resource management occupied by Small-Numbered 
Indigenous Peoples under their lifetime ownership. They could use these territories for 
hunting, reindeer herding, fishing and for other traditional activities. In 1993, the 
Association of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far 
East of the Russian Federation (RAIPON) was established, replacing the Congress of 
the Peoples of the North of the USSR, which was created in 1990 during the First 
Congress of the Peoples of the North. The purpose of this renewed organization was to 
defend, on both federal and regional levels,* the interests of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North, Siberia and the Far East of Russia. 
 
On June 19, 1996, the federal law “On the Basis of State Regulation of the 
Socio- Economic Development in the North of the Russian Federation”** introduced the 
term “Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples” into Russian legislation, that replaced the 
Soviet term “Small-Numbered People of the North” which was used before. The law 
defined “Small-Numbered Indigenous People” as people living on their ancestral land, 
following their traditional life, recognizing themselves as independent ethnic 
communities and whose population was less than 50,000 people.15 This federal law, 
despite its significant gaps and shortcomings, created a legal basis for more 
participation of the representatives of Small-Numbered Indigenous People in the state 
goverenment and more self-governance in economic and socio-cultural spheres. Thus, 
after adoption of this law, special quotas for SNIP representatives in government bodies 
were established by the formation of electoral districts with numerically small 
populations, national settlements were formed, territories of subsistence use were been 
created, subsidies and tax benefits were granted to boost traditional activities, and other 
positive outcomes have been experienced by the Indigenous Peoples in these areas. 
There were also efforts to develop native languages in order to preserve traditions and 
customs.16 However, as the well-known Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ defender Dmitriy 
Berezhkov 17 argued, Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples' organizations were mostly 
excluded from legislative initiatives. Only the Association of Nenets people, “Yasavey” 
from the Nenets autonomous okrug (region), and Kamchatka’s regional Association of 
                                                 
* The Russian Federation has two main levels of government: the federal government and the 
governments of its 85 federated states (regions). M. Russell, “Russia’s constitutional structure. Federal in 
form, unitary in function,” In-depth analysis., European Parliamentary Research Service (2015), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/569035/EPRS_IDA(2015)569035_EN.pdf. 
** The law expired 08/22/2004. 
15 Federal Law, “On the bases of state regulation of socio-economic development of the North of the 
Russian Federation,” (1996) //Федеральный закон "Об основах государственного регулирования 
социально - экономического развития Севера Российской Федерации" от 19.06.1996 N 78-ФЗ 
(последняя редакция) (утратил силу в 2005 году). 
16 Supra note 11. 
17 Dmitry Berezhkov, “The study of the Indigenous peoples’ participation in decision making in Russia 




Indigenous Peoples, have such rights at a regional level. RAIPON—an all-Russian 
umbrella organization that represents 40 regional and ethnic organizations—could not 
get the right to participate in the Russian policy making process, despite its federal 
status and all its previous attempts to obtain such rights. Despite not being able to 
participate directly in creating new laws, RAIPON was, however, as Murashko 18 notes, 
able to make recommendations on changes and amendments, and therefore managed to 
influence three important federal laws which aim to protect the rights of Russian Small-
Numbered Indigenous People according to international law. These are: 1) “About 
guarantees of the rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of Russian Federation,” 
of 1992; 2) “About general principles of organization of the Small-Numbered 
Indigenous Peoples' communities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of Russian 
Federation,” of 2000; and 3) “About territories of traditional use of the Small-Numbered 
Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of Russian Federation,” of 
2001. 
 
   Unfortunately, as noted by many authors and as mentioned in the Release, 
published by the Council of the Russian Federation: “On the question of the relationship 
of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples with industrial companies,” the legislation 
suffered from significant contradictions and legal conflicts.19 As a result, the adoption of 
these laws did not ensure full and effective protection of the rights of Small-Numbered 
Indigenous People. Moreover, these laws are not effectively implemented.20  
 
In spite of inadequate protection, RAIPON was very active in defending rights 
on land issues and social and economic development on different levels, from the 
regional to the international. RAIPON has special consultative status with the Economic 
and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC), participates in UN working 
groups on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues as well as the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues, and participates on the Arctic Council as well as other bodies. 
International recognition doubtless helped Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the 
North, Siberia and the Far East to better defend their rights and interests. The first 
RAIPON president was Yeremey Aypin, followed by Sergey Kharyuchi; vice-
presidents were Pavel Sulyandziga and then Dmitriy Berezhkov. The current president 
is Grigory Ledkov and the current vice president is Nina Veysalova.* 
III. Social Activism in Sakha Republic 
In the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), two main trends have characterized the 
Indigenous movements at the end of the 20th century: firstly, strengthening and 
defending the rights of Small-Numbered Northern Indigenous Peoples through the 
                                                 
18 Olga Murashko, “Introduction: The International Round Table on an Indigenous Parliament?” Realities 
and Perspectives in Russia and the Circumpolar North , ed. Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen, Denmark: 
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 2005), 22-27. 
19 Sergey Kharuchi, Committee of North and Indigenous People (2009), 
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d44f243f298c2efb01.pdf. [С.Н. Харючи. 2009. Создание 
комплексной системы законодательной защиты прав коренных малочисленных народов Севера в 
Российской Федерации — необходимое условие социально-экономического развития коренных 
народов и северных территорий. Комитет Совета Федерации по делам Севера и малочисленных 
народов.] 
20 James Anaya, “Country report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples,” 





Association of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North of Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) (a member of the RAIPON’s Coordination Council) and, secondly, ecological 
activism and cultural revitalization by the “large-numbered” Sakha people. 
 
1) Political Activism of the Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North  
 
The Association of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North of the 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), which works closely with RAIPON, was created in 1989 
under the leadership of Andrey Krivoshapkin. The association represented five Small-
Numbered Indigenous Peoples of the North originally residing on the territory of the 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): Yukaghirs, Evens, Evenki, Chukchi, and Dolgans. It also 
included Russian “Old-Livers” from the Arctic zone. The Association's leaders 
managed to establish constructive cooperation with Sakha government authorities and 
institutions of civil society in the Republic. They also proposed fundamental 
provisions to protect the rights of the Indigenous Peoples of the North in the first 
Constitution of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) in 1992, which were introduced into the 
new Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993. The Association also helped 
establish conditions in the Sakha Republic, where all legal acts related to the interests of 
Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples could not be accepted without the Association’s 
direct participation and agreement.21 
 
2) Ecological Activism of the Sakha (Yakut) People (1989-2017) 
 
Before describing social activism of the Sakha (Yakut) people, it is important to 
explain its context. Our Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is very rich in natural resources. 
During my childhood, I heard many times our elders telling with bitter humor a legend 
explaining the wealth loaded in our land: “One fine time, God decided to distribute 
natural resources evenly around the Earth. He loaded a bag with minerals and treasure, 
and flew around the Earth taking handfuls of valuables from his bag and throwing them 
all around. When he got to where the Sakha Land is located, there was a frigid winter 
that unfortunately was so cold that God's hands froze. The bag slipped out of his numb 
fingers and all the treasure that was intended for the whole Earth was scattered all 
around our homeland.” Indeed, likely all the minerals from the Mendeleev periodic 
table can be found within the territory of the Sakha Republic. This claim makes our 
officials proud, but ordinary citizens are troubled. It is indicated on the Sakha 
government website that the mineral resource potential of the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) is: 82% for diamonds, 17% for gold, 61% for uranium, 82% for antimony, 
6.2% for iron ore, 40% for coal, 28% for tin, and 8% for mercury. There are significant 
reserves of rare-earth elements, including silver, lead, zinc, tungsten.22 Industrial mining 
on the territory of the Sakha Republic started in the middle of the 19 th century by the 
Trapeznikov and Sibiryakov companies, when gold was discovered in the sand along 
the River Olekma.23 With time, resource extraction only grew as well as did 
environmental problems, since tsarist and then Soviet authorities did not consider 
environmental protection as necessary or even important. As a result of an outrageously 
careless attitude toward nature, serious deterioration of the ecological situation in the 
                                                 
21 ASNIP website (2017), http://yakutiakmns.org/istoriya.  
22 Website of the Department of Mining, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), 
http://old.sakha.gov.ru/node/174966. 
23 Michael Melancon, Goldfields Massacre and the Crisis of the Late Tsarist State  (College Station, USA: 




Republic of Sakha occurred, which became the reason for the intensification of citizen 
activism. Ecological activism involved many nationalities in the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia). However, Sakha people often played a leading role as a driving force for this 
movement, particularly because the majority of the population living in the most 
polluted areas are the Sakha people. There are two waves of ecological activism in 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): 
 
a) First Wave of Social Activism 
 
In 1989, a Public Environmental Control Center was established in Yakutsk, 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). Members of this Control Center included scientists, Sakha 
intelligentsia, public ecologists, and active citizens. The Center’s purpose was to study 
and disseminate any information about ecological problems with river watersheds 
within the territory of the Sakha Republic where industrial activities were conducted. 
This scope covered the Viliuy, Amga, Adycha, Indigirka, Kolyma, Alazeya, Aldan and 
Lena rivers. Following the Center's first conferences in 1990, grassroots organizations 
to protect those rivers were created. The most active in expressing the citizens’ opinions 
were the organizations “Protect River Amga,” “Protect Rivers Adycha and Kolyma” 
and the “Viliuy Committee.”24 
 
The “Viliuy Committee” united public ecologists and residents of four Viliuy 
uluses (districts), where mining activities of the diamond mining company “Almazi 
Russia Sakha” (ALROSA)25 were being conducted. The activity of the Viliuy 
Committee was carried out in very difficult conditions—all mining activities and 
ecological problems were considered high-level state secrets and were classified. Thus, 
no one would disclose information about them. Leaders of the “Viliuy Committee” had 
to travel a lot to take part in ecological expeditions. Dissemination of the information 
they collected was also difficult, since there was no public internet yet and neither was 
there an independent media.26 People in the Viliuy region were not aware of the real 
ecological situation of the Viliuy watershed. They had, however, already noticed a sharp 
decline in water quality in the Viliuy river, which was directly related to the activities of 
diamond-mining and to the Vilyui Hydropower plant (HPP). Mining activities had 
already resulted in a deterioration in their health. When information about the 
environmental onslaught in the Viliuy Region became accessible to the public, it 
immediately stirred public opinion. 
 
We can see an increase in public attention to the environmental degradation by 
looking at a table on the amount of press publications related to ecology in the Republic 
of Sakha (Yakutia) from 1985 to 1990.27 
                                                 
24 Stepan Grigoriev, “Razvitie ekologicheskogo dvizhenia yakutii v kontse XX v ,” Nauchnie problem 
gumanitarnih issledovanii. no. 3 (2012), 19-26. [Григорьев С.А. 2012. Развитие экологического 
движения Якутии в конце ХХ в. Научные проблемы гуманитарных исследований. 2012. № 3. c. 19 -
26]. 
25 ALROSA (Almazi Russia Sakha) is the one of the leading diamond mining companies  in the world. 
ALROSA's main diamond mining source “Mir” is located within the territory of the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia), which was established in 1957, http://eng.alrosa.ru/.  
26 Sofiya Bulchukey (2015), http://sakhalife.ru/miting-yakutyane-predpochitayut-zhit-bedno-no-zdorovo/ 
[Булчукей  С. 2015. Митинг:  Якутяне предпочитают жить бедно, но здорово. Решиональная газета 
“СахаЛайф”/Отдел “Экология”] 
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In 1986, there was an article called “Let the Viliuy River water be clean” in the 
Sakha official regional newspaper Kyym, where the author, Ivan Burtsev, argued that 
the mining company YakutAlmaz drained untreated water after use for diamond 
production into the River Viliuy, which was the only source of drinking water and was 
used in daily household activities for many local people. The article had a huge 
resonance in the Vilyui ulus. Following this article’s publication, a Sakha governmental 
commission was established. The commission found that there were no treatment 
facilities at YakutAlmaz at all and that, indeed, all untreated water had been dumped 
directly into the Viliuy River over the course of many years.28 
 
Another news item related to the Viliuy region was information about 
“peaceful” underground nuclear explosions for a deep seismic sounding of the Earth's 
crust* within the territory of the Russian Federation from 1965 to 1988,29 twelve of 
which were within the territory of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).30 Two of these 
explosions (Crystal and Kraton-3) were recognized as accidental due to technological 
mistakes and resulted in long-term radioactive contamination of the 
environment.31,32,33,34 In the case of Kraton-3, which exploded in 1978, a radioactive 
plume that contained volatile radionuclides 131I, 140Ba þ 140La and the refractory 
radioisotopes 141Ce, 106Ru, 95Nb, and 95Zr, as well as 134Cs and 137Cs, passed first 
over a temporary settlement where the participants of the experiment (totaling 80 
                                                 
28 Susan Crate, “Co-option in Siberia: the case of diamonds and the Viliuy Sakha,” Polar Geography 26, 
no. 4 (418-435), 2002. 
* Deep seismic sounding of the Earth’s crust is usually conducted for oil and gas finding purposes or to 
study seismic situations in the zone. In the Viluy River area, eight explosions were planned to create a 
basin for a tailings dam for the nearby diamond mine, but after the kraton-3 explosion this plan was 
refused. Please see Nadezhda Ivantsova, “Mirniy atom pod Mirnym,” Newspaper yakutia (June 1999), 
http://42.ykt.ru//yakutia/n29136/19-65.htm [Иванцова Н. 1999. "Мирный" атом под Мирным. Теперь 
я знаю, где водятся "атомные" олени. Газета "Якутия". 19 июня 1999]. 
29 Valeriy Ramzaev et al., “Radioecological studies at the Kraton-3 underground nuclear explosion site in 
1978–2007: A Review,” Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 100, no. 12 (2009), 1092–1099. 
30 Mikhail Kaymonov et al., “radiatsionnaya bezopasnost v Yakutii – problemi i puti reshenia,” J. Nauka i 
tehnika v yakutii 2, no. 7 (2004). [Каймонов М. В, Киселев В. В., Хохолов Ю. А.; Радиационная 
Безопасность Якутии – проблемы и пути решения, Научно-популярный журнал «Наука и техника 
в Якутии», № 2(7)] 
31 Supra note 28. 
32 Supra note 32. 
33 Evdokiya Burtseva et al., “Problema kompensatsii ekologicheskogo I sotsialnogo usherba v yakutii 
vizvannogo dobichei almazov,” Regionalnaya ekonomika 40 (2009), 
http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/problema-kompensatsii-ekologicheskogo-i-sotsialnogo-uscherba-v-
yakutii-vyzvannogo-dobychey-almazov [Бурцева Е.И., Кычкин В.Р., Федоров С.П., Бурцев И.С., 
Барашков Н.А. 2009. Проблема компенсации экологического и социального ущерба в Якутии, 
вызванного добычей алмазов. Региональная экономика: теория и практика. 2009. №40.] 




people)35 were staying. Judging by the dead “red” forest located in the way of the 
radioactive plume, the radiation level in the area of about 100 hectares was 
approximately 1000 R/h.36 Then, the radioactive cloud dispersed downwind in a 
northeastern direction for several hundred kilometers, covering an area of 450,000 km. 
It passed over the town of Aykhal, and then went to the settlements located in the basin 
of the Vilyui River. Drizzling rain washed off radioactivity from the clouds into the 
contaminated area.37 The participants of the catastrophic nuclear explosion left the site 
without making any warnings to the local people.38 The secrecy was so thick that even 
the government of Sakha Republic didn’t know about the possible negative 
consequences of these “peaceful explosions.”39 Only after three years, in 1981, 
MinAtom (the Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation) returned and 
conducted the very first cleanup operation. However, the cleanup was poorly done. As 
experts from the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) discovered during their radiological 
investigations in 1990, the radionuclides were still migrating from the explosion’s pits 
into the Markha river system—a tributary of the Viliuy River.40 Only after that, after 
eleven post-catastrophic years, MinAtom officially acknowledged the accident and 
classified data became available to the public.  
Public outcry to this shocking discovery was so loud* that Russia had to find 
ways to “smooth over” the situation by promising to finance and organize ecological 
projects and programs in the Viliuy region on a percentage of diamond sale profit. In 
1993, a joint governmental and ALROSA financial corporation called SAPI (Sakha –
Almaz ProInvest) was established. The purpose of the corporation was to create 
effective mechanisms for solving socio-economic and environmental problems in the 
eight regions of the diamond province of the Republic of Sakha (four of them located 
along the River Viliuy watershed). Unfortunately, these plans failed. Despite its 
generous funding from ALROSA’s profits, the corporation didn't function effectively 
from the very beginning, and was accompanied by several scandals and fraud until it 
finally dissolved in 2001.41 SAPI didn't fully finance any of the rehabilitation 
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programs.42 Moreover, there was no finance provided at all between 1994-1995 for 
environmental protection or for liquidation of ecological damage made by ALROSA 
during its diamond mining activities, even though SAPI was created especially for this 
purpose. As a result, there were not enough actions implemented to mitigate the 
negative environmental consequences in the Viliuy region, and compensations for 
socio-economic damage to local people were released only partially.43 
 
Despite the ineffective SAPI attempt and inadequate funding, the Viliuy 
Committee continued its work to improve the environmental situation in the diamond 
province. One of the problems designated by the Viliuy Committee for special attention 
was the ecological situation of the Viliuy territories, where fragments of the stages of 
rocket carriers from the cosmodromes Baikonur, Plisetsk, and Svobodniy were 
discharged. Along with the fragments, rocket fuel containing the toxic chemical heptyl* 
was dropped, poisoning the air, soil, and water. The territories of discharge were 
officially considered “uninhabited places.” However, they were used as pastures for 
horses and cattle along with hunting and fishing grounds, and hay and berry gathering 
places. Local people were not made aware of what was literally falling out of space and 
continued their subsistence activities in this area for many years.44 In 1999, the 
Committee representatives together with the deputies of the Sakha State Assembly (Il 
Tumen) from the Vilyui region, initiated parliamentary hearings that resulted in the 
adoption of a program called “Improvement of the environmental situation in the 
diamond province for 1999-2001,” developed by the Ministry of Nature Protection of 
the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).* Giving credit to the public ecologists’ activities, 
ALROSA has now carried out environmental protection actions during diamond 
extraction, which were approved and controlled by the Ministry of Nature, Protection of 
the Sakha Republic.45 In 2007, ALROSA started rehabilitation of the territory around 
the site of the catastrophic nuclear explosion.46 The company now uses relatively 
controlled technology to undermine the rocks of kimberlitic pipes.47 As a result, the 
ecological state of the Viliuy region has stabilized to some extent.  
 
However, as Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, recently noted in her statement at the Tenth Session of 
the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2017), despite the world’s 
trend in adopting legislation recognizing the rights of Indigenous Peoples, that 
legislation, unfortunately, does not interact in any way with mining, forestry, 
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agriculture, or nature protection laws. Extractive industries, the agro-industrial complex, 
and infrastructure projects that encroach on the territory of Indigenous Peoples remain 
the main threats in the expropriation of land, forced eviction, denial of self-government 
and loss of culture and spiritual heritage.48 Thus, even in Bolivia, where Mother Earth 
was proclaimed as the center of all lives and where sustainable development goals are 
based on the Indigenous Peoples’ spiritual world view, there are severe conflicts 
between environmental discourse and ongoing mining of natural resources that create 
huge environmental damage.49 In Russia, where the extraction of natural resources is the 
basis of the very existence of the state,50 and where there is no acceptance of any 
international document on Indigenous rights,51 land-related confrontations have become 
increasingly acute. The situation is aggravated by the changes that mineral mining 
businesses achieved in resource legislation in 2014. These laws have reduced the ability 
of local authorities to control and influence policies related to “Advanced Development 
Territories” (ADTs).52 
 
During the beginning of the 21st century, ecological activism in the Sakha 
Republic gradually decreased.53 Different authors explain this phenomenon differently. 
Grigoriev argues that environmental organizations, including the Viliuy Committee, 
made a transition to non-protest activities, like concerts, celebrations of Earth Day and 
educational campaigns, because the environmental situation in the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia) had finally stabilized.54 However, Crate stresses that the setback in Viliuy 
Committee activism had coincided with the death of its main leader Petr Martinov, and 
at the same time increasing pressure from pro-diamond mining forces. Many original 
members of the Viliuy Committee left, while new members were not as interested in 
environmental activism as they were in a bureaucracy convenient to state authorities.55 
The pressure on environmentalists increased when Vyacheslav Shtyrov—a 
former head of the ALROSA company—became president of the Sakha Republic in 
2002. Shtyrov was interested in the diversification of the economy by bringing new 
investors into the extractive industries. Under his supervision, a petroleum industry was 
formed, oil-processing and gas chemical factories were planned, the construction of a 
cascade of hydroelectric power stations (Kankun HPP) in South Yakutia was planned, 
and large Russian companies like Surgutneftegaz, Norilsk Nickel, Transneft, Gazprom, 
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Rosatom and Russian Railways became more involved in the region.* These plans were 
hampered by the positions of the Sakha environmentalists and citizens, who still 
remembered the ecological disasters that happened after the construction of the Viliuy 
Hydro Power Plant in 1965-1973, when a huge area of the taiga forest including the 
villages of Tuoy-Khaya, Synsyktakh, Chokchuolu, Ust-Chon, sacred religious sites, 
fishing and hunting locations and other culturally important places, were flooded. Some 
people did not want to relocate but were forced to by police. Although relocated people 
had been promised comfortable housing, financial help and cash compensation, they 
received almost nothing. Since the channel of the Viliuy reservoir was not cleaned 
properly, and 3.5 million cubic meters of woodlands was flooded, the reservoir became 
a source of phenols and other pollution to the River Viliuy. There are also a lot of 
negative consequences in social, biological, physical, chemical, climate and other 
conditions in the Viliuy area after Viliuy HPP was created.56 
 
In the case of the Kankun HPP, a cursory overview shows that all legal 
formalities look like they were carried out. The documents to support the formation of 
Kankun HPP even included an Environmental Impact Assessment on the Timpton River 
made by the All-Russian Research Institute of Hydraulic Engineering in 2007.* 
However, as it turned out, the assessment did not contain any hydrological data nor 
forecast potential damage that could be made by climate change. Based on these 
limitations and flaws, participants in the public hearing refused to accept this 
document.57 The interests of reindeer herders were also not taken into consideration.58 
In response, the President of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) Shtyrov called 
environmentalists “American spies” and expressed his attitude towards public ecologists 
with the words “dogs bark, but the caravan is on its way,” published in state 
newspapers.59,60 The State Committee on the Elimination of Consequences of the 
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Accidental Underground Nuclear Explosions, and the Initialization of Radioactive 
Substances, which was led by the environmentalist Ivan Burtsev, was abolished.  In 
Russia overall, environmentalists criticizing Putin's administration have been classified 
as opponents of the regime.61 For example, the regional public organization in Irkutsk 
called Baykal Ecological Wave was classified as a “foreign agent” and was liquidated in 
2016.62 As a result of these conditions during the beginning of the 21st century, the 
ecological protection progress declined and started to resemble that of the Late-Soviet 
period.63 Thus, in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), despite all diamond miners’previous 
assurances, pollution of the rivers is still ongoing.64 There is no control over gold 
extraction companies either, despite the knowledge that gold washing is a dangerous 
process that also pollutes rivers.65 
 
At the same time, political pressure increased towards Small-Numbered 
Indigenous Peoples’ associations all over Russia. State authorities suspended the 
validity of RAIPON in November 2012, after three years of pressure, numerous audits 
with the Federal Security Service, unsuccessful attempts to create an alternative 
organization, and other federal efforts to diminish this important organization. 
RAIPON’s activities were approved only after the change of its leadership to a member 
of the United Russia political party and, therefore, a change in the course of the 
association.66,67 Officially, the reason for the suspension was the inadequacy of the 
RAIPON statute compared with Russian legislation. However, the organization had 
worked under its statute for over 22 years without problems. As Pavel Sulyandziga and 
Dmitriy Berezhkov argued, the real reason for the RAIPON closure is that there is an 
intensification in the industrialization of northern territories. Indigenous Peoples are the 
last barrier in the way of state and extractive companies to mine natural resources. It is 
easier for the state and extractive companies to use forceful methods towards 
Indigenous Peoples to clear their way.68,69 Sulyandziga’s stance is indirectly supported 
by the acknowledgment made in the foreword of the publication of the Federation 
Council in 2009: “Intensive industrial development of the natural resources of the 
northern territories of the Russian Federation significantly reduced territories for 
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traditional economic activities of the Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples. Rivers and 
other water reservoirs used for traditional fisheries have lost their purpose due to 
environmental problems.”70 I should also mention that the tone and the angle were 
changed in a similar Federation Council publication, but it was published later, in 2012. 
 
These days, previous RAIPON leaders and other Indigenous rights defenders are 
under heavy pressure or have been dispersed all around the world. Dmitriy Berezhkov, 
after being arrested in Russia, lives and works in Norway; Pavel Sulyandziga requested 
political asylum in the United States; Rodion Sulyandziga still lives in Russia, but his 
Moscow-based Center for Support of Indigenous Peoples of the North is practically 
blocked after being officially designated as a “foreign agent.”  
 
   Unfortunately, in the beginning of the 21st century, many norms of federal 
laws that were supposed to protect Indigenous Peoples’ rights required detailed 
elaboration; decrees and laws were therefore repealed or forgotten.71,72 The federal law 
“On the territories of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation” 
from 2001 is not implemented at the federal level yet, and none of the territories of 
traditional land use were recognized at the federal level. The changes made in federal 
laws in 2008, whereby all the hunting and fishing territories could be distributed only 
through auctions, allowed businesses to buy land for up to 49 years. This resulted in the 
loss of many traditional lands previously owned by Indigenous Peoples.73 
 
b) Second Wave of Social Activism  
 
The second wave of citizen activism in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was 
associated with the major ecological movement in 2008 that focused on protections for 
the Lena river. This movement, based entirely on volunteer labor, was carried out in an 
attempt to influence the construction of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline 
under the Lena River that would cross over the territory of the Republic of Sakha 
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(Yakutia).* According to the Greenpeace website,* the assessment of the environmental 
impact of the oil pipeline was made by a Moscow-based company that had not taken 
into consideration the harsh natural conditions of the Sakha Republic. In the assessment, 
there were no reflections on the permafrost conditions in the region, nor the extremely 
low temperature in the winter (below -50 degrees Celsius), the seismically active zones, 
or other conditions. The interests of local Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples who 
traditionally used the forest, land and water resources for survival were not considered 
either. Sakha environmentalists listed these problems in the document as “The subject 
of disagreement.” However, the state-owned and largest pipeline company in the world, 
Transneft, has ignored the document and ignored the recommendations of parliament 
hearings in the State Assembly of the Sakha Republic as well. Moreover, 
environmentalists were not admitted to the signing of the Protocol or the public hearing. 
Despite numerous violations of environmental legislation, the Federal Service for 
Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor) approved the 
“Assessment.” Regarding this matter, as Stanitskaya reported,74 environmental centers 
of the Sakha Republic and the Association of Evenki People jointly appealed to the 
Federal Court in the city of Yakutsk. The Court denied the environmentalists’ claims, 
leaving Rostekhnadzor's decision in force. The environmentalists appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the Sakha Republic, and lost again. Citizens tried to appeal to 
President Putin in an open letter* where they listed problems related to the East 
Siberian–Pacific Ocean (ES-PO) oil pipeline construction, and asked him to help them 
in the protection of the Lena River and to require Transneft to implement all 
environmental and regulatory requirements and to build an underwater passage in the 
form of a tunnel. However, the letter was ignored too. After trying all ways of restoring 
effective execution of the laws, protests were held in Yakutsk City and more than 
20,000 signatures were collected in a petition.* Nonetheless, the protests were also 
ineffective, and construction of the ES-PO was carried out without taking into account 
the opinions of the regional government bodies, citizens, and environmentalis ts. In the 
name of profit, Transneft made the underwater crossing of the Lena River using a cheap 
and fast trench method instead of the more expensive but more safe and eco-friendly 
tunnel method. As a result, the ES-PO oil-pipelines were constructed without guarantees 
of safety or without taking into account the difficult geological conditions of 
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permafrost. At least three publicly acknowledged spills into the Lena River have 
occurred since the beginning of the ES-PO operation.75  
 
   Another wave of protests called “Save the Lena River” took place in 2013. This 
time, they were against the construction of a chemical factory that was part of the bigger 
development Zarechie (TOSER – priority social and economic development area). Once 
again, planning and development of the factory that would make methanol, ceramide 
and other chemicals was done without taking into account local conditions. For 
example, it was not considered that during construction some layers of soil would be 
removed, which would cause some partial permafrost melting. This could result in 
possible landslides and accidents with major ecological consequences. The construction 
of the factory would also result in environmental pollution of the Lena River and the 
neighboring cities and towns of Yakutsk, Pavlovsk, Haptagai, Khara and Maya. It 
would also affect local people’s rights to fish, hunt and collect berries on the territory 
that would be taken and negatively affected by the factory.  
 
Since the Lena River is the main source of drinking water and fish to eat, there 
was strong resistance among locals to the plan to build a chemical factory there. People 
organized several protests with demands to stop construction of the factory. Lawmakers 
from the Republic of Sakha went to a chemical factory in the Tula region located in the 
eastern part of Russia and came to the conclusion that it was impossible to build such a 
factory on permafrost.** The citizens again wrote a letter to the President of the Russian 
Federation, Vladimir Putin. They asked him to abandon the idea of building a chemical 
factory in this location due to environmental concerns. Ecologists prepared a petition to 
the UN and UNESCO describing possible damage to the environment and demanding a 
stop to the development of Zarechie.* The same demand was voiced by Anthonina 
Gavrilieva at the 15th session of the Permanent Forum on the Indigenous Issues at the 
UN in 2016.76 Due to the massive protest movement, the people of the Sakha Republic 
were able to achieve their goal: the plan to build the chemical factory in Megino-
Khangalass area was abandoned. However, the joy of victory was short-lived. The 
factory will instead be built in the neighboring region of Irkutsk at the source of the 
Lena River.77 The danger of pollution is still very high, but there are fewer ways to 
protect the river. 
 
   Another danger recently arose before the Indigenous Peoples of the Republic: 
an attempt to remove the status of Specially Protected Natural Territory (SPNT) in the 
Nyurba region. Since the Sakha people have a relatively large population—almost 
500,000 individuals—they cannot rely on the law “About territories of traditional 
use…” and therefore cannot create a territory of traditional land use. Therefore, they 
decided to create a Specially Protected Natural Territory (SPNT) under municipal 
supervision to protect endangered animals and plants and to protect the natural habitat, 
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used for traditional activities of “Large-Numbered” Indigenous Peoples such as the 
Sakha. After a referendum, SPNT Markha was created in the Niurba region in 2016. 
The territory of the SPNT protects the Markha River from industrial development that 
might pollute the only source of drinking water in the area. The SPNT law states that 
industrial development and mining cannot take place there without prior consultations 
with, and approval by, the local people. However, the creation of this protected area was 
not agreed upon by everyone. The first vice-president of the ALROSA company, Igor 
Sobolev, appealed to the prosecutor's office about illegal seizure of a forest federal 
property. His complaint is explained by the fact that the diamond deposit Ust-
Nakynskoye is located in the territory of the SPNT, which means the existence of the 
Markha prevents diamond mining by ALROSA. Unfortunately, regional authorities 
took the side of the diamond mining company. The prosecutor of the Niurba region 
supported Sobolev's complaint, and now is planning to cancel the decision to create this 
SPNT. The head of the Niurba region, who actively defended the interests of his voters 
by speaking out against ALROSA's plans, was placed in a detention center using 
questionable reasoning.78 Permission to develop the Ust-Nakynskoye deposit in the 
SPNT Markha by ALROSA was granted in February 2017 without free, prior or 
informed consent by local residents.79 
 
The attitude and position of ALROSA toward local people is further 
demonstrated by the corporation’s reaction to recent tragic events in the Mir mine. The 
Mir mine is a kimberlitic pipe, on the top of an ancient volcano. Diamonds are 
distributed many miles down. Until 2001, diamonds were extracted from the surface by 
the “open method,” but after 2001 the mining operation went into underground 
development when miners reached the pit kimberlitic pipe through tunnels. On August 
4, 2017, a tragedy occurred: the mining area where 151 people* worked had flooded. 
According to the FedPress80 a “partial flooding” of the pumping station of the main 
water remover #2 resulted in a “sharp deterioration of mining and geological conditions 
and erosion of the enclosing rocks into the quarry” and the water had already 
disappeared. However, this information is contradicted by local news stations that 
reported on a rescued miner who spent more than 30 hours in the water. If this accident 
had occurred at 10 am on August 4, this means that even on the evening of August 5 
there was still water in the mine. This assumption is further supported by the news that 
on August 5, seven divers were recruited to inspect the flooded mine. The statement 
related to “sharp deterioration of mining and geological conditions” cannot possibly be 
accurate, since the first water breaks occurred on July 24 and July 29, 2017. Despite 
these events, the mine was not closed, nor declared to be in a state of emergency, and 
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therefore people continued to work.81 Judging by the contradictory information 
provided, it is clear that the company's management tried to hide the scale and cause of 
the tragedy. Only a few days after, ALROSA officially acknowledged that the incident 
occurred due to a water break into the mine from the open pit. 
 
  What was the cause of the water breakout? While developing the principles of 
the transition to underground development of the kimberlitic deposit, Puchkov et al. 
noted82 the need for a protective layer (ore casing) under the bottom of the quarry with a 
thickness of at least 85 meters. This protective layer would also invariably contain 
diamonds, but they could not be extracted because doing so would lead to a decrease in 
the thickness of the whole. It was known that vertical water-conducting cracks are 
formed, through which water from the bottom of the pit can penetrate into the mine and 
flood it. An expert on the matter, Fedor Goryunov, while arguing about the possible 
causes of the accident, suggested that in the pursuit of profit, a decision to mine 
diamonds in the protective layer was taken.83 This was apparently confirmed by the 
words of miners explaining the causes of the accident: “Bad technical equipment, 
disgusting technical support. They economized and tried to take all the ore from the 
quarry. It got to the point that, contrary to safety precautions, we began working off the 
horizon 210 m (directly under the bottom of the quarry). The whole bottom of the 
quarry was in cracks and compromised. As a result, the bottom fell through, and the 
water from the quarry flooded the mine.” In general, it is alleged that “all the fault lies 
in [ALROSA] greed.”84  In summary, one of the richest companies in the world, the 
diamond mining company ALROSA, had not only heavily polluted the area of its work, 
but also neglected the safety of its employees in the pursuit of profit.   
 
A logical question arises after this tragedy: will the company engage in 
expensive environmental programs in their new location in Niurba, where possible 
mining sites are located near the single source of drinking water for the local people—




Reading articles about social and environmental activism in Russia, I have 
noticed that most international observers, while acknowledging the contradiction of 
Russian legislation with the UN’s understanding of the term “Indigenous Peoples,” still 
accept and follow the Russian definition, excluding other “Large-Numbered” 
Indigenous Peoples from their analyses. Therefore, social activists and 
environmentalists who oppose industrial developers as well as defenders of the 
Indigenous rights of “Large-Numbered” Indigenous Peoples do not have significant 
support from the international community. 
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Another problem is that international observers, with few exceptions, tend to 
cover the ecological activism of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples only, or study 
ecological movements in the western part of Russia and draw conclusions from there for 
the whole territory of the Russian Federation. These attempts at unification and 
homogenization of a multinational society could be fraught with false conclusions. As 
an example, Newell and Harley claim that non-governmental environmental 
organizations working on the ecological problems in Russia do not attract broad 
participation.85 I argue that in the Sakha Republic, non-governmental environmental 
organizations have had and still have a lot of supporters despite increasing pressure 
from the State and its repressive bodies. This support is not accidental. Many years of 
industrialization and development of the northern territories, accompanied by various 
environmental contaminations, have posed serious threats to the health of the Sakha 
People and their children.86 For example, before the “peaceful underground nuclear 
explosions” in the Viliuy basin, there were never as many cases of childhood leukemia 
as developed in the 1990s.87 Nikolaeva argues that oncology cases in the Sakha 
Republic increased by 25.6% from 2001 to 2011, while in the rest of Russia, the 
increase was 1.6% during this same period of time.88 
 
To address the environmental and social problems in the Viliuy region of the 
Sakha Republic, a comprehensive approach which combined public demands, scientific 
research, and regional government decrees was adopted at the end of 20 th century. 
Unfortunately, that approach did not fully work. Although all these measures 
contributed to a reduction in the discharge of dirty industrial water into rivers, the 
ecological and social situation in the Viliuy region remains tense. The ecological status 
of the region has not been determined, the Viliuy Environmental Fund has practically 
disintegrated, no activities have been taken to eliminate the negative consequences of 
pollution, and socio-economic damage has been reimbursed only partially.89 Recent 
opposition to state plans related to ES-PO have also not lived up to expectations, and the 
ES-PO crossing of the Lena River was built by means of a cheaper, but more dangerous 
trench method. The environmental activists, despite all public and republic authorities’ 
support, were also not able to effectively counteract the plans for building a gas 
chemical plant on the banks of the Lena River. These days, there is further direct threat 
of deprivation of the Specially Protected Status of the Marka territory in favor of 
diamond mining by ALROSA. 
 
Why are the people of Sakha, despite their republic status, not able to effectively 
protect their rights to a healthy life and clean ecology, stipulated by the Constitutions of 
Russia and the Sakha Republic? What factors are needed to be present in order to 
effectively protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and to protect nature—the crux of 
their livelihoods and their lives?  
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As Crate argues, the key components in resolving environmental issues in 
Russia are: 1) a strong urban base; 2) a knowledge of and ability to take advantage of 
existing legislation; 3) local leadership; and 4) international contact.90 
 
In recent environmental activism in the Sakha Republic, all points listed by 
Crate were present. The leaders of the movement, while living both in the village and in 
the city, had a strong urban base and an effective mechanism of influence through all 
kind of local media. Protests took place all around the Sakha Republic, attracting a large 
number of supporters. The most recent confrontation between environmentalists and 
ALROSA, concerning the Territory with Special Protective Status Markha, reached the 
international level when Sakha representative Antonina Gavrilyeva addressed this 
problem at the UNPFII session in 2017. She also appealed to the Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, these appeals have unfortunately has not 
yet resulted in a much-needed international- level review. There have been no positive 
results, as unprecedented pressure on the people trying to protect the Markha territory 
has only increased. There is no feedback from the Expert Mechanism representatives, so 
the Sakha defenders can only guess what to do next.  
 
I think that the explanation for the environmental movement’s failures in the 
Sakha Republic—despite the existence of their republic status, the public’s broad 
involvement, and support at many regional levels—has various reasons beyond those 
already known: 1) laws are not effectively implement in Russia; 2) corruption is 
rampant; and also 3) people try to solve urgent problems that are consequences of larger 
more systemic problems, rather than tackling the root causes themselves. The root of the 
problem lies in the fact that Indigenous Peoples are not the rightful custodians of their 
ancestral lands, and that they are excluded from land management decisions and from 
control over mining companies. In order to better protect the environment, the rights of 
Indigenous Peoples must be respected and protected. The most effective instrument for 
protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples is the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. It shows the direction and goals that states and people have to 
move towards.  
 
Currently, Russia’s Indigenous Peoples (“small” and “large”) keep trying to 
create civil society. Thus, Komi women, who are not officially recognized as Small-
Numbered Indigenous Peoples (population: 256,500 individuals) organized “Indigenous 
Women of the Komi Republic” with the purpose of protecting the Komi language; 
supporting and raising the status of rural women; and assisting in the formation and 
development of local self-governance, among other goals.91 The association of Buryat 
society (population: approximately 450,000 individuals) was founded in 2016.92 
Environmental organizations in Russia have started to unite to defend nature and to 
defend Indigenous Peoples’ rights. As Antonina Gavrileva, Sakha representative at the 
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UNPFII session in 2017, told me during our discussion: “I really want justice in our 
world. I think that our only hope and salvation is the ratification of the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Indigenous rights and duties are intertwined. It is 
peoples' right to live on their ancestral land, and it is their duty to protect and preserve 
that land. Indigenous Peoples must have a prerogative in decision-making process about 
developing their territories and using natural resources. If they do not want it, then it 
should not be. This is their right!” 
 
Overall, social activism of “Large-Numbered” Indigenous Peoples, which has 
risen in many aspects on the crest of the ecological protests, now may be transforming 
into wider civic activism. Thus, non-governmental organizations of the Sakha, Tatar, 
Bashkir, Chuvash and Buryat people recently appealed to the Russian government to 
endorse the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
 
The cooperation between Russia’s “Large-Numbered’ Indigenous Peoples’ 
NGOs and other defenders of Indigenous rights needs a new approach and further 
development. I have witnessed success of the resisters against gabbro-dolerite mining 
from the deposit Billyah, which was located on land traditionally used for fishing, 
hunting, and berry gathering. The mining attempts stopped after the mining company 
receiving an answer to a letter sent by local Evenki and Sakha communities to the 
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva in 2012.  
 
   The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the international Indigenous 
community, academia, and Indigenous rights defenders should support all Indigenous 
Peoples in Russia (including those who are “large-numbered”) in better defending their 
rights by involving them in the work of different international committees, reports, 









    Abstract 
 
This essay takes possible constraints, experienced by Euro-Western readers, in 
understanding Indigenous articulations as a point of departure. It is argued that the 
limitations experienced when interacting across cultures are productive since they limn 
and contour the limits of knowledge and challenge Euro-Western hegemonies. When 
working across languages, the impossibility of transferring meaning from one culture to 
the next is called untranslatability. Taking the literary works of Native American 
Renaissance writer Leslie Marmon Silko as an example, the critical scholarship on her 
oeuvre is taken one step further by connecting it with the seminal discussion on 
untranslatability currently being led in Comparative Literature. The main goal is to 
establish untranslatable narrative notions as an analytical object for reading literature 
across cultures. It is posited that narrative expressions can remain culturally specific and 
unappropriable when untranslatable. To read for untranslatability and to highlight it 
therewith means to stress the singularity of cultures. Their uniqueness continues to exist 
even when cultural artefacts circulate as world literature on a global literary market. To 
show the validity of the main idea on the productiveness of untranslatability, a close 
reading of Silko’s novels Ceremony and Almanac of the Dead will show how the 




Whoever enters the keywords “American Indians” or “Native Americans” on 
Google Images' search tool will inevitably encounter a multitude of images that depict 
noble men with feather headdresses, possibly on horses, or pretty women in flattering 
leather clothing. These images have little in common with the reality of American 
Indians. However, they have an important effect: they represent American Indians as 
peoples that belong to another era and who are a remainder of the past. This 
representation is so resoundingly successful that Euro-Western ignorance about the 
distinct social, political, and cultural differences of Indigenous Peoples prevail, although 
there are worldwide more than 370 million Indigenous persons, with 567 legally 
recognized tribes in the USA alone. How can this unawareness of cultural differences be 
alleviated when encounters with unfamiliar forms of social or cultural expression point 
towards the inadequacy of Euro-Western traditions of thinking and imaging? In this 
essay, this question is given a new and original twist. It is argued that it is precisely the 
encounter with untranslatable notions that can eventually provoke important insights, 
for instance by limning and contouring the limits of one's own knowledge. This entails 
non-knowledge no longer being seen as a failure, but rather as an indicator for the 
presence of untranslatable notions that can be discerned. It is proposed that reading 
fictional works of the Native American Renaissance writer Leslie Marmon Silko can 
give rise to encounters with untranslatable notions which this author initiates through 
form and style. 
 
Focusing on the repercussions of geopolitically specific, but globally 
circulating, literature by the American Indian author Silko, this essay connects questions 




autonomy as expressed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP).1 While the UNDRIP is first and foremost a legal and political 
instrument that helps to redress and prevent historical, political, and social injustices and 
human rights violations, it is also a declaration which highlights, strengthens, and 
supports Indigenous knowledge systems and forms of artistic expressions. When literary 
texts of Indigenous writers like Leslie Marmon Silko show that Indigenous knowledges 
are present within society and do matter, they trouble Euro-Western hegemony, oppose 
homogenizing globalization processes and display a liberatory vision by showing 
Indigenous persistence, resilience and creativity. Leslie Marmon Silko thereby puts into 
practice what the UNDRIP aims to achieve in legal terms. The presence of disturbing 
elements in the novels of Silko, herself of Pueblo Laguna and German ancestry, reminds 
readers of the survivance of American Indian nations in general and of their distinct 
story-telling traditions in particular. Untranslatable notions overturn what the 
Anishinaabe writer and scholar Gerard Vizenor has called “the static reduction of native 
identities.”2 For this re-signification of indigeneity, literary discourse is a powerful tool. 
The novels of Indigenous Peoples in general and of Leslie Marmon Silko in particular 
are traversing the global and, as such, claim an undeniable presence of Indigenous 
knowledge in the world.  
 
II. A Broader View of Untranslatability 
 
The Dictionary of Untranslatables refers to the concept of untranslatability as an 
indicator of the inherent dangers associated with sense-making.3 Sense-making is the 
ongoing and fragile process of transferring meaning, which is complicated when 
working across languages and cultures where it is constantly threatened with the loss of 
meaning and coherence. However, in the act of reading fiction, readers are asked to 
make sense not only of the meaning of the words but also of “the use of vocabulary, 
syntax, semantics, characters, narration, and plot—the whole configuration of the 
fictional text’s chronotopical world.”4 Just as with certain untranslatable words, these 
are areas in which the attempt at sense-making can fail and where narrative construction 
can create an instance of untranslatability. Lawrence Venuti, however, sees value in 
untranslatables as useful tools for remembering and challenging the legacy of colonial 
and ethnocentric violence upon which Euro-Western literature was founded.5 He argues 
that although translations are seen as successful when they allow the reader to forget 
that they are reading a translation rather than the original work, this leads translators to 
produce accessible and easily understood works, reinforcing the economy of violence 
through the erasure of any cultural difference or concept that is not easily understood by 
the target culture. Venuti asserts that a translation that centers on the cultural difference 
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United Nations Document A/RES/61/295 (October 2007).  
2 Gerard Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance  (Lincoln, USA: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1989), 142. 
3  Barbara Cassins, Emily Apter, and Jacques Lezra, Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical 
Lexicon (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2014), passim. 
4 Doro Wiese, The Powers of the False. Reading, Writing, Thinking Beyond Truth and Fiction  (Evanston, 
USA: Northwestern University Press, 2014), 6. 
5 Lawrence Venuti, The Translator’s Invisibility: A History of Translation (New York, USA: Routledge, 
1995), passim; Lawrence Venuti, The Scandals of Translation. Towards an Ethics of Difference  (London, 
United Kingdom: Routledge, 1998), passim; The Translation Studies Readers, ed. Lawrence Venuti, 




of the original can challenge the economy of violence6 and can remind readers of the 
heterogeneity of discourses by admitting that the translation is a translation.7 Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, in “The Politics of Translation,” posits that if translators do not 
focus on making the words and concepts in a translation fit neatly into the hegemonic 
discourse of the target culture, translations allow for “the experience of contained 
alterity in an unknown language spoken in a different cultural milieu.”8 In this way, 
untranslatables can be cross-cultural points of encounter. 
 
I would further argue that certain crucial information is hidden or distorted by 
Leslie Marmon Silko—herself of Laguna Pueblo and German ancestry—in her novels, 
leading to certain significant textual meaning being available only to those who have 
cultural familiarity with the relevant Indigenous belief systems and practices, such as 
certain oral traditions. The novel can then evoke distinct reactions depending on the 
reader’s ability or inability to access the hidden components of the narrative. Readers, 
particularly Euro-Western, non-Indigenous ones who cannot access the narrative 
elements that are not made available to them, are nonetheless aware that there is 
something there that remains inexplicable. In this way, readers are confronted with the 
experience of untranslatability, an experience which can destabilize and de-center Euro-
Western, privileged forms of knowledge production and transmission. In contrast, 
readers who have a background and experience with the Indigenous worldviews used in 
Silko’s work may be able to gain access to those elements of the narrative strategically 
left unwritten by being able to fill in the missing pieces based on contextual and cultural 
knowledge. By further examining these narrative elements, it becomes possible to 
recognize them and the forms of untranslatability they may create.  
 
The use of untranslatability within narrative structure and storytelling is 
especially important given the current debates regarding ideas of difference, specifically 
within the field of world literature. Emily Apter makes the point that the field of world 
literature must be made aware of the ways that it can play into the marketing of 
differences. In various texts, as well as in her latest piece, Against World Literature, she 
warns against “zoom[ing] over the speed bumps of untranslatability to cover ground.”9 
Untranslatability can be a form of resistance against the appropriative tendency of the 
world literature field since, as Apter argues, the language-specific element of any sort of 
meaning is lost when the text is translated or taken out of its original context. Apter 
posits that untranslatable words or concepts are a clearer instance of the approximating 
nature of sense-making. Sense-making is always translation and therefore always 
approximate, since any use of language to convey knowledge, whether that is 
philosophical, literary, or cultural knowledge, gives only the illusion of creating a 
general understanding capable of being free from contextual and linguistic specificity. 
The ideas put forth by Apter regarding untranslatability form part of a dynamic debate 
within the field of comparative literature and the problematics involved in the 
relationships with power. As many in the field are aware, the use of the broad category 
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of world literature is an example of this power relationship, since, although it creates the 
illusion that the field is free from a history and practice of Eurocentrism, in reality the 
field still centers on Euro-Western literature and analysis. The first compilations of 
world literature were published at the end of the Second World War and focused on 
European and Judeo-Christian works. This focus, unsurprising given that most of the 
authors and scholars were of European origin, has changed in subsequent years when it 
became more common to teach comparative literature in the United States.10  
 
Currently, as a consequence of multicultural and postcolonial analysis and 
critiques, the texts selected for publication in world literature anthologies are much less 
focused on European and settler-colonial texts. However, the field is still apprehensive 
of the dangers pointed out by Erich Auerbach in his famous essay “Philology and 
Weltliteratur,” in which homogenization is posited as a possible downfall for world 
literature. In his idea of homogenization, globalization has created “a single literary 
culture, only a few literary languages and perhaps even a single literary language.”11 
The idea of untranslatability is important precisely because the untranslatable resists 
appropriation into such a homogenized literary language and instead highlights cultural 
differences. 
 
Following from Auerbach’s notion of the danger of homogenization through 
globalization, I suggest that attention must also be paid to narrative forms and tropes, 
which are also potential points of resistance to narrative structures in Euro-Western 
literary tradition. Varied narrative and storytelling structures broaden ideas about 
literature and what it means to be literary, and can be as much a consequence and 
signifier of situatedness of different worldviews and cultural specificity as can be words 
and concepts. Including narrative forms and tropes within the realm of the 
untranslatable seems to align with the aims of the Dictionary of Untranslatables to 
create a “political theory of community,” surpassing “the limits of discrete national 
languages and traditions.”12 Creating space for perspectives that cannot be goes beyond 
the scope and bounds of language. According to this theory, untranslatables make the 
audience conscious of uncontainable differences, both in linguistic and cultural terms, 
and highlight the possibility of forming bonds through these differences and beyond the 
ideas of nation-states, in which non-hegemonic difference cannot be erased, reduced, 
appropriated, or controlled.  
 
Narrative forms are varied and possess an untranslatable quality. For readers 
unfamiliar with a specific narrative form, this can accentuate the puzzle created by the 
text. For example, the narrative form used by Silko is vital to how readers experience 
her work. Her use of untranslatable narrative forms highlights the cultural traditions and 
advancements of American Indians, while simultaneously respecting the need to 
maintain certain knowledge as untranslatable to a Euro-Western audience. Silko's work 
expands upon the democratic project tied up with untranslatability without falling into 
exoticization or what Anishinabe writer and scholar Gerard Vizenor refers to as 
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“portraitures of dominance.”13 Silko makes use of the untranslatable and makes it clear 
in her writing that American Indians form part of present day life, and while they have 
experiences, traditions, worldviews and knowledge that resist translation, and therefore 
appropriation, they are nevertheless present within the canon of North American 
literature. A closer reading of Ceremony and Almanac of the Dead by Leslie Marmon 
Silko illustrates how the use of storytelling narratives rooted in oral traditions can cause 
a sense of disorientation for Euro-Western readers.14 The untranslatability of 
worldscapes that do not privilege self-evident Euro-Western linguistic and conceptual 
frameworks can simultaneously allow for the construction of Indigenous histories, 
which can circulate within the centered, hegemonic spaces, creating alternative 
worldscapes. These worldscapes make distinct Indigenous storytelling traditions visible, 
and thereby “manifest, practice, develop and teach” what the UNDRIP wants to protect 
and maintain.15 
 
III. Obscured Meanings in Silko’s Ceremony  
 
 In 1996, Leslie Marmon Silko's Ceremony was identified as one of the four most 
important publications in modern American literature by members of the Modern 
Language Association and has received widespread critical acclaim and a worldwide 
readership.16 Kenneth M. Roemer writes in “Silko’s Arroyos as Mainstream” that the 
novel was able to connect with a wider spectrum of readers due to certain key global 
developments taking place simultaneously. The civil rights’ and women’s movements 
sparked greater dialogue on issues of social justice, a focus that reached the academy, 
especially in certain fields such as literary studies. In the 1970s, for example, there was 
much more criticism in the academy about what was considered to be part of the canon 
and there was an increasing openness to examine works from new or previously 
excluded writers. Such well-known publications as the Library Journal, The Choice, 
Newsweek and The New York Times Book Review spoke highly of Ceremony upon its 
release.17 Perhaps this is because the novel manages to draw both from elements 
familiar within Euro-Western narrative forms, such as the Bildungsroman, and those 
from Laguna Pueblo and Navajo oral traditions and characters, in a way that created 
enough of a departure from the Eurocentric style to be interesting for Euro-Western 
readers while still allowing them to feel they could identify with the narrative style.18 At 
the same time, its narrative about the traumatized war veteran also resonated with 
contemporary concerns about the effects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder on Vietnam 
veterans. While 15.2% of returning Vietnam veterans were diagnosed with mental 
health issues, the same statistic for minorities was much higher. This is perhaps due to 
the trauma of various layers of racism and additional barriers to being able to re-enter 
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civil society. As these forms of discrimination are key themes in the narrative of 
Ceremony, the book became all the more relevant at the time of its 1977 publication.  
 
Ceremony distinctly manages to blend its use of traditional Indigenous 
storytelling tropes and archetypal characters within Euro-Western narrative forms such 
as the Bildungsroman. Despite this, as scholar, professor and writer Paula Gunn Allen 
remarks, it is very difficult to discuss Ceremony with most students in the classroom. 
The novel contains stories from the Laguna Pueblo tradition that are considered inside 
knowledge of the Laguna Pueblo people that are not to be transmitted to broader 
audiences. Rather than explaining aspects of Laguna Pueblo culture and spirituality to 
her students who might exoticize the latter, Gunn Allen focuses instead on the narrative 
form. In this way, she can deflect the appropriative and exotifying curiosity of many of 
her students, who are “voraciously interested in the exotic aspects of Indian ways—they 
usually mean by that traditional spiritual practices, understandings and beliefs... At 
every least opportunity, they vigorously wrest the discussion from theme, symbol, 
structure and plot to questions of ‘medicine,’ sacred language, rituals, and spiritual 
customs.”19 She recognizes that those not coming from an Indigenous Navajo and 
Laguna Pueblo cultural heritage may treat these traditions, stories, and spiritualities “as 
though they were simply curios, artifacts, fetishes ... objects of interest and 
patronization” rather than powerful ways of conceiving the world.20 David L. Moore 
responds to these concerns in “Rough Knowledge and Radical Understanding: Sacred 
Silence in American Indian Literatures,” arguing that these are different perspectives on 
the practice of storytelling and that while Allen focuses her analysis on cultural 
ownership and issues of appropriation in content, Silko emphasizes, especially in her 
discussion of mythopoetics, the importance of the practice of storytelling and challenges 
the idea of a static content, context, or use of traditional stories, arguing that they are 
constantly in flux.21 It is possible to connect these two arguments through the discussion 
of untranslatability. Gunn Allen is perhaps being particularly cautious of invasive and 
exotifying portrayals or discussions of Laguna Pueblo culture by non-Laguna people, 
which could come as a consequence of Silko’s use of Laguna Pueblo mythology. But a 
close reading of Ceremony reveals that this may obscure a very strategic exposure of 
Indigenous myths and knowledge that deliberately form a carefully constructed yet 
incomplete picture. The story of Tayo offers an example. Tayo, a mixed-blood member 
of the Pueblo community, returns to his reservation after fighting abroad in World War 
II. He finds himself suffering from an unknown sickness that leads to constant vomiting 
and is plagued by unrelenting images of war and a feeling of unresolved grief that 
causes his family to seek the help of the medicine man, or traditional healer, named Old 
Ku’oosh. There are three important elements in the interaction between Tayo and O ld 
Ku’oosh: first, we see Old Ku’oosh speaking to Tayo in “the old dialect,” Western 
Keres, which is “full of sentences that were involuted with explanations of their own 
origins, as if nothing the old man said were his own but all had been said before and he 
was only to repeat it.”22 Second, Old Ku’oosh describes a place that “people said back 
in the old days they took the scalps and threw them down there. Tayo knew what the old 
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man had come for.”23 And finally, Old Ku’oosh speaks about the interconnected, 
interdependent nature of the world: 
  
It took a long time to explain the fragility and intricacy because no word exists 
alone, and the reason for choosing each word had to be explained with a story 
about why it must be said this certain way. That was the responsibility that went 
with being human, old Ku’oosh said, the story behind each word must be told so 
there could be no mistake in the meaning of what had been said; and this 
demanded great patience and love. More than an hour went by before Ku’oosh 
asked him.24  
 
In this way, Silko is able to convey the feeling of experiencing an encounter with 
traditional wisdom, and some of its core ideas, without revealing traditional knowledge 
that is not meant to be shared. Since she does not write in Western Keres, which carries 
age-old meaning intrinsically in its form, and she does not reveal the place spoken about 
by Old Ku’oosh, which may have been a sacred ritual site, and she does not explain the 
ways in which everything in the world is interconnected, as Old Ku’oosh did for Tayo, 
she does not make this knowledge available to readers. By doing this, it is clear that 
there are knowledges and practices that can and have been passed on, but in this 
context, the knowledges and practices themselves are not revealed, which creates 
certain strategic gaps in the narrative whose content is only available to readers who 
have the Indigenous knowledge necessary to fill them in. In this way, Silko centers 
Indigenous forms of knowledge and experience and allows for a greater understanding 
to be available to those who can fill in the blank spaces, namely those of the Laguna 
Pueblo people. This was done quite purposefully. Roemer tells us of the time that Silko, 
in a Flagstaff seminar in 1977, stated that a thirty-page version of her novel Ceremony 
could be understood by a Laguna Pueblo reader: “brief references to particular family 
names and veterans and to specific events in Laguna, Grants, and Gallup, New Mexico, 
would open up networks of stories, memories, and meanings.”25 Roemer also recalls 
that Silko went on to say that readers not of Pueblo Laguna cultural origin faced a 
knowledge gulf “wide enough to swallow hundreds and hundreds of pages.”26 The gaps 
created in the text, containing that undisclosed knowledge unavailable to those unable to 
decode its specificity, is vast and remains hidden within the text. While some might say 
that Silko could be seen as satisfying the curiosity of readers eager to glean the 
knowledge of the American Indian experience, often in the fetishizing and exoticizing 
way described by Gunn Allen, I posit that Silko is instead highlighting the boundaries of 
which knowledge can and cannot be shared outside the Laguna Pueblo communities for 
her Euro-Western readers. These instances of withheld knowledge in the text are 
visceral markers indicating that there is something there that remains hidden and 
unavailable to readers who do not have the Laguna Pueblo cultural knowledge, and 
these markers operate to demarcate a difference between the characters and author, and 
the reader. The limitation to textual access emphasizes the need to retain certain 
knowledge in order to safeguard it from the appropriation, exoticization and devaluation 
of the cultural production of Indigenous Peoples by European and Euro-Western 
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culture. Silko’s textual strategies are thereby in line with the UNDRIP, as the 
Declaration also stresses that Indigenous Peoples have a right “to maintain, protect, and 
have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites” in order to safeguard what is 
sacred from (cultural and economic) appropriation.27 
 
Even though specific knowledge remains hidden and only indicated textually, 
Silko does share some of the core ideas and consequences of this knowledge with her 
readers. Her description of how Tayo experiences this knowledge illustrates its healing 
potential, even in the face of massive global warfare and destruction. Through 
storytelling, she is showing how Indigenous knowledge is highly valuable and crucial. 
Tayo, for example, recovers from his suffering after a ceremony is conducted in which 
his connection to the human and non-human world around him is revealed to him and 
he comes to understand that not only does his welfare depend on these connections, but 
also that all of these other elements suffer when he is not well. With this understanding, 
he is then able to pass on the knowledge that he gains through this ceremony to the 
elders of his nation, meaning he not only receives knowledge but also contributes to it. 
Once again, we see here how information is withheld from readers who do not have 
access to the Laguna Pueblo traditions, since the reader does not know what the 
ceremony entails nor what specific knowledge is gained from it. But it is possible to 
understand how the act of sharing secret knowledge is yet another form of creating and 
strengthening community, something that occurs within the varied community 
memberships to which any reader of the novel may belong.  
 
Finally, for Silko, untranslatability is used as a way to create simultaneous but 
distinct experiences for different readers in a way that challenges hegemonies based on 
Euro-Western centricity. Readers who are familiar with Laguna Pueblo storytelling and 
culture are invited to use this knowledge to become active participants in filling in the 
missing elements of the text through these traditions. For other readers, these gaps are a 
way to indicate the value of this hidden traditional knowledge, which not only 
highlights the value of traditional knowledge but makes the lack of knowledge evident 
to Euro-Western readers unfamiliar with these Indigenous languages, histories, sites, 
and mythologies. In this way, the use of this specific form of narrative structure creates 
differentiated accesses to Indigenous knowledge as a key element in a new practice of 
reading, which uses the narrative form to delineate the boundaries of Euro- and Euro-
Western-centric knowledge. The use of untranslatability can create spaces in which 
Indigenous knowledge is valued, and brought into the center, without appropriating it. 
This practice also helps to break down the binary between center and margin by 
showing the untranslatable as part of the cultural hegemony rather than only existing in 
the periphery. Indigenous story telling is shown to traverse the center as it points to the 
presence of an untranslatable and uncontainable difference in its midst.  
 
IV. Almanac of the Dead and the End of the Death-Eye Dog  
 
    Almanac of the Dead, a multi-generational epic chronology, spins a web of 
interconnecting stories that unfold over the course of the 500-year history of 
colonization in the US-American Southwest and Mexico. The storyline of Silko’s novel 
creates a complex and multi-layered analysis of internal colonialism in this region. 
While some of the seventy or so characters fit neatly into the archetypes of good or evil, 
                                                 




other characters are portrayed in a more nuanced and dynamic manner, trying to find 
their way as they struggle with complex moral dilemmas in the face of situations of 
precarity, homelessness, and loss. Among her characters can be found corrupt 
government officials and corporate businessmen, Mafiosos, drug lords and addicts, 
clandestine arms dealers, human traffickers, environmental activists and a television 
psychic. Most characters remain underdeveloped, having defined roles that rely heavily 
on archetypes. This form of character portrayal can be seen as an attempt to fight the 
use of the novel as a medium for bourgeois ambitions, social longings and legitimations. 
Silko uses character set-up, of central concern to narratology, to weaken the discursive 
genre of the novel. This has strong ideological effects since it compromises the 
powerful link between the Euro-Western bourgeoisie and novel writing. The novel 
traditionally depicts bourgeois social authority, energy and experience through the 
portrayal of the bourgeoisie’s ability to make history and to take over space, as Edward 
Said has claimed.28 Silko, however, centers the focus on social conditions and their 
limitations, and uses temporality to show that current socioeconomic conditions and 
forms of exploitation and inequality are inseparable from the colonial past. She 
delineates a five-hundred-year time period between the present day and the colonization 
of the Americas which she calls “the reign of the Death-Eye Dog.” She uses a non-
linear concept of time, portraying the storylines as interwoven strands, just as her 
narrative switches voices, storylines, and temporal settings to emphasize these 
connections and to challenge the division between past and present. The non-linear 
concept of time is one of the central untranslatable elements in the Almanac of the 
Dead. This clashes with Euro-Western ideas of linear time and the idea that individual 
subjectivity is something that is acted on, but separate from, its geographic, 
environmental, and temporal location.  
 
Almanac of the Dead, like Ceremony, draws on the American Indian oral 
tradition. The characters, as in mythology, are used as archetypes to teach about life, 
and to display certain characteristics and their consequences. Mythical characters—
often gods, animals, or heroic or villainous creatures—teach lessons about moral and 
ethical behavior or society and encourage heroic deeds. Here the lesson is how to resist 
and end the reign of the Death-Eye Dog. However, Silko defies archetypical ideas of a 
hero—there is no single hero taking action, but rather there is a process and a collection 
of intertwined characters that she uses to illustrate and criticize social conditions. For 
example, she writes about the post-colonization period of the Death-Eye Dog, when 
“human beings, especially the alien invaders, would become obsessed with hungers and 
impulses commonly seen in wild dogs,”29 and would be “attracted to and excited by 
death and the sight of blood and suffering.”30 The “alien invaders” are, of course, the 
European colonizers, whose identity is that of the destroyers and who are opposed by 
those who have the vision to recognize the power of resistance. 
 
A “Five Hundred Year Map” is found at the beginning of Almanac of the Dead, 
to help readers navigate the vast scope of the text and the various intertwined storylines 
spread out over the centuries. The storylines are laid out in dotted lines and characters 
are identified according to location. It is important to note that this map acknowledges 
the land as being populated (in contrast to the “settler discourse”), and includes 
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Indigenous resistance in its depiction of the American Southwest. According to the 
legend, the map lays out “the future of all the Americas” through “the decipherment of 
ancient tribal texts.” Despite this, parts of the Almanac presented in the text remain 
difficult to decipher. In the novel, the Almanac is described as being incomplete, with 
sections of it having been lost over the course of the centuries as the Almanac’s 
caretakers fled from the Spanish invasion. However, the remaining text, decoded by the 
drug addicted psychic Lecha was also difficult to understand. Lecha’s visionary 
capabilities are considerably crippled, impacting her deciphering activity, which 
remains unreliable and partial. The map’s legend also mentions that historical events are 
indicated by “arcane symbols and old narratives,” a claim that should be interpreted as 
irony. Once again, Silko is purposefully hiding certain parts of the sacred texts and 
prophecies. Even the “symbols and old narratives” are incomplete and untranslatable, 
being so far outside their context and frames of reference.31  
 
The character Lecha illustrates how Silko employs specific literary conventions 
to allow space for the untranslatable in which historically marginalized Indigenous 
knowledges are centered and gaps in Euro-Western knowledge and understanding are 
revealed. Lecha, like all characters in Almanac of the Dead, is influenced by the spirit of 
an age that considerably limits her possibilities of action. Lecha, and her twin sister Zeta 
who is an arms dealer, have received part of the ancient almanac from their 
grandmother Yoeme. But in addition to being entrusted with the almanac, Lecha also 
has visions, albeit visions that are bleak and full of death: “They are all dead. The only 
ones you [i.e. Lecha herself] can locate are dead. Murder victims and suicides. You 
can’t locate the living. If you find them, they will be dead. Those who have lost their 
loved ones only come to you to confirm their sorrow.”32 Lecha has no control over the 
content of her visions, however disturbing they may be, and although she is able to 
communicate with, and speak for, the dead, her role as a constant witness to death 
causes her to become weaker. As this becomes too much to bear, Lecha takes to using 
Demerol to dull the destructive and tragic visions, the pain of her gift of clairvoyance 
and the burden of the almanac. She must resist the allure of her visions if she is to avoid 
becoming a destroyer, those who “delight in blood” and “energies released by 
destruction.”33 
 
Almanac of the Dead also acknowledges the histories of those who had been 
able to foresee the arrival of the destroyers. However, we know about them only 
through what remains in the oral tradition of the collective consciousness. As the 
character Clinton points out, “African and other tribal people had shared food and 
wealth in common for thousands of years before the white man Marx came along and 
stole their ideas for his ‘communes’ and collective farms.”34 Though Marxism is 
regarded critically in the novel, there is a longing expressed for other ways of living 
collectively with special value being placed on the cooperative organization of 
Indigenous societies. David A. Moore puts forth the idea of “communitism” as the core 
ethical motive presented in Almanac of the Dead. This sort of communitism does not 
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involve a vanguard or individual heroism, but rather a constant consciousness of the 
profound connection and interdependency of all beings together with the earth and 
nature. As he explains, “[t]he earth is worth protecting, and humans are part of the 
earth”35; this extensive interconnection of all life is vital. While the characters in 
Almanac of the Dead may come across as one-dimensional and lacking development, 
this has been a choice to privilege the special and temporal interconnectedness that 
illustrates the consistent presence of Indigenous worldviews and asks non-Indigenous 
readers to engage with these spiritual ideas even though they may seem quite 
unfamiliar. In this way, untranslatability may give readers the chance to form a distinct 
relationship with ideas presented in the novel, such as the profound interconnectedness 
with the world, rather than simply identifying with a character. When readers can 
identify with these concepts, the novel can serve as a semiotic device evoking “words, 
phrases, and gestures of human solidarity”36 that are crucial for realizing the rights of 
Indigenous individuals and collectives that are formulated in the UNDRIP. It evokes 
recognition and respect for “indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices” 
that contribute, as the UNDRIP makes clear, “to sustainable and equitable development 
and proper management of the environment.”37  
 
The final climax of Almanac of the Dead poises the world on the verge of an 
epic battle between the destroyers and their opponents, when Lecha and Zeta, the prison 
activist Barefoot Hopi, the revolutionary La Escapia, and the drug dealer Mosca, come 
together during the International Holistic Healer Convention in Tucson. The outcome of 
this final confrontation is not made clear because the actions of the destroyers and their 
opponents counterbalance each other. Silko uses “alternating currents of irony and 
crackpot occultism, pity and disgust, common sense and messianic vision” in her 
narration to pull readers in “only to tip them off balance, the purpose being not to make 
them identify but to make them think.”38 She uses her narrative threads to share her 
vision of the strands of connection woven through time, space, beings, and with the land 
and environment, and she involves readers in the desire to see the end of the reign of 
Death Eye Dog and his seven brothers. To perch readers on the verge of this final 
showdown and to infect them with hope of a better world is, I would argue, the ultimate 
aim of the novel. It is perfectly clear that this aim can only be reached when Indigenous 
knowledges, worldviews, and ways of life are safeguarded, respected, welcomed, and 
recognized, as asked by the UNDRIP. 
 
V. Conclusion: Centering the Margin 
 
   I have used the examples of two novels by Leslie Marmon Silko to look at the role of 
making knowledge or meaning unavailable in order to create multiple and parallel 
narratives that exist simultaneously within the same text, as a purposeful aspect of 
untranslatability.  Silko uses this tactic to create a moment of encounter and illustration 
of the existence, power, resistance and importance of Indigenous culture and 
knowledges, without making them available to the Euro-Western reader or providing an 
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easy roadmap to navigate that which is hidden in the text. This exposes the 
untranslatable elements to the reader without handing them the keys to decipher them, 
creating an experience where reading becomes an act of encounter with selective access 
to meaning. Within Euro-Western narrative traditions, this may be seen as a failure of 
narrative clarity; however, I argue instead that it is a means of encouraging critical 
reflection on different forms and availability of knowledge, which ultimately decenters 
Euro-Western forms of knowledge and worldviews. I see Silko using these “speed 
bumps of untranslatability”39 to incite this reflection in an attempt to spark 
understanding for, and appreciation of, Indigenous worldviews, and the knowledges and 
healing potential that are present in these forms of knowing and being. Untranslatability 
is therefore an important tool for maintaining the rights of Indigenous Peoples to be 
“equal to all other peoples” while promoting recognition that all peoples are different, 
and all peoples have the right “to consider themselves different, and to be respected as 
such,” as stated in the Annex of the UNDRIP.40 
 
Silko’s novels have been translated into many languages and she has a 
readership that spans the continents. Her novels have brought ideas of Indigenous 
culture and vision to a very broad audience. However, by carefully keeping critical 
knowledge hidden from the reader, she protects this knowledge from being appropriated 
or overtaken in ways historically common to the European or Euro-Western culture of 
consumption, while simultaneously challenging readers to be open to non-Western 
forms of knowledge and narration. Silko's work illustrates James Clifford’s ideas of 
globalization, in that they are “the multidirectional, unrepresentable sum of material and 
cultural relationships linking places and people, distant and nearby” and can be 
important tools for weaving more nuanced and varied “cultural relationships.”41 These 
cultural relationships are formed when encountering the untranslatable found within a 
familiar framework, such as the novel, where space is created for readers to examine 
their own relationships with the untranslatable and with difference. This offers a means 
to engage with ideas of breaking the margin-center binary and decentering the 
historically centered worldview as an act of democracy.42  
 
In conclusion, I argue that following from the “political theory of 
untranslatability” as put forth in the Dictionary of Untranslatables,43 it is also possible 
to assert that unassimilable and untranslatable forms of expression which can contribute 
to the world of ideas also include narrative forms and tropes. Untranslatability, as a 
political concept, can be seen in relation to how acknowledging Indigenous Peoples and 
their distinct worldviews and knowledge impacts on the Euro-Western-centered 
historical narrative. On one hand, because of their own particular sovereignty and rights 
with regard to autonomy and laws, and their relationship with national borders crossing 
their lands, Indigenous Peoples question the prioritization and legitimacy of the nation-
state. Simultaneously, their very presence and survival contradicts the narrative of 
conquest, and in particular the narrative of the “discovery” of (supposedly uninhabited 
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or unclaimed) lands by Europeans. The continuous presence, survival, and resistance of 
Indigenous populations also contradict the narrative that colonization happened in the 
past and is not part of an ongoing process. The ongoing appropriation of Indigenous 
lands and the concurrent human rights violations, as well as both acute and institutional 
racism toward Indigenous communities, are sadly still a contemporary global issue. 
Their resistance and fight for sovereignty makes Indigenous Peoples’ humanity hard to 
ignore, and in this way, it fights against the tendency to push them into a state of 
alterity. Jody Byrd writes in The Transits of Empire about the ways that Indigenous 
Peoples are written off as “past tense presences,” in order to accomplish the 
“derealization of the Other.”44 Through the visibility and presence of Indigenous 
Peoples, their cultures, and their knowledge, the vulnerability of the narrative of 
colonization is exposed. Judith Butler asserts that since a hegemonic construction relies 
on repetition of its own narrative in order to maintain is hegemonic position, it is 
therefore at risk should its own discursive assertions be challenged, contradicted, or 
reinterpreted.45 As the colonial state relies on the idea of the “Other” to assert its 
identity, this “Other” becomes a point of vulnerability when it has its own narrative and 
its own voice and agency.  
 
Language and literature can be useful tools in challenging the centralization of 
the discourse of the colonial settler state. Telling stories of the lived experiences of 
Indigenous Peoples, in past and present, not only speaks to the oral traditions of 
American Indian nations, but honors their survivance as an intrinsic act of resistance. 
The untranslatable elements of narratives can recognize the fallacy of the narrative in 
which American Indians are relegated to a distant, and therefore distanced, past.46 Leslie 
Marmon Silko and other Indigenous writers, through the visibility and broad reach of 
their writing, challenge the ideas of otherness and the colonial narrative, and 
simultaneously challenge ideas of margin and center. In Leslie Marmon Silko’s novels, 
for example, we see that Indigenous lives, culture, knowledge and worldviews do not 
exist outside society, but rather exist inside, informing and influencing and, potentially, 
healing it. Not only do they exist, but they matter, and they bring important knowledge, 
resistance, connection, and creativity that has the potential to challenge global processes 
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